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INTRODUCTION

The word "Enron" has become a shorthand reference for corporate
wrongdoing in the first years of the twenty-first century. Aside from the
dizzying heights from which it fell, Enron was notable for the intricacy of
the misbehavior in which it engaged. "'Every other white-collar case in
history is arithmetic,"' commented one investigator, while "'Enron is
calculus.' 1 The company created elaborate organizational structures, often
with multiple layers of control, that were intended to use legal form to
disguise economic substance.
Such manipulation of form obviously required the services of many
lawyers. Transactional lawyers in particular have expertise in fashioning
elaborate permutations of form that the law will honor, even if the result is
not entirely congruent with underlying economic substance. 2
It is
reasonable therefore to assume that lawyers' fingerprints were on Enron's
arrangements perhaps more than in any other recent corporate scandal.
Enron thus would seem to have especially valuable potential as an
instructive case study for lawyers and law students. In particular, it
promises to offer insights into the kinds of judgments that transactional
lawyers must make-a group largely neglected in ethics rules and whose

1. Jeffrey Toobin, End Run at Enron, The New Yorker, Oct. 27, 2003, at 48, 50.
2. A "triangular" merger, for instance, is an arrangement in which an acquiring
company creates a new subsidiary to which it transfers its assets in return for all of the
subsidiary's stock. The boards and shareholders of the subsidiary and the acquired company
then approve the merger of the two entities, thereby avoiding what otherwise would be the
requirement that the merger be approved by the original acquiring company's shareholders.
Similarly, corporate subsidiaries may be substantively controlled by a parent company, but
still treated formally as separate entities for certain purposes. A "synthetic lease" enables a
company to sell and then lease back its assets, continue to operate exactly as before, but
remove the debt associated with those assets from its books. The list is limited only by the
imaginations of corporate lawyers and business professionals.
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Much of the
activities generally are shielded from public view.
commentary on Enron's attorneys has focused on whether these lawyers
violated ethical rules or other legal provisions, and on how the law
conduct might be strengthened to prevent future
governing attorney
3
transgressions.
This commentary generally has been thoughtful and valuable as far as it
goes. The application of legal rules, however, is triggered by the existence
of certain facts-and the perception that these facts exist is the result of a
complicated process. As Geoffrey Hazard has observed, "The difficult
ethical problem . . . is not ... what the rule says but whether the factual
conditions have arisen that call the rule into operation." 4 This suggests that
we may gain particularly rich insights into the complexity of ethical
judgment by trying to understand circumstances as lawyers themselves may
have seen them. Proposed transactions do not come labeled as problematic
and intricate legal structures are rarely obviously fraudulent. Those
characterizations are conclusions that are the product of a complex process
of perception that organizes information in particular ways, based on factors
such as situational cues and personal predilections. Behaving ethically
requires cultivating powers of perception that are sensitive to and recognize
events that carry ethical significance.
Gaining an appreciation of the circumstances in which a given set of
lawyers operated can be difficult, because it requires access to details about
the texture of practice that often are unavailable. In the case of Enron,
however, the bankruptcy court appointed an Examiner to review many of
Enron's transactions for the purposes of determining what assets might be
recovered by the company's estate and whether Enron might have causes of
action against any individuals or entities. 5 In response, over the course of
more than a year, the Examiner provided an extensive multivolume analysis
of certain major transactions and the conduct of the people who helped
create and implement them. Of particular interest, the Examiner's final
report contains an appendix that discusses possible causes of action that

3. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC,
103 Colum. L. Rev. 1293 (2003); Roger C. Cramton, Enron and the CorporateLawyer: A
Primer on Legal and Ethical Issues, 58 Bus. Law. 143 (2002); Michael F. Fox, To Tell or
Not to Tell: Legal Ethics and Disclosure After Enron, 2002 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 867;
Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers? The Corporate Counselor After Enron, 35
Conn. L. Rev. 1185 (2003); Susan P. Koniak, Corporate Fraud: See, Lawyers, 26 Harv. J.
L. & Pub. Pol'y 195 (2003); Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D. Paton, Lawyers, Ethics, and

Enron, 8 Stan. J. L. Bus. & Fin. 9 (2002).
4. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Personal Values and Professional Ethics, 40 Clev. St. L.

Rev. 133, 139 (1992). For an excellent discussion of the crucial role of discerning facts in
ethical judgment, see Robert Rubinson, Attorney Fact-Finding, Ethical Decision-Making
and the Methodology of Law, 45 St. Louis U. L.J. 1185 (2001).

5. First Interim Report of Neal Batson, Court-Appointed Examiner, at 9-10, In re
Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2002), available at
First
[hereinafter
http://www.enron.com/corp/por/pdfs/InterimReport1ofExaminer.pdf
Batson Report].
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Enron might have against its inside and outside legal counsel, along with
potential defenses to these claims.
The Examiner's reports constitute one of the most detailed accounts
available of the activities of transactional lawyers as they worked on
matters that later were deemed fraudulent, in some cases criminally so. The
aim of this Article is not to evaluate the case for these attorneys' liability.
That would require even more facts to which I do not have access. Rather,
the goal is to try to imagine the world as these lawyers may have seen it at
the time the events unfolded. What influences shaped their perception of
what was occurring? To what situational cues were they sensitive or blind,
and why? How might they have interpreted information that in retrospect
seems incriminating? What precisely does it mean, in other words, to say
that Enron's lawyers "blessed, ' 6 "sign[ed] off' on, 7 or "approved ' 8 the
company's transactions? Are these conclusions consistent with how the
flow of events unfolded?
Ideally, addressing these questions will shed light on broader issues.
When are circumstances likely to suggest that an ethical question has
arisen? What kinds of factors enhance or obscure the ability to recognize
this? What rationalizations tend to be available in what circumstances that
provide reassurance that nothing is amiss?
What follows is a discussion of several transactions that the Examiner
analyzed for the Enron bankruptcy court. These represent only a portion of
the many transactions that the Examiner analyzed, but constitute a large
number of the transactions with respect to which he focused on the conduct
of attorneys. In most of these cases, the Examiner found that Enron's
lawyers potentially could be liable to the company under various causes of
action. In some instances, the Examiner did not find potential liability.
These transactions are included in my discussion, however, because they
can be used to explore certain ethical issues that can arise in transactional
practice.
The Examiner sometimes provides enough detail that it is possible to
construct a tentative description of how things may have unfolded as they
did. In these instances, the deals have particular pedagogical value by
providing an opportunity to identify and discuss why lawyers did not
recognize potential warning signs. In other cases, the details are sparser.
These transactions are most useful as the basis for posing questions based
either on the actual events or hypothetical variations on them. Finally,
some deals afford an opportunity both to suggest possible explanations for
behavior as well as to generate questions for discussion.
I should be especially clear on one point: I do not regard explanation
necessarily as justification. Understanding why lawyers may have acted or
failed to act is different from concluding that their conduct was blameless.
6. Koniak, supra note 3, at 196.
7. Id. at 197.

8. Id.
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The aim of explanation in this context is to make lawyers and law students
more sensitive to the process of exercising judgment in ambiguous
situations in which wrongdoing is not apparent on its face. Appreciating
how specific events may reflect tendencies in organizing information, as
well as subconscious methods for avoiding confrontation with unpleasant
facts, will ideally produce more sophisticated ethical discernment and
deliberation. By shedding some light on the psychological and
organizational influences on attorney conduct, it also may allow us to craft
9
more sensitive responses to unethical behavior.
Working through the transactions requires some patience. I provide
diagrams in many cases in an effort to clarify specifically how deals were
structured and what roles attorneys played in that process. I believe that
taking the time to understand these matters will make clear that compelling
human stories often lurk just beneath the surface of complex organizational
structures and cutting-edge financial instruments.
Undoubtedly, instructors more imaginative than I will be able to use the
Enron matters that I describe to yield even more insights than I suggest
here. Whatever the pedagogical approach that it prompts, the Examiner's
account of lawyers' behavior in these matters provides a sense of the texture
and dynamics of practice that can be used to deepen our understanding of
the milieu in which transactional lawyers work and must make ethical
judgments.
I. ENRON

As background to the discussion of Enron's attorneys and some of the
matters on which they worked, this part focuses on what concerns were of
particular significance to Enron's business strategy and what kind of culture
the company fostered to respond to them. What business pressures did
Enron face, how did it attempt to address them, and what effects did this
have on organizational culture? How did that culture in turn shape the
business opportunities and risks that Enron executives perceived?
Enron began as a gas pipeline company in the days when natural gas
prices were federally regulated. Gas producers explored for gas and
pumped it out of fields, then sold it to pipelines at prices set by the federal
government. The pipelines then sold gas to local utilities, also at
government-regulated rates. Natural gas thus was a relatively sleepy
industry, with minimal competition and no market pricing.1 0
By the mid-1980s, the government had deregulated the prices that natural
gas producers could charge, and had encouraged pipelines to make their
lines available to all gas companies. As a result, local utilities could buy
gas directly from producers and then pay pipelines simply for transporting
9. One work that emphasizes the importance of this approach with respect to lawyers in
general, and Enron's lawyers in particular, is Mark A. Sargent, Lawyers in the Moral Maze,
49 Viii. L. Rev. 867 (2004).
10. Loren Fox, Enron: The Rise and Fall 10 (2003).
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the gas. Pipeline companies therefore had to develop separate businesses
for gas transportation and gas sales."I
Deregulation resulted in much more volatile gas prices for both
producers and utilities. Enron tried to hedge this volatility by providing
forward contracts to deliver gas to users at specified prices on future dates.
This gave natural gas users a measure of predictability by allowing them to
lock in maximum prices for the gas they needed to purchase. In these
transactions, Enron acted not only as a broker, but actually took possession
of gas in order to meet its contractual obligations to deliver it. Enron
therefore had to hedge its own risk that it might have to acquire gas to meet
its commitments at prices higher than the prices it would be receiving under
its contracts with utilities. It did so by entering into contracts with gas
producers that set the maximum prices that Enron would have to pay. 12
Enron therefore had to transform itself from a relatively stable company
in a regulated industry to an entity that was able to engage in complex
estimates of future prices in a volatile natural gas market. In order to do so,
it began hiring people with expertise in finance, mathematical modeling,
and hedging-employees whose skills and outlook often differed sharply
from Enron's traditional workforce of persons who were familiar with the
natural gas industry.
The cultural shift at Enron was accelerated when Jeff Skilling arrived in
1990 to become Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") of Enron Finance. 13 As a
consultant at McKinsey & Company, Skilling had advised Enron on how it
might reposition itself to take advantage of opportunities in the new
deregulated environment. As CEO of Enron Finance, he began moving the
company away from reliance on physical assets such as pipelines toward an
emphasis on holding financial assets-from a gas pipeline company to
14
something more akin to an investment bank.
Under Skilling's prodding, Enron eventually began trading not only gas,
but the contracts to buy and sell gas at certain prices. These contracts
essentially were derivatives-financial instruments whose prices were
based on the underlying price of gas. Most were customized contracts,
unregulated by exchanges. Enron sought to use derivatives to lock in
maximum and minimum prices, and to seek out profits that came from
exploiting the spread between the two. This "freed Enron from having to
own assets involved in the production and transportation of natural gas. In
theory, instead of owning a portfolio of assets-natural-gas reserves and
pipelines-Enron could simply own a portfolio of contracts that would
allow it to control the resources it needed.' 15

11. Id. at 13.
12. Id. at 31.
13. Bethany McLean & Peter Elkind, The Smartest Guys in the Room: The Amazing

Rise and Scandalous Fall of Enron 35 (2003).
14. Id. at 33.

15. Id. at37.
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A crucial step in the transformation of Enron was obtaining permission
from the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") to use mark-tomarket accounting treatment to establish the value of Enron's gas trading
contracts. 16 Traditionally, the assets that these contracts represented were
carried on the books at historical cost, even if market conditions resulted in
increases or decreases in the prices at which they would trade. A company
could not recognize the gain from appreciation in the value of such an asset
until it actually sold it-until then the gain was only a theoretical possibility
on paper.
A different accounting treatment, however, was used by businesses such
as the trading units of investment banks, whose assets consist almost
entirely of financial instruments that constantly fluctuate in value. These
companies are permitted to adjust the value of their assets to reflect current
market prices, even if they do not engage in the actual sale or purchase of
the assets at those prices. Such an approach ostensibly provides a better
picture of the actual financial condition of the company than reliance on the
historical cost at which its assets have been acquired.
Ideally, the mark-to-market process is relatively accurate because
valuations are based on actual prices in robust trading markets. For
contracts based on price movements over a long period, however, or
contracts involving assets in thinly traded markets, such price information is
either of limited use or unavailable. In these cases, mark-to-market
valuation requires the use of mathematical models to predict fluctuations in
the price of underlying assets, and thus the anticipated long-term income
from various contracts.
Skilling believed that the logic behind mark-to-market accounting
applied to Enron's gas contract trading activity-that this treatment
provided a better indication of the actual economic value of the company's
trading unit. In June of 1991, Enron therefore requested that the SEC
permit it to use this accounting approach for its natural gas contracts. In
January of 1992 the SEC agreed. Enron ultimately expanded the use of
mark-to-market accounting to every portion of its merchant investment
business, including profits of private equity and venture capital
investments. 17 By 2000, some thirty-five percent of Enron's assets received
mark-to-market treatment. 18
One particularly notable feature of mark-to-market accounting is what it
permits with respect to booking revenues from long-term contracts. Under
conventional accounting, a company recognizes revenues as they are
received and calculates profits accordingly. Thus, for instance, if Enron had
a ten-year contract to supply natural gas to a utility, it would record the
revenues that it received from that contract as the utility made payments
over the ten-year period. Under mark-to-market accounting, by contrast,
16. Id. at 41.
17. Id. at 127.
18. Id.
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Enron could book the present value of the estimated revenues, and calculate
the anticipated profits, for the entire ten-year period immediately when the
contract was signed. Any changes in natural gas prices that affected those
figures would show up as additional income or losses in later periods.
Thus, if Enron expected $200 million in income over the course of a tenyear contract, it could recognize the present value of that income on its
financial statements as soon as it entered into the contract.
Enron sought to use its natural gas contracts market model as the basis
for expansion into trading of other items, such as oil, electricity, timber,
broadband, and water. 19 By 1999, Enron Wholesale Business, the trading
arm of Enron, accounted for sixty-six percent of 1999 income before
interest and taxes. At that point, top management at the company regarded
20
trading, deal making, and risk management as Enron's core activities.
This transformation led to an increased emphasis on hiring persons with
abstract financial and analytical skills that could be applied to any type of
business operation. 2 1 Ideally, anything could be turned into a commodity
that could be traded in a market. As people like Skilling saw it, Enron's
business was identifying these commodities, creating a market for them if
need be through its own trading activity, and hedging the risks of the
market for itself and others. Skilling felt that traditional capital investment
in hard assets such as factories and pipelines no longer were the key to good
returns. Instead, it was versatile intellectual firepower that maximized
22
performance.
As a result, Enron became an increasingly young, well-compensated
culture. By 1999, the average gas pipeline employee had been at Enron for
sixteen years, while the average capital trading employee had been there for
three to four years. Furthermore, Enron's value system began to "divid[e]
the world into those who 'got it' and those who didn't.' '23 Traders and
dealmakers were in the first category, and traditional pipeline personnel
were in the second. 24 This dichotomy extended beyond the company as
well. "Outsiders who came into regular contact with Skilling hungered to
be included on the list of those who got it. This was especially true of Wall
Streeters, who pride themselves on their smarts." 25 Enron was able when
necessary to exploit this pride. As one major investor recounted,
If you asked a question that [Skilling] didn't want to answer, he would
dump a ton of data on you. But he didn't answer. If you were brave and
said you still didn't get it, he would turn on you. "Well, it's so obvious,"

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Fox, supra note 10, at 88.
Id.
See id. at 79-83.
McLean & Elkind, supra note 13, at 110.
Id. at 233.
Id.
Id.
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he'd say. "How can you not get it?" So
the analysts and investors would
26
pretend to get it even when they didn't.
Whatever sense of arrogance traders and deal makers had based on their
perceived intellectual superiority was reinforced by their sense of mission.
They saw themselves as injecting meritocratic market principles into sleepy
industries that for too long had been insulated from the bracing rigor of the
market. This was consistent with the animating business spirit of the 1990s,
which proclaimed that innovative high-tech companies were rewriting the
book for business success. As a result, "[b]ecause the traders thought they
were creating a new world, they looked upon existing rules not as
guidelines to be respected but as mere conventions to be gotten around in
27
whatever creative fashion they could devise."
As various markets matured, the entry of other companies tended to
erode Enron's competitive advantage and profit margins. The company
therefore constantly needed to be on the lookout for opportunities in new
markets-where it could enjoy the benefits of being the first entrant at least
for awhile. This placed a premium within Enron on creativity and
competition among employees to find the next big business idea.
This culture was reinforced by something called the Performance Review
Committee ("PRC") process--or, more colloquially, "Rank and Yank."
The PRC consisted of managers from various business units who met every
six months in order to conduct personnel evaluations. Each employee was
compared against all other employees in the same business unit on a bell
curve in a "forced ranking." 28 This ranking was the basis for one's bonus,
which could come to more than a million dollars for some high achievers.
More ominously, employees who were ranked in the bottom ten to twenty
percent were given six months to improve their ranking by the next PRC
review. If they did not, they were fired. As one observer notes,
"Inevitably, because of the bell-curve aspect of PRC reviews, internal
competition became a part of life at Enron." 29 Managers felt that this was
the best way to emphasize the importance of constantly striving for new
ideas and never resting on one's laurels.
This system, however, sometimes fostered competition within business
units that affected how the company functioned. Originators, for instance,
negotiated long-term deals to provide commodities such as natural gas,
while traders executed the buy and sell orders that made sure that Enron had
the commodities available to meet its obligations. Traders were in charge
of calculating "forward price curves," or estimates of the prices at which the
commodity would sell in, say, years seven to ten of a ten-year contract.
Originators complained that traders adjusted these projections to favor their
short-term trading profits at the expense of the longer-term deal. Traders

26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. (quoting an unnamed investor).
Id. at 216.
Fox, supra note 10, at 84.
Id.
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resented the fact that, as they saw it, originators received a windfall at
bonus time from mark-to-market accounting simply by getting a customer
to sign a contract without assuming responsibility to ensure that Enron was
able to perform profitably under it. This infighting "made it more difficult
for originators to sign long-term contracts. As a consequence, less business
came from long-term contracts and the company had to rely even more on
30
the shorter-term trading operation for profits."
Enron also sought to promote innovation by fostering an entrepreneurial
ethos among employees that focused on temporary teams who worked on
constantly changing projects, rather than persons who fit into specific
positions within an explicit organizational structure. Enron, according to
Skilling, was "like a free market of people." 3 1 Job assignments could
change month to month. Projects were like self-contained jobs; "[o]nce a
project was over, it was up to the employee to find work elsewhere within
the company." 32 Furthermore, in parts of the company, "managers told
employees that it would hurt their chances of advancement if they stayed
too long on one project. ' 33 The company started, folded, and reorganized
businesses constantly. It spent more than $6 million a year on relocating
offices and cubicles. 34 As one former executive put it, "'The best way to
35
describe Enron was as a constant job search.'
The development of Enron OnLine ("EOL"), the company's profitable
online trading operation, reflected the operation of this entrepreneurial
culture. Louise Kitchen, the leader of the project, never obtained approval
for it from Skilling or CEO and Chairman Kenneth Lay. She assembled a
team of 350 people by going directly to employees she wanted, not to their
bosses. 3 6 Some managers did not even know their employees were working
on the project. 37 It was not until a month before the launch of the trading
program, when versions of it had already been introduced in several
3
European countries, that project leaders even informed Skilling about it. 8
Thus, in keeping with Enron's culture, "even though they were about to
spend millions getting EOL off the ground, chew up people's time, and plot
to radically change Enron's business model, the coconspirators felt no need
39
to seek approval from Skilling or [CEO and Chairman Kenneth] Lay."
In short, Enron hired smart, ambitious people, granted them autonomy,
set them loose in a competitive environment, and then ranked their
performances. Skilling sought to position Enron as a dot-coin with a new

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 85.
Id. at 89.
Id. at 88.
Id. at 89.
McLean & Elkind, supra note 13, at 120.
Id.
Id. at 222.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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business culture of constant change and a flat organizational structure. 40
"Employees who didn't add to profits or at least provide a strategic function
were deemed expendable ... ."41 This resulted in a stressful workplace that
had the potential to emphasize the short-term. Originators and traders did
not worry about whether the mark-to-market value of deals changed three
or four years hence. By then they might be in a different business group
and any erosion in the value of their deal would not affect their current PRC
42
ranking.
Understanding the milieu in which Enron's lawyers operated also
requires appreciating the company's distinctive business challenges.
Enron's role as a market maker, and the company's own predictions to the
investment community about its continued growth, required it continually
to find and create new markets that enabled it to enjoy first-mover profits
from trading and financing activities. Enron needed large amounts of cash
43
in order to do this. Even though Skilling aspired to an "asset light"
strategy in which Enron divested itself of most physical assets, creating new
markets often initially required the acquisition or construction of hard assets
in order to learn about a business, and then build trading and finance
activities around it.44 Thus, for instance, Enron needed cash to acquire
assets such as a public utility in Oregon, 45 timberland in Maine, paper mills
in New Jersey and Quebec, 46 and fiber optic cable in various parts of the
country. 47 It also built massive power projects in places like India 48 and
pipelines in South America. 49 The idea was to leverage these assets in
50
order to "build up a complementary financial business."
The problem was that Enron did not have much cash flow, despite
booking large amounts of income based on mark-to-market accounting.
The company might be able to record $200 million in income immediately
based on the present value of the expected earnings from a contract over its
multiple-year duration. That $200 million only came in the door gradually,
however, over the life of the contract. As Enron's financial statements
declared, the company had considerable "'recognized, but unrealized
income.' 5 1 The gap between income and actual cash flow thus was a
continuing problem, which prevented Enron from using cash to finance
most of its growth.

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 121.
Fox, supra note 10, at 87.
Id. at 89.
McLean & Elkind, supra note 13, at 110.
Fox, supra note 10, at 88.

45. Id.

46.
47.
48.
49.

McLean & Elkind, supra note 13, at 225.
Fox, supra note 10, at 146-48.
Id. at 52 ($3 billion power plant in Dabhol, India).
Id. at 102 (1875-mile pipeline from Bolivia to Brazil).

50. Id. at 60.

51. McLean & Elkind, supra note 13, at 41.
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One potential source of financing, of course, was the stock market.
Enron likely would be successful in selling additional shares to the public
because of its track record. The company, however, did not want to issue
new equity to raise capital. That would lower earnings per share, which
would make it harder to hit the earnings targets that the company had
52
indicated to stock analysts.
Finally, Enron did not want to acquire cash by incurring debt because
that would adversely affect its credit rating. In order to continue growth in
its trading operations, Enron needed to trade without having to post
collateral. This in turn depended on its credit rating for senior unsecured
long-term debt. Incurring additional debt could cause that rating to be
downgraded. 53 Furthermore, covenants in some of the company's existing
loan agreements required Enron to maintain a certain credit rating.
Violation of this provision could result in acceleration of Enron's loan
54
obligations.
The result of all this was that Enron's desire to keep its share price high
while maintaining its credit rating limited its options for narrowing the gap
between its reported income and the cash flow necessary to fuel continued
55
growth.
One reason for attempting to ensure that Enron's share price remained
high was that the company could use its shares as currency to fund its
growth. Setting and meeting increasing earnings targets was crucial to a
high share price. Skilling apparently set quarterly and annual earnings per
share targets based solely on what analysts told him was necessary to keep
the stock price up, rather than based on analysis of operations of the various
business units. 56 Growth numbers thus were imposed on business units
from above, with the assumption that the creative and competitive people
whom Enron hired would find a way to meet them.
The difficulty with this strategy was that a company built around trading
and deal making cannot possibly count on steadily increasing earnings,
because trading is an inherently risky and volatile business. This is why
57
companies whose business primarily is trading have low stock valuations.
Furthermore, mark-to-market accounting created an earnings treadmill.
Marking to market can boost growth rates because it permits booking
income from long-term deals immediately. In order for its share price to
stay high, a company needs to meet even more ambitious earnings targets
for the next quarter. Where would these earnings come from? Enron was

52. See id. at 150.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 236.
55. See generally Second Interim Report of Neal Batson, Court-Appointed Examiner, at
15-36, In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2003), available at
http://www.enron.com/corp/por/pdfs/examiner2/InterimReport2ofExaminer.pdf [hereinafter
Second Batson Report].
56. McLean & Elkind, supra note 13, at 127.
57. Id. at 126.
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not building up a backlog of income, because income from all existing
contracts had already been fully recorded. In each quarter, in other words,
traders and dealmakers "had to start again with a blank page." 58 Enron
therefore needed a constant flow of new deals that generated more income
that could be booked immediately in the next quarter.
The trading and deal culture that Enron had created was unleashed to find
new deals and business opportunities that would accomplish this income
generation. In terms of its financial statements, Enron needed transactions
that permitted it to: (1) book income and earnings on its income statement
as soon as possible, (2) remove debt from its balance sheet, and (3) book
cash flow from operations on its statement of cash flows. These measures
would help Enron maintain the favorable financial ratios that were crucial
59
to its stock price and credit rating.
Enron was candid that bolstering the accounting that was the basis for
these ratios was more important than the underlying economics of a
transaction. As Enron's own risk-management manual declared:
Reported earnings follow the rules and principles of accounting. The
results do not always create measures consistent with underlying
economics. However, corporate management's performance is generally
measured by accounting income, not underlying economics. Therefore,
risk management strategies
are directed at accounting, rather than
60
economic, performance.
This statement reflects the fact that there is inevitable divergence
between accounting treatment and economic substance.
Accounting
presents a stylized picture of economic activity, whose elements are
assembled according to certain conventions. Its traditional conservatismdelay booking income and recognize obligations as soon as possible-may
not provide the most accurate reflection of a company's operations and
prospects. Furthermore, structuring a transaction one way instead of
another can make it eligible for a certain accounting treatment, even though
the basic economic characteristics of the transaction are no different. 6 1 In

58. Fox, supra note 10, at 42.
59. For a list and short description of these ratios, see Second Batson Report, supra note
55, at 20.
60. McLean & Elkind, supra note 13, at 132.
61. Instead of owning an asset such as a manufacturing plant, for instance, a company
can enter into a "synthetic lease" whereby it sells the plant to another party and then leases it
back. The company then operates the plant as it would if it still owned it. As a result of the
change in form, however, the company
will be able to expense the rental payments it makes to the lessor under the
synthetic lease, and its balance sheet will not be marred by the appearance of real
estate ownership or by the existence of mortgage debt.
However, the
lessee/corporate user will retain all the tax benefits and burdens of ownership,
including the ability to depreciate the real estate assets and obtain any appreciation
upon a subsequent purchase of the seal property from the lessor or upon resale to a
third party.
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such instances, the rules themselves provide support and incentives for
using form to mask substance. Thus, as two scholars have recently put it,
"Accounting information is sufficiently disconnected from underlying
economic reality that it presents a distorted and unreliable picture of
62
economic consequences."
Enron was frank in recognizing that stock analysts, investors, and even
creditors sometimes take the conventions of accounting as equivalent to the
economic reality that the numbers are supposed to represent. As in any
instance in which certain variables are taken as indications of performance,
gaming the system by manipulating the variables is predictable behavior. 63
This behavior was especially likely near the end of business quarters in
which Enron threatened to fall short of its earnings targets. Rather than
revise its estimate, the company sent out requests to various business units
64
for creative ways to squeeze out more earnings.
Enron created a free-wheeling culture that it believed was nimble enough
to meet its business challenges, but in hindsight failed to put in place
effective constraints on it. The company's Risk Assessment and Control
("RAC") office, for instance, was supposed to provide an internal review of
proposed deals. A Deal Approval Sheet ("DASH") was required on each
proposed transaction, which summarized the deal, indicated the range of
projected returns, and estimated the risks. There was space on the sheet for
the signatures of everyone who needed to approve the transaction, and a
65
box for RAC to provide its recommendation.
In practice, however, the RAC appeared regularly to shy away from
attempting to curb the momentum for any deal. Indeed, Chief Risk Officer
Rick Buy said in a promotional video for Arthur Andersen that Enron was a
"'fast-moving place. You don't want anyone... [who's] going to slow you
down or bog you down or not be value-added .
",66 Nor did RAC seem
to enjoy much respect within Enron. As one deal originator said, "'If a deal
had overwhelming commercial support, it got done. I treated [RAC] like
dogs, and they couldn't do anything about me."' 67 "'The corporate culture
was such that you never said no to a deal ....
It was 'how do you make a
deal work?""..68 RAC "'didn't want to be seen as someone saying no to a

Anthony J. Luppino, Stopping the Enron End-Runs and Other Trick Plays: The Book-Tax

Accounting Conformity Defense, 2003 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 35, 53 (emphasis omitted)
(citation omitted).
62. Geoffrey A. Manne & E. Marcellus Williamson, Hot Docs vs. Cold Economics, 47
Ariz.
L.
Rev.
(forthcoming
2006),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf~abstractid=676727.
63. McLean & Elkind, supra note 13, at 142 (stating that "[wihat [Enron was] doingwhat some might even privately admit they were doing-was gaming the system").
64. Id. at 127.
65. Id. at 115.

66. Id. at 116.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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deal.' ' 69 Further undermining RAC's influence was the fact that traders
and originators sat on the panels that conducted PRC evaluations of RAC
70
personnel.
Attempts by those outside the company to question a transaction also met
with stiff resistance. An accountant in Andersen's Professional Standards
Group ("PSG") in Chicago, for example, had objected to Enron booking a
$50 million gain on the sale of an interest in a deal involving Blockbuster.
Project Braveheart was a twenty-year contract between Enron and
Blockbuster to provide video on demand ("VOD"). Revenue from the
project was based on projections about "future DSL use, customer video
purchases, the speed of the rollout, market share, expenses, and other
factors." 7 1 As soon as the contract was signed, Enron Broadband sold most
of its interest in it to an outside buyer and immediately booked profits from
72
the sale up front.
PSG objected to this accounting treatment, but David Duncan, the
accountant in charge of the Enron engagement, did not follow this advice
and permitted Enron to recognize the profits. Nonetheless, the Enron
Broadband Christmas party that year featured a presentation that mocked
PSG's objection. It depicted Andersen as "The Grinch Who Stole VOD,"
starring Andersen as the Grinch in "'the story of how the mean, heartless
' 73
auditors tried to ruin the deal.'
The evolution of Enron from a gas pipeline company to a trading
enterprise using mark-to-market accounting thus created certain challenges
and contributed to the emergence of a particular culture within the
company. The quest for continuing growth produced pressure for a
constant flow of innovative transactions that were high risk but promised
high reward, with expert hedging that supposedly minimized the company's
exposure.
These transactions ideally secured certain outcomes that
complied with the technical requirements of accounting rules,
notwithstanding some divergence between accounting treatment and
economic substance.
Enron's decentralized entrepreneurial culture of multiple fluid project
teams provided little systematic oversight by superiors in a conventional
organizational hierarchy. Formal review processes were in place, but were
buffeted by influences from both above and below in favor of moving deals
forward. The project teams themselves were populated by financial whiz
kids who ostensibly were creating a new era of capitalism, and who
therefore had little patience for those who failed to understand the
intricacies of their transactions.

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id. at 117.
Id. at 293.
Id.
Id. at 296.
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Finally, the desire to keep the share price high through continued growth
in earnings, the use of mark-to-market accounting, and the "Rank and
Yank" personnel evaluation process all reinforced a short-term focus within
the company. For many, deal origination became the ultimate objective,
with much less attention to performance after the contract was signed-in
part because Enron was always ready to sell its interest in a project if
market conditions were right.
Enron's lawyers thus operated within an environment constituted by "a
steady accumulation of habits and values and actions" 74 that shaped their
understanding of behavior and events. With that environment in mind, it is
time to turn to the attorneys who represented Enron and the transactions in
which they were involved.
II. ENRON'S AT-rORNEYS

Enron had a substantial in-house legal department, but also relied
extensively on the services of law firms. This part describes the
organizational structure within which Enron attorneys operated and some of
the major responsibilities that they assumed. 75
A. Inside Counsel
James Derrick, a twenty-year veteran of the law firm of Vinson & Elkins
("V&E"), became Enron's General Counsel in 1991.76 Derrick regarded
Enron's Legal Department as "world-class." 77 Most of its lawyers had
between eight and seventeen years of experience when they joined the
department. 78 Each of Enron's several business units, such as Enron
Energy Services and Enron Global Finance, had its own legal department
supervised by a general counsel. 79 Each general counsel reported to the
80
head of the business unit in which he or she served, as well as to Derrick.
Rex Rogers, the Associate General Counsel in Enron's corporate legal
department who reported directly to Derrick, was responsible for Enron's
compliance with securities laws. 81 Weekly meetings of the general
82
counsels of the major business units occurred in Derrick's office.
Eventually, the general counsels of Enron's overseas units participated in

74. Id. at 132.
75. The material in this part is drawn from the Final Report of Neal Batson, CourtAppointed Examiner, app. C, at 15-26, In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
Nov.

4,

2003)

(Role

of

Enron's

Attorneys),

available

http://www.enron.com/corp/por/pdfs/examinerfinal/NBFinalAppendixC 1.pdf
Final Batson Report].
76. Id. app. C, at 16 n.1.
77. Id. app. C, at 16.
78. Id.

79. Id. app. C, at 17.
80. Id.

81. Id.
82. Id.

at
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these meetings on a monthly basis. Derrick stated that at any given time
there were "probably thousands of projects" 83 on which Enron's in-house
lawyers were working.
B. Outside Counsel
Enron retained several outside law firms, but relied most heavily on
V&E. The company paid legal fees to V&E of $18.5 million in 1997, $26.6
million in 1998, $37.8 million in 1999, almost $42.8 million in 2000, and
$36.4 million in 2001.84 During the period relevant to the bankruptcy
Examiner's report, the partner at V&E in charge of the relationship with
Enron was Joseph Dilg.85 Periodic advice to Enron on SEC disclosure
issues was provided until 1997 by Robert Baird, and afterward by Ronald
Astin.86 Each of these lawyers worked closely on these matters with inhouse lawyer Rex Rogers. Several other V&E partners and associates
worked on various transactions for Enron. At the height of its work for
Enron, V&E derived a little over seven percent of its total revenues from
this client.
Andrews & Kurth ("A&K") began representing Enron on certain
"structured finance" transactions, described below, in 1998.87 A&K partner
David Barbour was the primary attorney for these transactions. 8 8 He was
assisted by lawyers who worked on legal opinions for and on tax issues
related to these deals. A&K also worked on various other Enron
transactions. Enron paid legal fees to A&K of $991,000 in 1997, $2.3
million in 1998, $6.6 million in 1999, $9.7 million in 2000, and $9.2
million in 2001.89
The remainder of this Article describes several of the transactions on
which various Enron inside and outside attorneys worked, the Examiner's
conclusions about these transactions, and his assessment of the possible
liability of attorneys for their work on these deals. The examination of each
transaction then includes a discussion of the dynamics that may have
shaped the situation as the lawyers understood it, poses questions that
illuminate some of the judgments with ethical implications that lawyers
must make in these circumstances, and presents hypothetical variations on
the facts that suggest other issues that might arise in similar situations.

83. Id. app. C, at 16.

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. app.
Id.
Id. app.
Id. app.
Id.
Id. app.

C, at 21.
C, at 20-2 1.
C, at 24.
C, at 25.
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Ill. STRUCTURED FINANCE TRANSACTIONS

A. Background
The form of transaction that Enron used often to manipulate its financial
statements improperly is known as a "structured finance" transaction. In
basic terms, this is an arrangement in which a company sells incomegenerating assets to an affiliated special purpose entity ("SPE") in return for
a payment from the SPE. The company selling the assets is known as the
"originator" because it creates the assets, such as contracts for the receipt of
a future stream of payments that are central to the transaction. 90 The asset
may be a set of accounts receivable, an investment in an enterprise, or any
other interest that entitles the recipient to future income payments. The
SPE purchasing the asset then issues bonds or some other form of security
to investors. 9 1 The issuing SPE receives the proceeds from investors and
uses them to pay the seller for the asset. The income from the asset that the
issuer owns is earmarked to pay periodic interest to the bondholders and
eventually to repay their principal.
Companies use structured finance transactions for legitimate purposes all
the time, mainly to lower the cost of borrowing money. A company may,
for instance, have only a fair credit rating because of the debt that it has
outstanding. This means that it must pay a higher interest rate on bonds or
for a commercial loan than if its rating were higher. Creating an SPE and
selling an income-producing asset to it can result in an entity with a high
credit rating, which enables the SPE to borrow funds at a lower rate than the
company could on its own. This is because bondholders have security for
their loan in the form of the income stream from the asset. The SPE has no
other creditors to satisfy with whom the bondholders must compete; its sole
asset is pledged to satisfy its obligation to bondholders. When the entity
passes the proceeds on to the company from whom it purchased the asset,
the effect is that the originating company has been able to obtain funds
through proceeds from the sale of the asset more cheaply than if it had
incurred debt directly on its own behalf.
If there has been a true sale of the asset from the company to the special
entity, the seller can enjoy certain benefits in its financial reports. First, if it
sells the asset for a price above the price at which it obtained it, it can book
90. See Steven L. Schwarcz et al., Securitization, Structured Finance, and Capital
Markets 6-7 (2004).
91. In some cases, as in several of the Enron transactions, the entity receiving the assets
from the originator may be an affiliate of the originator. This affiliate then transfers the
assets to a special purpose entity ("SPE"), which is the entity that issues the securities. In
the Enron transactions, the affiliate was known as the "sponsor." See Second Batson Report,
supra
note
55,
app.
M,
at
7,
available
at
http://www.enron.com/corp/por/pdfs/examiner2/9551-13.pdf; see also Schwarcz et al., supra
note 90, at 11-12 (describing a common structured finance transaction in which a SPE that
receives assets from the originator then transfers assets to a second SPE, which issues
securities).
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the difference as a gain on its income statement. Second, it can report the
proceeds from the sale as cash flow from operating activities. By contrast,
proceeds from a loan must be reported as cash flow from financing
activities, which investors in the company regard less favorably. Finally, if
the asset represents an investment in a company, a gain in the share price of
that company is only a paper gain until the investment is actually sold.
Selling the asset thus provides a way to "monetize" the investment in a
transaction that results in the actual receipt of cash.
Enron's sale of financial assets in structured finance transactions had a
major impact on its financial statements. In 2000, for instance, such
transactions increased Enron's net income by $351.6 million (thirty-six
percent of total net income), increased cash flow from operations by $1.2
billion (thirty-eight percent of total flow from operations), and kept
$1.4
92
billion in debt associated with the assets off Enron's balance sheet.
B. Enron's FinancialAssets
Enron owned a number of financial assets in the form of interests in
various companies, particularly in the energy and telecommunications
industries. In order to monetize these assets through sale to an SPE, Enron
had to comply with Financial Accounting Standard ("FAS") 140.9 3 This
requires that for the transfer of financial assets to be treated as a sale, the
transferor has to surrender control of the assets. Three conditions must be
met in order to confirm such surrender. The first of these is that the assets
have been "legally isolated" from the transferor.94 This means that if the
transferor were to declare bankruptcy, the assets could not be treated as part
of its estate and therefore available to the transferor's creditors. 95 Evidence
of this usually takes the form of a "true sale" legal opinion, which opines
that the transfer of the assets would be considered a sale rather a loan under
relevant state law. 96 In Enron's case, such an opinion would provide
assurance to purchasers of the SPE's securities that the income stream from

92. See Second Batson Report, supra note 55, at 38.
93. Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial
Assets and Extinguishments of Liabilities, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No.
140 (2000) [hereinafter FAS 140]. FAS 140 was preceded by FAS 125, which governed the
sale of financial assets prior to April 1, 2001. Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., Accounting for
Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and Extinguishments of Liabilities, Statement of
Financial Accounting Standards No. 125 (1996) [hereinafter FAS 125] (currently superseded
by FAS 140). The two standards are essentially identical with respect to the Enron
structured finance issues that the Examiner analyzed.
94. The other two are that the transferee (or holders of beneficial interests in it) obtains
the right to pledge or exchange its interest in the assets, and that the transferor has no right to
repurchase or redeem the assets before their maturity. Second Batson Report, supra note 55,
app.
B,
at
59-60
(Accounting
Standards),
available
at
http://www.enron.com/corp/por/pdfs/examiner2/9551-02.pdf.
95. Id. app. B, at 60.
96. Id.
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the financial asset could not be used to satisfy the claims of Enron's
creditors in case that company filed for bankruptcy.
Courts look to several factors to determine if a true sale has occurred,
such as whether the transferor retains benefits from and risks of holding the
asset after the transfer, the actions of the parties after the transfer, the
parties' intent, the lender's intent; the amount of the proceeds paid to the
transferor compared to the value of the asset transferred, how the
transaction was treated for tax and accounting purposes, and how the parties
described the transaction. 97 The essence of the inquiry is whether the
economic substance of the transaction is consistent with its form; if not,
courts are free to disregard its form as a sale.
In Enron's case, if there were not a true sale the transfer would be treated
essentially as a loan from the SPE bondholders to Enron, which was
secured by the asset in question. In that case, despite their secured status,
the bondholders would have to compete with Enron's other creditors for
repayment if the company went into bankruptcy. More importantly, from
Enron's standpoint, Enron could not record a gain from the transfer of the
asset, would have to report the proceeds of the transaction as cash flow
from financing activities, and would be required to reflect the debt of the
SPE on its books. With few exceptions, Enron asked its outside attorneys
to provide an opinion letter that Andersen could use to satisfy FAS 140.98
C. The "Sales" that Weren't
The Enron bankruptcy Examiner concluded that Enron had engaged in
several supposed FAS 140 transactions in which Enron in fact did not
surrender rights and risks with respect to the asset supposedly sold to the
SPE. In simplified terms, a typical such Enron transaction proceeded as
follows. 99 Enron, directly or through a "Sponsor" entity, transferred a
financial asset to an "Asset Limited Liability Company ('LLC')."' 0 0 This
was treated as a capital contribution to the Asset LLC, for which Enron or
the Sponsor received a "Class A" interest entitling it to complete voting
control over the Asset LLC and a negligible economic interest in it. Enron
or the Sponsor also was entitled to a special cash distribution from the LLC
10
in an amount equal to the value of the asset as established by Enron. 1
The Asset LLC then issued a "Class B" interest to an SPE (which usually
took the form of a trust), entitling the latter to all the economic proceeds
10 2
from the asset held by the former, but no voting rights in the Asset LLC.
The consideration for the Class B interest was a payment in the amount of

97. See
id.
app.
C,
at
8-16
(Legal
Standards),
http://www.enron.com/corp/por/pdfs/examiner2/9551-03.pdf.
98. See infra note 110 and accompanying text.
99. See First Batson Report, supra note 5, at 59-63.
100. See infra fig.1 (step 1).
101. First Batson Report, supra note 5,at 60.
102. See infra fig.1 (step 2).
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the special distribution that the Asset LLC owed Enron or the Sponsor. The
SPE obtained a bank loan, 103 for which it used its Class B interest as
collateral, and used the proceeds, along with a small equity contribution by
a third party (typically an affiliate of the lender), to pay for the Class B
interest. 1°4 The amount of the equity generally comprised at least three
percent of the purchase price of the Class B interest, plus fees due the
lender. 105
Upon receiving payment from the SPE, the Asset LLC then made the
"special distribution" to Enron or its Sponsor as consideration for the asset
that ostensibly had been sold to it. 10 6 After giving effect to these
transactions, the Asset LLC held the asset, Enron or the Sponsor held
voting control over the LLC, and the SPE trust had an interest in the SPE
that entitled it to proceeds from the LLC's asset.
A condition of the bank loan to the SPE to purchase the Class B interest
was that Enron would enter into a "Total Return Swap."' 07 Under this
arrangement, Enron or one of its affiliates agreed to make payments to the
SPE or the lender in an amount equal to the SPE's obligation to the lender,
which was usually ninety-seven percent of the purchase price of the asset
that had been transferred to the Asset LLC. 10 8 Enron or its affiliate then
was entitled to first priority on the proceeds from the asset up to the amount
of its Total Return Swap obligation (and, after any equity holders in the
SPE received a return on their investment, any remaining proceeds). 10 9 The
effect of this was to guarantee the SPE's loan from the bank, in return for
the SPE's Class B interest in the income from the asset. 1 0
The Examiner found that in five of the six FAS 140 transactions that he
reviewed, the assets that ostensibly were the source of payment by the SPE
to the security holders produced insufficient cash flow to serve this purpose,
or may have been difficult to sell on acceptable terms in a genuine armslength transaction. 111 Enron's guarantee under the Total Return Swap thus
"played what appears to be a substantial-if not the decisive-role" in
112
convincing the lenders to advance funds to the SPE.
Several features of these deals undermined their compliance with FAS
140. Since Enron retained voting control over the asset, it had not
relinquished rights in it. Furthermore, Enron also retained the rewards and
risks associated with the asset. By virtue of the Class B interest it obtained
103. See infra fig.I (step 3).
104. See infra fig.1 (step 4).
105. First Batson Report, supra note 5, at 60.
106. See infra fig.1 (step 5).
107. First Batson Report, supra note 5, at 64.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See infra fig.1 (steps 6-7); see also Second Batson Report, supra note 55, app. B, at
61 (stating that, by virtue of the Total Return Swap, "Enron in substance guaranteed the
debt" of the SPE).
111. First Batson Report, supra note 5, at 16.
112. Id.
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in exchange for the Total Return Swap, it would enjoy appreciation in the
value of the asset in the form of any increases in income that it generated.
If, however, the asset's income stream declined to a level below the amount
necessary to cover the bank loan to the SPE, Enron had to make up the
difference. In effect, the money used to pay Enron for the "sale" of its asset
to the Asset LLC ultimately came from a bank loan that Enron itself
13
guaranteed.1
The Examiner concluded that the economic substance of such a
transaction as a whole, therefore, was that Enron had incurred debt for
which the asset served as collateral-not that it had sold an asset to an SPE
in a structured finance transaction. In effect, as the Examiner described one
of these transactions, Enron "acquire[d] funds in the short term using
certain assets, while retaining the opportunity to subsequently re-acquire
those assets and sell the assets to a third party" at a more advantageous
time.11 4 "The economic reality cf this transaction may thus be viewed as a
' 15
bridge loan, as opposed to a sale."

113. See id. at 65 ("In short, substantially all of the risks and rewards of the asset
remained with Enron .. ").
114. First Batson Report, supra note 5, at 50 n.129.
115. Id.
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FIGURE 1: ENRON FAS 140 TRANSACTION
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Asset special distribution to Enron: (a) Cash, (b) Class A
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Enron total return swap effectively guarantees Bank loan to
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The Examiner came to this conclusion notwithstanding the existence of
legal opinions that were issued in connection with these transactions. 116 "In
many of the FAS 140 Transactions," the Examiner stated, "legal isolation
was not achieved ....,,117 The legal opinions concluding otherwise, he
steps and
declared, "were limited in scope and analyzed only certain
118
specific entities, rather than the transaction in its entirety."'
To the extent that a transfer of a financial asset was not a true sale, Enron
was not entitled to book a gain on its income statement from the "sale" of
the asset to the Asset LLC, to report the distribution from that entity as cash
flow from operating activities, or to avoid listing the bank loan as debt on
its balance sheet or in the related footnotes.
D. Issue One: True Sale Versus True Issuance Opinions
V&E served as counsel to Enron on several FAS 140 transactions that
closed in late 1997 and 1998.119 In the vast majority of these transactions,
Enron asked V&E to deliver not a "true sale" but a "true issuance"
opinion. 120 In terms of the typical transaction described above, a true sale
opinion speaks to whether there has been a genuine transfer of an asset from
Enron (or an Enron "sponsor") to an Asset LLC. 12 1 By contrast, a true
transfer of a
issuance opinion deals with whether there has been a genuine
12 2
Class B interest in the asset from the Asset LLC to the SPE.
V&E attorneys apparently were puzzled by the request for a true issuance
opinion. As an internal V&E memo noted, "'a 'true issuance' by an [SPE]
would accomplish little, in regard to the isolation of its financial assets from
the original transferor, if there had not been a true sale or contribution of the
financial assets to the [SPE]. ' '" 2 3 And, as the bankruptcy Examiner stated,
Vinson & Elkins believed, and Vinson & Elkins attorneys testified that
they repeatedly told both Enron and Andersen, that Andersen had asked
for the wrong opinion when it requested a true issuance opinion. This
was potentially significant because Vinson & Elkins did not believe that it
could provide a true sale opinion in some of those transactions as
124
structured.

116. Second Batson Report, supra note 55, at 39.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See Final Batson Report, supra note 75, app. C, at 15.
120. Id. app. C, at 28.
121. See supra fig.I (step 1).
122. See supra fig. 1 (step 2). Specifically, a true issuance opinion would state that a court
would not "'recharacterize the issuance of the Class B Membership Interest by [the Asset
LLC] ... as a loan to the [Asset LLC] supported by a security interest in [its] Class B
.- Final Batson Report, supra note 75, app. C, at 35 n.99.
Membership Interest ....
123. Final Batson Report, supra note 75, app. C, at 31 (alteration in original). As an

Andersen accountant who worked on Enron matters noted in a memorandum in 2000,
"'[The] Asset LLC must own the Financial Asset in the first place before it can consider
Id.
I..app. C, at 31 n.81.
selling it .
124. Id. app. C, at 31-32.
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The response of V&E lawyers to these misgivings was to attempt to
confirm that Arthur Andersen understood the difference between a true sale
and true issuance opinion, and that the accountants were comfortable that
the latter would satisfy FAS 140.125 On two transactions known as Sutton
Bridge and Riverside, Terry Yates, a V&E attorney, had never been asked
for a true issuance opinion, nor had any of the V&E partners whom he
contacted.1 26 He told an Andersen employee that he understood FAS 140
to apply to situations in which assets were bought and sold, not the grant of
interests in assets. 12 7 He questioned whether a true issuance opinion was
appropriate, but ultimately provided one in both transactions when he
received reassurance from Andersen employees that this is what they
wanted. "'I mean they were the accountants," he said, "they understood
what they wanted and based on what [they] said, I had ...no reason to
think that was not reasonable from an accounting criteria standpoint.""128
On another transaction known as Cornhusker, David Keyes, the V&E
lawyer who was asked for a true issuance opinion, did not know what it
was. 129 He told Arthur Andersen that he believed that accountants were
asking for the wrong kind of opinion. As Ronald Astin testified, this lawyer
felt that "'from a lawyer's perspective . . . what [Anderson was] asking for
was [not] what his reading of the corporate rules required.""' t 30 Keyes also
pointed out to Andersen that V&E had added to its opinion the assumption
that a court would not recharacterize the transaction in its entirety as a
loan. 13 1 In other words, the opinion assumed that a true sale of the asset to
the Asset LLC had occurred prior to the issuance of the Class B interest.
When Andersen indicated its understanding of what V&E was providing,
the firm issued a true issuance opinion.
Keyes, however, continued to have concerns about the request for a true
issuance opinion.' 3 2 One lawyer working with him on a later transaction
indicated in a memo to Dilg that the event in Cornhusker that resulted in
recognition of a gain to Enron was the transfer of the asset from an Enron
sponsor to the Asset LLC. "'This fact suggests,"' he said, "'that, for
opinion purposes, we and the accountants focused on the wrong part of the
transaction." ' 133 The memo also noted that the characteristics of the
transfer to the Asset LLC were such that "[v]irtually all law firms would
refuse to give a true sale opinion" for such a transaction.' 34
Eventually, Dilg scheduled a meeting with Enron general counsel
Derrick to discuss, among other matters, issues relating to the V&E opinion
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. app.
Id.
Id. app.
Id. app.
Id. app.
Id. app.
Id. app.
Id. app.
Id. app.
Id. app.

C, at 32.
C,
C,
C,
C,
C,
C,
C,
C,

at 32-33.
at 33 n.92 (omission in original).
at 34.
at 34 n.98.
at 34-35.
at 36.
at 37 (citation omitted).
at 38 n.113.
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letters.1 35 Dilg focused on two questions. First, was a true issuance opinion
sufficient for FAS 140 accounting treatment? Second, did the qualification
in V&E's opinion letter that a court would not recharacterize the overall
transaction as a loan create any problems with respect to FAS 140? On the
latter issue, Dilg's notes for the meeting said, "We are not asked to render
accounting advice but qualification we had to take in opinion could be
inconsistent with [FAS 140] requirements." 1 36 Dilg noted that V&E could
not remove the qualification from its opinion if asked to.
Some time after the meeting, Derrick told Dilg that he had spoken with
Rick Causey, Enron's Chief Accounting Officer, who in turn had consulted
with high-level Arthur Andersen personnel.' 37 The Andersen people told
him that the opinions were "'satisfactory for their purposes."' 38 Dilg
reported back to V&E lawyers who had raised the issue that both Enron and
Andersen understood the nature of the true issuance opinions and felt that
Dilg, this information "'removed any
there was no problem with them. For
139
doubt in my mind"' on the question.
Keyes, however, "was still not satisfied, and he continued to raise these
same issues in the next FAS 140 Transactions that he worked on for Enron.
.. 140 It was not until a transaction named Project Iguana closed in late
1999 that Andersen appeared to have appreciated the true issuance/true sale
distinction and the assumption in V&E's true issuance opinion letters that a
court would not recharacterize the transaction as a loan. 14 ' In an internal
V&E e-mail, Keyes described a meeting with an Andersen person in which,
the lawyer said, the Andersen representative "'[f]or the first time ... really
realized that FAS 125 calls for more than what Arthur Andersen has been
getting." ' 142 The lawyer went on to say,
"I think that I am blamed by some of the inside Enron attorneys ... for
drawing this distinction to AA's attention, as it could jeopardize Enron's
FAS 125 transactions. The Enron theory is, apparently, that relations with
AA must be carefully managed and that AA is a sophisticated
organization that can read opinions and draw their own conclusion. I
have believed that it is our professional duty to call the attention of a third
party recipient to the meaning and scope of our opinion, especially in a
situation where we do not believe that the recipient has a correct
understanding of what14 3it says in relation to the purpose for which the
opinion is requested."

135. Id. app. C, at 37-38.

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. app. C,
Id. app. C,
Id.
Id.
Id. app. C,
Id.
Id. app. C,

143. Id.

at 44.
at 46.
at 47.
at 47 n.169.
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The lawyer later, however, told the Examiner that "'I don't think that's a
correct statement of legal opinion practice and I-I'm reasonably confident
that what I meant by that was that I shouldn't affirmatively mislead
somebody

."'144
...

The Examiner concluded that V&E possibly could be liable to Enron
under Texas law for malpractice and for aiding and abetting breaches of
fiduciary duties by Enron officers in connection with its work on the FAS
140 transactions. In several of these transactions, V&E attorneys "rendered
true issuance opinions even though those attorneys knew that these opinions
did not address the critical issues under FAS 140, as Vinson & Elkins
understood those issues." 145 In many cases, the Examiner indicated, the
firm knew that Enron was retaining the risks and rewards of the asset
supposedly sold, and that Enron was using Total Return Swaps to guarantee
14 6
repayment of the loans that had been used to finance their "purchase."'
With respect to a malpractice claim, the Examiner noted that Texas
courts have held that the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct
may sometimes be used to aid a fact finder in determining what a
reasonable attorney would have done under the circumstances. 14 7 For this
purpose, the Examiner turned to Texas Rule 1.12, entitled "Organization as
Client."' 148 This rule, said the Examiner, "is relevant in a situation where a
company's attorney knows that an officer of a company is causing the
149
company to enter into transactions that have an improper purpose."'
When an attorney encounters this situation, the rule provides that he or
she "shall proceed as reasonably necessary in the best interest of the
organization"' 150 and "must take reasonable remedial actions."15 1 This may
consist of asking for reconsideration of the matter, recommending a second
legal opinion, and referring the matter to higher authority within the
organization, including to the highest authority if the matter is sufficiently
serious. 152 If a lawyer fails to take such steps when he or she knows that an
officer has committed or intends to commit a legal violation likely to result
in substantial injury to the organization, 153 that lawyer does not act as a
lawyer of reasonable prudence.1 54

144. Id.
145. Id. app. C, at 179.
146. Id.

147. Id. app. C, annex 1, at 9 (Legal Standards Applicable to Attorneys).
148. Tex.

Disciplinary

R.

1.12

(1989),

http://www.txethics.org/reference-rules.asp?view=conduct&num=1. 12
Client).
149. Final Batson Report, supra note 75, app. C, annex 1, at 10.
150. Tex. Disciplinary R. 1.12(a).

available

at

(Organization

as

151. Id. R. 1.12(b).

152. Id. R. 1.12(c).
153. Id. R. 1.12(b). The violation also must be related to a matter within the scope of the
lawyer's representation of the organization. Id.
154. Final Batson Report, supra note 75, app. C, annex 1, at 14.
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The Examiner noted that V&E "may argue that it had no duty to question
the subject matter of a legal opinion requested by an accountant. ' 155 The
firm also could argue that, even though there was no duty to do so, V&E
attorneys informed both Andersen and Enron of its belief that Andersen was
asking for the wrong opinion, and that V&E obtained assurance that the true
issuance opinions were sufficient to satisfy the requirement of FAS 140 that
the assets be effectively "legally isolated" from the transferor.' 56 V&E
could claim that Enron had considered the concerns raised by the firm "and
had made an appropriate business decision." 157 "These arguments," stated
158
the Examiner, "present issues of fact for determination by a fact-finder."'
Questions and Discussion
Was the question whether a true issuance opinion satisfied the legal
isolation requirement of FAS 140 an accounting issue or a legal issue?
Paragraph 23 of FAS 125, the predecessor to FAS 140, stated,
The nature and extent of supporting evidence required for an assertion
in financial statements that transferred financial assets have been isolated.
• . depend on the facts and circumstances. All available evidence that
either supports or questions an assertion shall be considered. That
consideration includes making judgments about whether the contract or
circumstances permit the transferor to revoke the transfer. It also may
include making judgments about [what kind of bankruptcy might be
involved], whether a transfer of financial assets would likely be deemed a
true sale at law, whether the transferor is affiliated with the transferee, and
other factors pertinent under applicable law ....

[T]he available evidence

[must provide] reasonable assurance that the transferred assets would be
beyond the reach of the powers of a bankruptcy trustee or other receiver
for the transferor or any of its affiliates .... 159
V&E might maintain that Paragraph 23 leaves it to accountants to decide
under "the facts and circumstances" what kind of evidence will be sufficient
in a given case to satisfy the first criterion of FAS 125/140. Paragraph 23
says that one form of evidence "may" be a judgment whether a transfer of
assets would be "deemed a true sale at law," but it does not require such an
opinion. It was Andersen's judgment that a true issuance opinion was
sufficient under FAS 140, Andersen informed Enron of this, and it was
Enron's prerogative as the client to instruct V&E lawyers regarding the
scope of the work that the company wanted performed.
On the other hand, the Audit Issues Task Force of the Auditing Standard
Board issued an auditing interpretation in 1994 that declared, "A
determination about whether the isolation criterion has been met to support

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. app. C, at 179.
Id. app. C, at 179-80.
Id. app. C, at 183.
Id. app. C, at 180.
FAS 125, supra note 93, § 23 (currently superseded by FAS 140).
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a conclusion regarding surrender of control is largely a matter of law. This
aspect of surrender of control, therefore, is assessed primarily from a legal
perspective."' 160 This suggests that it is up to the lawyers to determine what
type of evidence is sufficient to support a claim that transferred assets have
been legally isolated.
V&E clearly had doubts about the claim that a true issuance opinion
would satisfy FAS 140. An internal firm memo, albeit not prepared until
November 2000, declared that
[a]lthough the true issuance opinion is rendered at the step following the
transfer of financial assets into the issuer, we believe that rendering a true
issuance opinion

. . .

while technically correct, may not be resfonsive to

16 1
the intent or purpose for which the true sale opinion is required.

The memo further noted, "[A] 'true issuance' by an [SPE] would
accomplish little, in regard to the isolation of its financial assets from the
original transferor, if there had not been a true sale or contribution of the
financial assets to the [SPE]."' 162 V&E received repeated assurances from
Enron and Andersen, however, that a true issuance opinion was sufficient.
Indeed, this assurance ultimately came from the General Counsel of the
company and its Chief Accounting Officer.
In retrospect, it seems clear that V&E's analysis of FAS 140 was correct.
Furthermore, even if Enron's and Andersen's contrary interpretation were
plausible, one can argue that V&E's interpretation should have prevailed
because the issue of what evidence is sufficient to establish legal isolation
appears be a legal, not an accounting or business, judgment. At the same
time, Enron and Andersen had some support, albeit weaker, for their
interpretation. Faced with insistence on this interpretation, V&E's response
for a long time was puzzlement, not suspicion. V&E lawyers repeatedly
asked Enron and Andersen if they understood the difference between a true
sale and true issuance opinion, and whether they were sure that the latter
was all they needed. V&E's actions suggest that the lawyers believed that
the client required education, not investigation.
This should not be surprising. For better or worse, most lawyers do not
immediately suspect that their clients are engaged in wrongdoing when the
lawyers are confronted with behavior that does not seem completely
intelligible. Most people believe that they and those for whom they work
have good intentions. The psychological impact of acting otherwise would
be substantial. The natural inclination when faced with what seems like
illogical conduct, especially by such ostensibly rational people such as
business executives and accountants, is to assume a misunderstanding.

160. Using the Work of a Specialist: Auditing Interpretations of Section 336, Statement
of Auditing Standards No. 73, § 9336 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1994),
quoted in Final Batson Report, supra note 75, app. C, at 27-28.
161. Final Batson Report, supra note 75, app. C, at 30 n.80.
162. Id. app. C, at 31.
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Consider, for instance, a memo of June 7, 1998, by V&E attorney Tarry
to Dilg about a meeting concerning an FAS 140 transaction known as
MidTexas. 163 In that transaction, an Enron sponsor transferred assets to an
Asset LLC. As in the other FAS 140 transactions, the Asset LLC then
issued an interest in the income from the assets to an SPE. The SPE paid
for this interest with a loan, which Enron effectively guaranteed with a
Total Return Swap. V&E delivered a true issuance opinion addressing the
64
issuance of the interest from the Asset LLC to the SPE. 1
At the meeting, the Andersen partner commented that in transactions
with a Total Return Swap, "the substantive consolidation opinion was
generally difficult for law firms to give."1 65 Tarry did not understand this
comment. He appeared to assume that the partner was referring to the true
issuance opinion that V&E was rendering, which was what V&E had been
told was necessary. He saw no problem with issuing such an opinion. As
he noted, the SPE receiving the right to the income from the asset was
clearly bankruptcy-remote. A non-consolidation opinion in that situation
thus was "routinely given."' 6 6 Why, then, did the Andersen partner say that
the type of opinion that V&E had issued usually was difficult to give?
It was only later, Tarry said, that another V&E lawyer suggested that the
Andersen partner may have had in mind a different kind of legal opinion
than the kind V&E had been providing. The Total Return Swap was
relevant only to the transfer of the asset from the sponsor to the Asset LLC.
If the accountants had asked for an opinion that this transfer was a true sale,
he noted, "that would be much more difficult to give."' 167 This was because
the Total Return Swap effectively meant that Enron provided a full
guaranty of the loan to the SPE to buy the interest in income from the
assets. "Virtually all law firms," he said, "would refuse to give a true sale
opinion in a transaction that provided for full recourse back against the
16 8
purported transferor of the asset."
This recognition did not, however, lead Tarry to surmise that Enron and
Andersen knew that the transfer of the assets was not a true sale, and that
they therefore may have been trying to use V&E's services to commit
accounting fraud. Instead, Tarry exhibited confusion and frustration about
Andersen's insistence on a true issuance opinion. His memo concluded, "I
still don't understand the position the accountants are taking . . . the
statements made by the Arthur Andersen partners in the ...meeting did not
169
make the situation any more comprehensible."'
Similarly, as described earlier, in another FAS 140 transaction that closed
in late 1999, V&E originally had agreed to give a true issuance opinion.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. app. C, at 37 & n.113.
Id. app. C, at 36.
Id. app. C, at 37 n.113.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The details of the transaction changed, however, and V&E met with
Andersen to discuss the legal opinion. As Keyes noted in an e-mail to other
V&E lawyers, "[flor the first time . . . I think [the Andersen accountant]
really realized that FAS 125 calls for more than what Arthur Andersen has
170
been getting."
Whatever psychological resistance may have served to prevent V&E
from becoming suspicious could well have been subtly reinforced by
awareness of the importance that Enron attached to the FAS 140
transactions. Dilg's notes for his meeting with Derrick describe these deals
as "[large transactions with significant earnings impact."' 17 1 "Given the
combined size of the various deals," the notes say, Enron needed to
"carefully focus" on what the company should say about them in the
Management Discussion & Analysis portion of its securities filings. 172 The
notes indicate, for instance, that the MidTexas transaction was "[s]aid to
represent 25% of earnings for 2d quarter," that Cornhusker generated $40
million of gain, that EuroCash produced $55 million on the sale of assets,
73
and that Project Churchill generated $150 million in gain.1
Given the magnitude of the income produced by these deals, V&E
lawyers could have been even more receptive to accepting Andersen's
explanation why a true issuance opinion was sufficient-even if they didn't
fully understand the accountants' reasoning. As earlier described, Keyes
apparently felt some pressure from Enron not to rock the boat by
emphasizing the difference to Andersen between true sale and true issuance
opinions, because this "could jeopardize Enron's FAS 125 transactions." 174
Similarly, Dilg testified that if V&E was asked for a type of opinion that
it believed it could not give, that might require expensive restructuring of
transactions. "I didn't want to be in [the] position," Dilg said, "of Mr.
Derrick hearing that Vinson and Elkins was unwilling to give an opinion
that was going to cost the company a fair amount of money to restructure
transactions to satisfy us without him being aware of that potential
beforehand."' 175 This of course reflects appropriate concern that the client
be fully informed. It also, however, indicates awareness that insistence on
V&E's position as to what was necessary to satisfy the legal isolation
requirement could prove costly to Enron. Even if only subconsciously, Dilg

170. Id. app. C, at 47 n.169. The Examiner also seemed to accept that Andersen did not
fully appreciate for some time the issues surrounding the necessary legal opinion for the FAS
140 transactions. "It was not until Project Iguana," he said, "that Andersen appears to have
understood the import of the true issuance/true sale distinction and the 'no
recharacterization' assumption contained in Vinson & Elkins' true issuance opinion letters."
Id. app. C, at 47. This was the transaction that Keyes referred to in his internal e-mail.
171. Id. app. C, at 48.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. app. C, at 47 n.169.
175. Id. app. C, at 44 n.155; see also id. app. C, at 45 (reporting that Dilg's notes from a
meeting with Derrick relating to the MidTexas transaction stated, "Don't want deal to blow
up at last moment and cause earnings surprise").
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thus may not have been determined to press the issue forcefully with
Derrick, nor displeased to hear Derrick's and Causey's assurances that a
true issuance opinion was adequate.
Faced with tension between its own understanding of the legal isolation
requirement and Enron's and Andersen's insistent request for a true
issuance opinion, V&E appears to have tried to steer a middle course. It
provided a true issuance opinion, but made explicit in the opinion that it
was assuming that a court would not treat the sequence of transactions as a
loan secured by the financial assets that had been transferred.' 76 This was
intended to emphasize that the firm was not purporting to render a true sale
opinion.
As a matter of legal analysis, however, this approach seems problematic.
The legal isolation condition required assurance that the assets would not be
treated as part of the transferor's estate in the event of that entity's
bankruptcy. Securitization of financial assets necessarily involves a series
of transactions that, considered as a whole, is supposed to produce that
result (among others). V&E's opinion addressed one particular step in the
sequence of transactions, but assumed what Enron was supposed to
demonstrate-that the transactions together resulted in a transfer of assets
that were legally isolated. Furthermore, as both V&E and Andersen
comments indicated, a prerequisite for the Asset LLC's ability to issue an
interest in the asset to the SPE is that the Asset LLC own the asset.
The potential problem of focusing on only one isolated part of the
sequence of transactions is highlighted by the fact that V&E felt that it
could not provide a true sale opinion for some of these projects. As Dilg
testified with respect to the concerns that his partners had raised about
rendering only a true issuance opinion, "there was something in the
structure, and I can't recall the details, that would have prevented us from
being able to render an opinion on the true sale nature of the transfer of the
"177
assets .
Was it appropriate for V&E to take such a narrow focus in its opinion in
cases in which it had doubts that a true sale of assets from Enron to the
Asset LLC had taken place? One question is how much information V&E
had in order to make its judgment about whether there had been a true sale.
Did its work on the true issuance opinion inevitably provide the firm with
details about prior steps in the sequence of transactions? If V&E suspected
that the original asset transfer might not always be a true sale in these
transactions, could it ask to receive only information about the issuance of
the Class B interest by the Asset LLC to the SPE? Could it claim that this

176. See id. app. C, at 47 & n.169.
177. Id. app. C, at 44 (footnote omitted); see also id. app. C, at 31-32 (stating that V&E's
belief that Andersen was asking for the wrong opinion "was potentially significant because
Vinson & Elkins did not believe that it could provide a true sale opinion in some of those
transactions as structured").
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is all it needed to perform its assigned task, thereby avoiding acquiring any
disturbing information about the larger picture?
Or imagine a common scenario in transactional work: specialized
division of labor. Suppose that V&E was asked to provide a true issuance
opinion and another law firm took responsibility for rendering a true sale
opinion. Could V&E then simply defer to the judgment of the other firm on
the true sale issue? The Examiner noted, for instance, that some V&E
partners were troubled with some of the true sale opinions given by A&K,
the law firm that had begun to handle most of the FAS 140 transactions in
late 1998.178 As V&E partner Ronald Astin testified, "I was concerned that
if we believed there was something so fatally wrong with the opinion that
we didn't think a reasonable lawyer could give it that it implicitly undercut
the reported financial results of the company." 179 V&E ultimately decided
that it could not say that a reasonable lawyer could not provide the true sale
opinions, so it did not raise the issue with Enron.' 80
V&E's concern about A&K's true sale opinions arose with respect to
disclosure issues on transactions on which V&E had not worked. The
firm's conclusion that the opinions were acceptable would seem even more
likely in the hypothetical case in which V&E was working on the true
issuance opinion and A&K on the true sale opinion. To raise a concern in
that setting would present a direct obstacle to effecting the transaction in an
organizational culture that emphasized devising and closing deals quickly.
Simply deferring to A&K would allow V&E to focus on its part of the deal,
without having to confront troublesome questions about the transaction as a
whole.
V&E's involvement in the FAS 140 transactions thus provides a useful
vehicle for exploring some of the issues of ethics and judgment that arise in
transactional work. In retrospect, it is not hard to claim that V&E should
have stood firmly by its understanding of what was necessary to satisfy the
legal isolation requirement-at least until it received a persuasive
explanation from Enron and Andersen for why a true issuance opinion was
sufficient. Furthermore, one can argue that at some point the failure of
these parties to provide such an explanation should have evoked not
puzzlement but suspicion.
Several features of the situation, however, militated against V&E
responding in this way. First, there is the natural tendency to give the
benefit of the doubt to persons with whom we regularly work. This
tendency may have been even more pronounced in the case of Enron, a
company with a reputation for cutting-edge innovation by employees who
did not suffer fools gladly. It is conceivable that a lawyer operating in this
milieu may have been especially reluctant to second-guess the client and its

178. See infra Part III.E for a discussion of Andrews & Kurth's work on the true sale
opinions.
179. Final Batson Report, supra note 75, app. C, at 89.
180. Id.
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accountant, and likely instead to assume that he or she just did not fully
grasp the creative approach that Enron and Anderson were taking.
Furthermore, at least some of the V&E attorneys knew that the FAS 140
transactions were generating considerable income for Enron. The prospect
of telling Enron that it would have to restructure these transactions in order
to obtain a true sale opinion-or even stop them altogether-must not have
been a pleasant one for a law firm that prided itself on working closely with
a company that was seen as a business revolutionary.
The inclination to adopt a benign interpretation of events may have been
reinforced by three rationalizations that often are available in transactional
work. The first is deference to other experts. V&E could claim that what
Andersen needed to support the desired accounting treatment for the FAS
140 transactions was an accounting, not a legal, issue. To reiterate the
statement of a V&E lawyer, "they were the accountants, they understood
what they wanted . . . [and] I had . . . no reason to think that was not

reasonable from an accounting criteria standpoint."' 18 1
The second rationalization is taking refuge in narrowly defined
responsibility. V&E could claim that its role was confined to determining if
there had been a true issuance of interest from the Asset LLC to the SPE.
This is what the client wanted, and this is what V&E provided. Anything
beyond this relatively narrow task was for others to consider.
Finally, corporate lawyers are supposed to defer to the business judgment
of their clients, even if they may think it imprudent or misguided.
Whatever risks may have existed beyond the question of whether there was
a true issuance were for Enron executives to weigh and balance, not V&E.
The law firm had raised its concerns with the highest-ranking legal and
accounting officers at Enron. If they were comfortable with the situation,
V&E could say that it had fulfilled its obligation to ensure that the client
makes fully informed decisions.
These three claims often are appropriate in transactional practice.
Lawyers and law students need to be aware, however, that in some cases
they can serve as rationalizations that prevent clear-eyed recognition of
problematic behavior. They also need to appreciate that the tendency to
rely on them will be greater when a lucrative client fosters a deal-making
culture that bristles at any obstacle to moving forward.
E. Issue Two: Andrews & Kurth Opinions
Beginning in November 1998, A&K represented Enron in the majority of
the company's FAS 140 transactions. From that month through October
2001, the firm delivered at least twenty-four true sale or true issuance
opinion letters in connection with such transactions. 182 In cases in which
the firm provided a true issuance opinion, "[u]nlike Vinson & Elkins,

181. Id. app. C, at 33 n.92.
182. Id. app. C, at 52.
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Andrews & Kurth did not raise with Enron or Andersen whether or not a
true issuance opinion was responsive to the requirements of FAS 125 or
In virtually all these transactions, an Enron sponsor
FAS 140."183
transferred an asset to an Asset LLC over which it had voting control. That
LLC then issued a Class B interest in the income from the asset to an SPE,
which financed the purchase of that interest through a bank loan. In most
transactions, Enron entered into a Total Return Swap with the SPE.
The Examiner found that A&K was aware that Enron's goals in these
transactions were to raise funds that would not be reflected as debt on its
balance sheet and to recognize a gain on its income statement when the sale
price of the asset exceeded the value at which Enron was carrying it on its
books. 184 He also found that the firm was aware that "the opinions it
140 Transactions were critical to Enron's intended
rendered in the FAS '185
accounting treatment.
A&K explicitly recognized in many of its opinions that the Total Return
Swap had the characteristics of a guarantee of the loan obtained by the SPE
ostensibly to purchase the asset. 186 Furthermore, the bankruptcy Examiner
noted A&K memos stating that in these transactions "'Enron, as a practical
matter, retains all the risks and rewards of owning the asset,""' 187 and that
while the deals "were structured as sales for the purpose of accounting
treatment, Enron retained full control over its interest.., and commercially
the transactions look more like financings."' 188 Questioned by the Examiner
with respect to the first statement, however, the author of the memo
testified that he was "not sure it's completely accurate," because it did not
take into account that the risks were limited to the payment of the debt, and
asset that exceeded
the reward was only any appreciation in the value of the189
what was necessary to repay the SPE's security holders.
An additional way in which Enron allegedly sought to retain control of
the asset supposedly transferred was to prepay the SPE's loan. This
resulted in unencumbering the asset whose income effectively was used to
guarantee the loan. It was done by purchasing the equity interest in the SPE
and then directing the SPE to pay off the loan and "unwind" the transaction.
As a formal matter, the existing SPE equity holder could refuse Enron's
offer to purchase its interest. In fact, however, there was never an instance
in which Enron made an offer that was not accepted. 190 Indeed, an A&K
memo to Enron in March 2000 stated, "In the deals which closed in
December we were given very clear instructions that Enron had to be able
to prepay and get the assets back at any time. A right to prepay in full was

183. Id. app. C, at 52 n.180.
184. Id. app. C, at 54-55.

185.
186.
187.
188.
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190.
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Id. app.
Id. app.
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55 (footnote omitted).
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59 n.199.
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59, 60 n.202.
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included in the documents (as for all previous deals)."' 19 1 While the author
of this memo clarified to the Examiner that the SPE, not Enron, had the
right to prepay, he could not "identify a single instance where Enron desired
19 2
the facility to be prepaid and it was refused."'
The prepayments occurred despite the fact that the terms of the FAS 140
transactions provided for an auction of the asset transferred to the SPE (the
Class B interest) just before the date on which the SPE had to pay off its
obligations to the lender and security holders. Proceeds from the auction
were to provide the SPE with funds that would be paid to Enron under the
Total Return Swap. 19 3 A genuine auction would have transferred control of
the asset to a party other than Enron or any of its affiliates.
A memo that Enron sent to A&K for revisions, however, stated that "the
Auction-related mechanisms will come into play ONLY if the indebtedness
is not prepaid by the Sponsor [an Enron affiliate], which is always [Enron]
Global Finance's planned means of unwind and has been, with one
exception I'm aware of, the actual means of unwind."' 194 The memo noted,
however, that "this prepayment plan is not memorialized in any deal
documentation (and cannot be for financial accounting and legal opinion
195
purposes)."'
The Examiner found that A&K was aware as early as November 1998, in
connection with the first FAS 140 transactions on which it worked, that
"Enron did not intend to transfer the monetized asset to a third-party."'1 96
An A&K memo recounted that the lead Enron attorney assigned to the FAS
140 transactions "did not want to mention the auction in the consent. I said
this was okay as long as Enron [was] absolutely confident that there would
never in practice be a sale to a third party. [The Enron attorney] said that
this was correct ....-197

A&K worked on both the FAS 140 transactions and on Enron's steps to
unwind them, sometimes simultaneously with respect to the same
transaction. Some of the transactions were unwound as soon as about two
weeks, four weeks, six weeks, and two months after the transaction
transferring the asset had closed. 198 Indeed, in some of the fifteen unwound
transactions, the unwinds were effected before the firm issued its true sale
or true issuance opinion letter for the original FAS 140 transfer of assets. 199
The Examiner observed that the ability of Enron to prepay the loan and
equity did cause some concern to A&K. In the course of closing an FAS

191. Id. app. C, at 59-60.
192. Id. app. C, at 60 n.202.
193. Id. app. C, at 61-62.
194. Id. app. C, at 61. The only exception was an auction in which the purchaser of the
asset was an entity controlled by Enron. Id. app. C, at 62 n.21 1.
195. Id. app. C, at 61.
196. Id. app. C, at 61 n.207.
197. Id.
198. See id. app. C, at 66 (summarizing unwound transactions).
199. Id.
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140 transaction in late 1999, attorneys at the firm asked Enron whether
prepayment and sale by Enron about two months after the transaction
closed would "jeopardize the FASB 125 treatment of the transaction? Does
it matter if [the Enron affiliate] intends to arrange such a sale and prepay the
facility at the time of entering into the FASB 125 transaction?" 20 0 The
Examiner said that he had not seen any evidence that A&K received an
answer to this question. He stated, "Andrews & Kurth appeared to think
that the answer required
an accounting judgment, but the question calls for
20 1
a legal conclusion."
The Examiner concluded that Enron could have a cause of action against
A&K for malpractice based on Texas Rule 1.12 or negligence, as well as
for aiding and abetting officers' breaches of their fiduciary duties, in
connection with the firm's work on the FAS 140 transactions. A&K, he
said, knew of Enron's accounting goals in entering into these transactions,
and "also knew that the risks and rewards of owning the assets remained
'20 2
with Enron and that isolation of the assets was not occurring.
Furthermore, A&K assisted Enron in unwinding several of these
transactions, and in some cases began work on that project even before
delivering the opinion on legal isolation of the assets that was necessary for
the transaction to close. "As the number of prepayments and unwinds
grew," said the Examiner, "Andrews & Kurth also knew that the
transactions were being used by certain officers of Enron to manipulate its
'2 03
financial statements.
The Examiner noted that A&K may argue that it lacked knowledge of
wrongful conduct because the prepayments and unwinds were permitted
under the transaction documents. Loans "are routinely repaid prior to their
maturity dates or otherwise modified for a variety of legitimate business
purposes," the Examiner acknowledged, "but these transactions were
supposed to be sales, not loans." 20 4 A&K also may argue that the opinions
were issued "as of' the closing even though they were delivered later, and
thus were correct as of their effective dates. The Examiner responded,
however, that "the decision to issue an opinion must be made within the
context of what the attorneys know about the intent of the parties, and their
conduct reveals that intent. Conduct occurring after closing but before
20 5
delivery of an opinion can reflect on the intent of the parties at closing."
Even if A&K did not have knowledge of wrongdoing, said the Examiner,
a fact finder could conclude that the firm was liable for malpractice based
on negligence. This conclusion would be based on a finding that a prudent
attorney would have recognized that certain Enron officers did not intend
for Enron to relinquish control over the assets that were transferred and
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id. app. C, at 60.
Id. app. C, at 60 n.204.
Id. app. C, at 187.
Id.
Id.

205. Id.
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were using the FAS 140 transactions to manipulate the company's financial
206
statements.
Finally, the Examiner found that a fact finder could conclude that A&K
was liable for aiding and abetting Enron officers' breaches of fiduciary
duties by lending substantial assistance to those breaches. This consisted of
issuing opinions and preparing documents necessary for the transactions to
close.
A&K may claim that it "acted merely as scriveners" who
memorialized the terms of the deals, but the Examiner noted that "the
rendering of just one legal opinion can constitute substantial assistance
20 7
under some circumstances."
Questions and Discussion
As the above summary indicates, A&K began doing most of the work on
Enron's FAS 140 transactions beginning in November 1998. There is no
evidence in the record on this issue, but it is natural to wonder if this
development was prompted in any way by V&E's persistent questions
about the adequacy of a true issuance opinion for these transactions. Dilg's
meeting with Derrick at which the former raised V&E's concerns was on
June 8, 1998. Derrick apparently went all the way to Chief Accounting
Officer Rick Causey with Dilg's questions, and Causey informed him that
Enron and Andersen were comfortable relying on the true issuance
opinions. Even after this reassurance, Keyes at V&E continued to have
concerns, which he raised during work on a transaction that closed in
November 1998.208
It is not clear how much in additional revenue A&K gained from
assuming primary responsibility for the FAS 140 transactions. We do
know, however, as indicated earlier, that its fees from Enron jumped from
$991,000 in 1997 to $2.3 million in 1998, $6.6 million in 1999, and $9.7
million in 2000.209 Even though V&E's fees from Enron still dwarfed these
figures, A&K probably was pleased that it finally had begun to acquire
more legal business from Houston's most famous corporation after being
left in the shadows for many years.
Might this explain why, in contrast to V&E, A&K raised no concerns
with Enron or Andersen about either the sufficiency of a true issuance
opinion or the propriety of a true sale opinion? It is impossible to know for
sure, but reasonable to ask the question given the competition for legal
services in general and for work from Enron in particular. We know, for
instance, that banks competed fiercely for Enron's business, and allegedly
assisted the company in structuring questionable transactions in order to
obtain it. Simply remaining silent about any reservations that A&K may
206.
207.
208.
during
209.

Id. app. C, at 188-89.
Id. app. C, at 188.
Id. app. C, at 47. Keyes apparently continued to raise the issue as late as 1999
a project on which he worked that closed late that year. Id.
See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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have had about the true issuance opinion would have been relatively simple
by comparison.
At least with respect to true issuance opinions, Enron and Andersen may
well have told A&K that V&E had been providing true issuance opinions
on FAS transactions on a regular basis-while neglecting to mention that
V&E had persistently raised questions about the practice. Being told this,
A&K still had an independent obligation to satisfy itself that such opinions
would satisfy the legal isolation requirement. By this point, however,
Enron had done several apparently successful FAS 140 transactions, and
likely communicated the idea that they were relatively routine. It probably
is common after several essentially identical transactions have been closed
for those working on them to regard them uncritically as routine, rather than
rethink their basic rationale and structure with each iteration. Using the
same basic documents, supplemented by some cutting and pasting, may be
all that seems necessary once the deals take on a "cookie cutter" quality.
At this point, in fact, the work often is handed off to more junior
attorneys who are not expected to exercise much discretion in performing it.
Indeed, such attorneys sometimes work on only a discrete portion of a
larger matter, and thus are not in a position to raise questions about the
broader transaction. The Examiner stated that in the "vast majority" of
cases, Enron asked for a true issuance, rather than true sale, opinion. 2 10 It is
therefore possible that inertia contributed to A&K's failure to express any
concerns about the use of true issuance opinions in Enron's FAS 140
transactions.
What about A&K's provision of true sale opinions, however? It is
possible that Enron told A&K that V&E had rendered such opinions on
previous FAS 140 deals, or at least left A&K with that impression. If so,
the "cookie cutter" mentality may have made it less likely that the firm
would conduct an independent analysis of the propriety of delivering such
opinions.
What is more puzzling, however, is written comments by A&K that
suggest their appreciation that these transactions really were not sales but
loans. The Examiner identified statements by the firm that say that the
Total Return Swap resembled a loan guarantee, that Enron retained the risks
and rewards associated with the assets, and that the deals were structured as
sales for accounting purposes but for commercial purposes were more like
loans. How could A&K acknowledge this and still give true sale opinions?
If it were simply the case that A&K knowingly assisted Enron in
committing fraud, then we can regard these comments as cynical
acknowledgments that the company was crossing the line with the
assistance of A&K. What makes this explanation less than wholly
satisfying, however, is that a firm with this attitude would be unlikely to
express it so explicitly in print.

210. Final Batson Report, supra note 75, app. C, at 28.
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What seems more likely is that A&K knew that some features of the
transactions had the characteristics of loans, but also knew that this in itself
did not automatically mean that they were "really" sales. Securitization is a
technique that in substance is a loan, in the sense that it allows a company
to borrow funds more cheaply than it otherwise would be able to.2 11 At the
same time, the funds that the company obtains do not show up as debt on its
2 12
balance sheet, but as income from the sale of assets.
Furthermore, securitizations typically feature some degree of recourse
against the transferor of the assets, which means that this entity continues to
be exposed to some of the risks associated with those assets. 2 13 As the
Examiner noted, some courts treat recourse as an indication that a purported
sale was really a loan, but others hold that recourse alone is insufficient to
support such a conclusion. 2 14
Some amount of divergence between
economic substance and accounting treatment thus is the rule, rather than
the exception, in structured finance transactions. Courts use multi factor
tests, rather than bright lines, to determine when that divergence is too great
to permit companies to characterize a transaction as a sale.
Such legal ambiguity leaves lawyers with significant opportunities to
rationalize their behavior. This was particularly the case with respect to
Enron. As the Examiner noted, none of the reported court decisions dealing
with true sales involved "transactions of the complexity found in the
Selected Transactions-a multi-tiered seller/borrower structure, multiple,
contemporaneous transfers down the corporate chain and the existence of
various derivatives, including swaps and complex arrangements consisting
of various puts and calls." 2 15
Add to this the cognitive filters of
routinization and a likely disinclination to raise questions that would
jeopardize A&K's increasing work flow from Enron. A possible result is a
law firm that could make the kinds of comments that the Examiner
identified without believing that it was on notice that Enron was abusing
accounting rules. Whether that belief was reasonable, of course, is another
matter.
Even if A&K had no concerns at the outset, the Examiner concluded that
it eventually knew or should have known that Enron had no intention of
relinquishing control over the assets that it supposedly sold to the Asset
LLC. A&K knew that Enron was unwinding the FAS 140 transactions
shortly after they had closed. In fact, in some cases A&K began work on
the unwind before it delivered its opinion supporting the accounting
211. "[V]irtually all structured-finance transactions have loan-like economics." Steven L.
Schwarcz, The Limits of Lawyering: Legal Opinions in Structured Finance, 84 Tex. L Rev.
(forthcoming 2005), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=774350
(manuscript at 16).
212. See generally Schwarcz et al., supra note 90, at 1-17.
213. "[A] buyer of financial assets always must demand, to the extent consistent with a
true sale, some amount of contingent recourse against the seller." Schwarcz, supra note 211,
at 27 (footnote omitted).
214. First Batson Report, supra note 5, at 43-44.
215. Id. at41.
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treatment of the transaction as a sale. A&K was aware that Enron intended
to retain the ability to prepay the SPE's obligations and reacquire the assets
that it had transferred. Indeed, one A&K memo inquired whether this intent
jeopardized the accounting treatment of these transactions. It also was
aware from an Enron memo that plans to unwind the transactions could2 16not
be memorialized for "financial accounting and legal opinion purposes.
As an A&K lawyer noted to the Examiner, the SPE, not Enron, was the
entity with the formal authority to prepay the SPE security holders and
unwind the transaction. Furthermore, the SPE was not legally required to
sell its interest to Enron. As a formal matter, therefore, there was no
provision that ensured that Enron always would be able to purchase the SPE
interest, prepay the obligations to the security holders, unwind the
transaction, and reacquire the assets. As a practical matter, however, this
inevitably is what happened. Here again is a divergence between form and
substance. When is that divergence large enough that the lawyer must
conclude that form is being abused?
In the case of the prepayments and unwinds, the issue is how probative
they are concerning the intent of the parties in the FAS transactions.
Specifically, do they indicate that Enron never intended to relinquish
control over the assets? Intent can be inferred not only from what the
parties say, but from what they do, even after a transaction has closed. At
what point should A&K have concluded that, notwithstanding the
formalities, these transfers of assets were not really sales? After the first
transaction was unwound? The second? The fifth? What if the SPE once
refused Enron's offer to purchase the security interest? As one scholar of
structured finance observes, "warning signs are more easily recognized than
defined," which means that generally they must be identified on a case-bycase basis. 2 17 This means that a law firm in A&K's position may find it
easy to rationalize to itself that, all things considered, form is not being
abused.
Consider other scenarios that involve even more ambiguity, and thus
more opportunities for rationalization. We know, for instance, that, in
addition to the unwinds, the Total Return Swaps cast doubt on the propriety
of treating the FAS 140 transactions as sales. Suppose that there were no
such swaps, so that there was a stronger case that the risks and rewards
associated with the assets had been shifted to the Asset LLC. Would the
same pattern of repayment and unwinds still create a problem, because
those risks and rewards were transferred for only a brief time? Or should
each repayment and unwind be treated as separate from the original
transfer, and not relevant to the accounting treatment?
Or suppose that the repayments and unwinds occurred, but A&K did no
work on them. That would create the opportunity for the firm to claim that
216. Final Batson Report, supra note 75, app. C, at 61 (quoting an e-mail from Enron to
Andrews & Kurth).
217. Schwarcz, supra note 211, at 31.
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it was unaware of these arrangements. Furthermore, even if it were aware
of them, it might argue that it was responsible for only one aspect of the
transaction, and did not purport to pass judgment on the work that others
did on other matters.
The significance that the Examiner attached to the unwinds reflects the
fact that concepts such as intent, business purpose, and economic substance
theoretically are available to limit lawyers' ability to take refuge in
technical compliance with form. No transactional lawyer can assume that
conformity to the letter of the law always will protect her from liability for
perpetrating a breach of its spirit. At the same time, it is a matter of degree
-not every violation of the spirit of the law constitutes a fundamental
breach. Transactional lawyers thus need to employ not only legal, but
fundamentally ethical, judgment in determining when form no longer
should triumph over substance.
Finally, it is important to keep in mind that lawyers may attempt to avoid
the responsibility for exercising such judgment by arguing that an issue
calls for the professional judgment of another expert. As the Examiner
noted, for instance, A&K asked whether the plan to unwind the FAS 140
transactions and reacquire the assets could jeopardize the accounting
treatment. 2 18 The Examiner suggested that A&K raised this as an issue for
the accountants to consider, rather than a question for the lawyers. Is he
right that this issue requires a legal analysis, rather than an accounting
judgment? What precisely determines into which category a question falls?
On the one hand, accountants need lawyers to determine the legal rights
and obligations that flow from a transaction in order to determine what
accounting treatment of that configuration of rights and obligations is
appropriate. On the other hand, A&K might argue that it was saying to
Enron and Andersen, "This is the combination of rights, obligations, and
intentions that characterize this transaction. Do the intentions jeopardize
the accounting treatment?" 2 19 Such ambiguity can make it easy to deflect
responsibility.
IV. PROJECT NAHANNI

A. Background
At a September 1999 meeting between Enron and Citigroup, Enron
indicated that a delay in the sale of one of its merchant investments was
likely to cause it to fall short of its projection of cash flow from operations
for the year. 220 This source of cash flow reflects cash obtained from

218. Final Batson Report, supra note 75, app. C, at 60.
219. In this case, it seems reasonable that Enron and Andersen would turn the question
back to the lawyers and say, "That depends on the legal significance of these intentions."
220. Citigroup,
Inc.,
80 SEC Docket
2614,
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-48230.htm.

2620

(2003),

available

at
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acquiring and selling the company's products and services. 22 1 Positive and
increasing cash flows from operations "usually denote a healthy enterprise
that can use this cash to expand operations, satisfy long-term obligations, or
provide a return on investment to its owners." 22 2 By contrast, investors
regard cash flow from investing (acquiring and selling long-term
investments and assets) or financing (obtaining cash from short- and longterm debt from creditors) as a less useful reflection of the soundness of the
company's basic business operations.
The company explained that it would like to engage in a transaction with
22 3
Citigroup to make up the shortfall in cash flow from operations.
Citigroup's response was Project Nahanni, which involved the sale of
Treasury bills by a consolidated Enron subsidiary in which a third party
created by Citigroup held a minority interest. Purchase of the Treasury bills
by the subsidiary was financed by a loan from Citigroup, and proceeds from
the sale of the T-bills were entered as cash flow from operating activities on
Enron's financial statements at the end of 1999. Shortly after the beginning
2 24
of the year, Enron repaid the loan to Citigroup.
As the Examiner explained, the economic substance of the transaction
was that Enron borrowed $500 million from Citigroup, bought T-bills with
it, sold the bills, recorded the proceeds from the sale as $500 million in cash
flow from operating activities, and then repaid the loan from Citigroup, all
within thirty days straddling the end of the 1999 reporting year, without
22 5
reflecting the loan as a debt on its financial statements.
In the announcement of its settlement with Citigroup relating to Project
Nahanni and other matters, the SEC stated that the transaction was entered
into "just long enough to achieve a year-end financial reporting effect," and
that characterizing proceeds from the sale of the T-bills as cash from
operating activities "created the false impression that this transaction related
to Enron's regular course-of-business investments in energy and technology
companies." 22 6 The Examiner similarly found that the accounting treatment
of the proceeds was not in conformity with generally accepted accounting
principles ("GAAP"), 227 and that the loan obtained to purchase the T-bills
by the subsidiary should have been recorded as debt on Enron's balance
sheet. 2 28 In essence, the Examiner concluded, Project Nahanni served no
business purpose other than to burnish Enron's financial statements. 22 9 The

221. David R. Herwitz & Matthew J. Barrett, Accounting for Lawyers 117 (3d concise
ed. 2001).
222. Id. at 263.
223. Citigroup, Inc., 80 SEC Docket at 2620.
224. Id. at 2623.
225. Final Batson Report, supra note 75, app. C, at 68.
226. Citigroup, Inc., 80 SEC Docket at 2616.
227. Second Batson Report, supra note 55, app. I, annex 3, at 17, available at
http://www.enron.com/corp/por/pdfs/examiner2/9551-09.pdf (Nahanni Transactions).
228. Id. app. I, annex 3, at 14.
229. See id. app. I, annex 3, at 1-2.
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next two sections describe how the transaction was structured and the roles
that lawyers played in that process.
B. The Structure of ProjectNahanni
Nahanni was a form of transaction that the Examiner described as a
"minority interest financing transaction." 230 In these financings, Enron or
an affiliate formed a majority-owned subsidiary. This subsidiary was
consolidated with Enron's financial statements. 23 1 Another entity with at
least 3% equity from non-Enron sources was the minority owner in the
subsidiary. 232 Of the funds contributed to the subsidiary by this entity in
return for its minority interest, three percent was comprised of equity and
the other 97% of the proceeds of loans. 233 The majority-owned subsidiary
then typically loaned these funds to Enron or an Enron affiliate. This
amount was reflected on Enron's balance sheet as an ostensible
investment
234
in the minority interest in the subsidiary, rather than as debt.
For purposes of the Nahanni project, Enron created a subsidiary known
as Marengo, in which a wholly owned Enron subsidiary, Yellowknife, held
a majority interest as general partner. 2 35 In return for its interest, Enron
contributed $400 million in Enron notes and $100 million worth of
preferred stock in one of its wholly owned subsidiaries. 236 Nahanni was
created as an entity to serve as the limited partner in Marengo. The source
of its capital contribution to Marengo was a $485 million loan from
Citigroup, secured by Nahanni's interest in Marengo, and $15 million of
equity contributed to Nahanni by investors. 237 With its $500 million in debt
and equity Nahanni then purchased $500 million worth of Treasury
securities, which it contributed to Marengo in exchange for Nahanni's
limited partnership interest. 238 The entire structure was put in place on
December 21, 1999.239
On December 29, 1999, Enron directed Marengo to sell the Treasury bills
and make the $500 million proceeds available to Enron under a demand
loan from Marengo to Enron. 240 As a condition of this transaction,

230. Id. app. I, annex 1, at 1. The discussion in this paragraph is drawn from Appendix I,
pages 1-4. The Examiner distinguished minority interest financings from "simply third-party
minority interest investments in Enron subsidiaries." Id. at 79 n.155.
231. Second Batson Report, supra note 55, app. I, at 3.
232. Id. app. I, at 4.
233. Id. app. I, annex 3, at 6.
234. The loan from the subsidiary to Enron was then treated as an intercompany loan that
was cancelled out in the consolidation of the financial statements. Id. at 81.
235. Id. app. I, annex 3, at 4.
236. See infra fig.2 (step 1); see also Second Batson Report, supra note 55, app. I, annex
3, at 5.
237. See infra fig.2 (step 2); see also Second Batson Report, supra note 55, app. I, annex
3, at 6-7.
238. See infra fig.2 (step 3).
239. Citigroup, Inc., 80 SEC Docket 2614, 2622 (2003).
240. See infra fig.2 (step 4).
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Citigroup required that Enron obtain a letter of credit from a financial
institution to guarantee the loan. The term of the loan could not exceed the
term of the letter of credit that Enron obtained. The letter of "credit...
expired on January 27, 2000, thus assuring repayment of the loan prior to
that date." 24 1 Enron recorded the $500 million that it had obtained from
Marengo as cash flow from operating activities, which constituted 41% of
the $1.2 billion in such funds for 1999.242
The Examiner stated that, on January 13, 2000, Enron drew on the letter
to repay the loan to Marengo with interest. 243 On the following day Enron
caused Marengo to partially redeem Nahanni's limited partnership interest
244
in the amount of $485 million in principal and $2.1 million in interest,
24 5
which Nahanni used to repay its loan from Citigroup.

241. Third Interim Report of Neal Batson, Court-Appointed Examiner, app. C, at 62, In re
Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2003), available at
http://www.enron.com/corp/por/pdfs/exanminer3/appendixC.pdf [hereinafter Third Batson
Report] (Role of Enron's Officers).
242. See infra fig.2 (step 5).
243. See infra fig.2 (step 6).
244. See infra fig.2 (step 7).
245. The Third Batson Report says that the loan was repaid on January 13, 2000, and that
$485 million was repaid to Nahanni the following day. Third Batson Report, supra note 241,
app. C, at 62. The SEC Proceeding, however, says that Enron drew on the letter of credit to
repay the loan to Marengo on January 24, 2000, and then directed Marengo to pay Nahanni
$487.1 million, representing the principal and interest on Nahanni's loan from Citigroup.
Citigroup, Inc., 80 SEC Docket 2614, 2623 (2003). This slight difference, however, does
not affect the analysis of the transaction by the Examiner and the SEC, which is based on the
fact that Enron effectively received $500 million from Citigroup and arranged beforehand to
repay it less than thirty days afterward. See also infra fig.2 (step 8).
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FIGURE 2: PROJECT NAHANNI

(1)
(2)
(3)

(4)

(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)

Enron transfers $400 million in notes and $100 million in
preferred stock to Marengo, in return for majority interest and
general partner status.
Nahanni was created and capitalized with a $485 million loan
from Citigroup and $15 million in equity from outside
investors.
Nahanni purchases $500 million in Treasury securities and
contributes these to Marengo in return for limited partner
status.
On December 29, 1999, Marengo sells the Treasury securities it
receives from Nahanni and transfers proceeds to Enron, in
return for a demand note backed by a Letter of Credit.
Enron records the proceeds it receives from Marengo as cash
flow from operations for the last quarter of 1999.
On January 13, 2000, Enron repays the loan from Marengo
with interest.
On January 14, 2000, Marengo redeems Nahanni's partnership
interest in the amount of $487.1 million.
Nahanni uses the $487.1 million to repay the loan from
Citigroup with interest.
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The payment to Nahanni did not cover the $15 million in equity that
Nahanni had received from outside investors, because Enron wanted to be
able to continue to use this entity for "year-end financial statement
management"
without having to include the debt on its own balance
6
sheet.

24

Enron's treatment of the $500 million as cash flow from operations was
based on "the pretext that buying and selling bonds was part of Enron's
day-to-day business." 24 7 Enron did engage in trading in various "merchant
investments" 24 8 in companies in industries such as energy and
telecommunications, which trading could be considered part of its operating
activities. On the advice of Andersen, 24 9 Enron expanded the definition of
"merchant investments" in its annual 10-K report for the year ending
December 31, 1999, to include government securities maturing in more
250
than ninety days.
As the Examiner noted, however, Enron's own guidelines for classifying
an asset as a merchant investment describe "venture" activity in companies,
projects, or infrastructure assets. "A mere short-term investment in
Treasury securities," said the Examiner, "very plainly is not the type '2of
'venture' investment contemplated by Enron as a merchant investment. 51
For this reason, the cash flow from the sale of the T-bills at a minimum
should have been presented as cash flow from investing activities.
Furthermore, noted the Examiner, the transaction was "hardwired" in
such a way that it in substance was not an investment but a loan. 252 By
"hardwired," the Examiner meant that the transaction was structured to
accomplish a particular economic result that was fundamentally
inconsistent with the way it was treated for accounting purposes. 253 Tying
the term of the loan to the expiration date of the letter of credit effectively
preordained that the loan would be repaid within thirty days of the
December closing of the transaction. In practical terms, the Examiner said,
the deal was structured so that "the proceeds resulting from the year-end
sale of the treasury securities contributed to [Marengo] would be repaid to
the Nahanni lenders within thirty days. '254 The only reason for this quick

246. Third Batson Report, supra note 241, app. C, at 62 n.233. The Enron Examiner
found, however, that the outside equity in Nahanni was not at risk because of certain
guarantees that "effectively assured repayment of both the equity and the debt portions of
Nahanni's investment." Second Batson Report, supra note 55, app. I, annex 3, at 15. As a
result, he said, Nahanni should have been consolidated with Enron's financial statements,
and the loan that Nahanni obtained from Citigroup recorded as debt on Enron's balance
sheet. Id.
247. McLean & Elkind, supra note 13, at 157.
248. Second Batson Report, supra note 55, app. I, annex 3, at 17.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Third Batson Report, supra note 241, app. C, at 61.
253. Id.
254. Id. app. C, at 62.
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round trip of the money was for it to appear as cash flow from operations on
Enron's year-end balance statement before Enron paid it back. 255
As a result, the Examiner found, there was sufficient evidence from
which a fact finder could conclude that "the Nahanni transaction was
implemented over year-end for the purpose of artificially inflating Enron's
cash flow from operating activities, rather than to obtain financing or for
256
another business purpose."
C. Enron'sAttorneys
V&E served as outside counsel for Enron in Project Nahanni, under the
supervisior of Scott Sefton, General Counsel for Enron Global Finance.
Although it appears that counsel for Citigroup drafted many of the
transaction documents, both Sefton and V&E attorneys reviewed and
analyzed the relevant material. Ronald Astin of V&E testified that Sefton,
he, and V&E partner Kenneth Anderson, whose specialty was banking,
finance, and loan transactions, were the attorneys representing Enron's
7
interest.

25

Astin told the Examiner that V&E' s understanding of Nahanni was that it
was akin to a revolving loan available to Enron for use over a period of
time-that it would be "used, repaid and reused. ' 258 This is consistent with
the fact that when Enron repaid the loan it directed Marengo to return only
an amount reflecting Nahanni's debt to Citigroup.
This ostensibly left sufficient equity from outside investors in Nahanni to
avoid having to include any of that entity's debt on Enron's balance
sheet. 259 This in turn made Nahanni available for additional minority
interest transactions with Enron. Astin testified that he was not aware that
Enron intended to repay the loan shortly following the end of 1999. When
he was working on the transaction, he said, he did not believe that "it was
anything other than a structure that was intended to last for a significant
260
period of time."
The Examiner found, however, that, "given the repeated use of specific
year-end straddling dates in connection with the transaction documents, a
fact finder could reasonably infer that the intent to hardwire the transaction"
to accomplish prompt repayment was apparent to attorneys working on the

255. Indeed, the Examiner quoted an internal Citibank memo that described the
transaction as producing "year-end window dressing" for Enron. Second Batson Report,
supra note 55, app. I, annex 3, at 2.
256. Final Batson Report, supranote 75, app. C, at 68.
257. Id. app. C, at 70.
258. Id. (footnote omitted).
259. Marengo was consolidated into Enron's financial statements, but Nahanni's interest
in Marengo could be shown on Enron's financial statements as a minority interest in a
consolidated Enron subsidiary, as long as there was at least a three percent equity investment
in Nahanni by an outside investor. Second Batson Report, supra note 55, app. I, annex 3, at
14-15.
260. Final Batson Report, supra note 75, app. C, at 71 n.259.
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transaction. 2 6 1 Evidence of this intent includes:
(1) the Marengo
partnership provision permitting the Enron note to Marengo to be held only
between December 17, 1999, and January 24, 2000; (2) the requirement that
the letter of credit be drawn down before January 18, 2000, to pay the
Enron note; (3) the expiration of the letter of credit on January 27, 2000;
and (4) the fact that the Marengo Partnership Agreement permitted only one
distribution to partners annually, to be made no earlier than January 13 of
any year. 262 In addition, the Examiner pointed to a memo from an associate
at V&E to Sefton and Astin stating in a summary of the parties' obligations
that "'Yukon must not continue to hold [the Enron demand note] after
'
January 23, 2000.' 263

These were among the documents reviewed by Astin or Anderson, noted
the Examiner, "although neither attorney worked on all of them." 264 As a
result, a fact finder could conclude that it was "apparent to these attorneys
that the repayment of the $500 million within thirty days of the December
1999 closing, was preordained. '26 5 A fact finder also could conclude that
V&E "knew of Enron's accounting goal-to recognize funds flow at yearend-and knew that the Nahanni transaction lacked any material business
266
purpose apart from its impact on Enron's financial statements."
The Examiner found that there was no evidence of any attempt by either
Sefton or the V&E attorneys to raise concerns about the transaction,
including the early unwind, at any time before or after it closed. He
therefore concluded that Enron might have causes of action against V&E
for malpractice based on Texas Rule 1.12, malpractice based on negligence,
267
and aiding and abetting Enron officers' breach of their fiduciary duties.
The Examiner noted that V&E might argue that Nahanni had a
substantive business purpose, which was to obtain financing. If it was a
financing, however, the Examiner said, "it was being entered into for a very
short term and was structured to require repayment within thirty days, all to
produce operating cash flow at year-end 1999."268 The Examiner noted that
V&E might claim that it did not know that the $500 million would be
repaid so soon, "but the documents clearly require such repayment, so any
269
such contention would present an issue of fact for the fact-finder."
The Examiner also concluded that Enron might have causes of action
against Sefton for malpractice based on Texas Rule 1.12 and breach of
fiduciary duty because he knew that Nahanni "lacked any business purpose

261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
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apart from its impact on Enron's financial statements." 2 70 Sefton might
argue, the Examiner noted, that he did not understand enough about the
transaction to appreciate its lack of valid business purpose. This argument,
however, might "provide support for a claim that he committed malpractice
in light of his responsibility to oversee the legal work" on the project on
27
Enron's behalf.

1

Sefton alternatively might claim that a valid business purpose animated
the transaction because it was a financing. As with such a claim by V&E,
the Examiner responded that the "hardwired" nature of the deal indicated
that if it was a financing, it was entered into for a very short term and was
structured to be repaid within thirty days that straddled the end of the fiscal
year, "all to produce operating cash flow at year-end 1999."272 While
Sefton may argue that he did not know that the $500 million would be
repaid so quickly, the documents clearly indicate this, so that his claim
would present an issue of fact for a fact finder. 273
D. Questions and Discussion
Astin described his understanding of Enron's business purpose for
Project Nahanni as follows: "[A]t this point in time [Enron was] capital
hungry and all I can recall thinking is that this is one more in a series of
transactions where they were trying to raise money. '27 4 He said that he
believed that Project Nahanni created a revolving loan fund on which Enron
could draw over time, and was unaware of the provision for rapid
repayment of the $500 million.
The Examiner stated that certain documents prepared in connection with
the transaction put Astin and Andersen on notice of the planned repayment
of the $500 million within thirty days, "although neither attorney worked on
all of [these documents]." 27 5 Citigroup apparently created the transaction in
response to Enron's request, and the bank's attorneys prepared many of the
documents. Should a transactional lawyer be presumed to be familiar with
all the documents prepared for a deal, regardless of who creates them? It is
common for drafts to be circulated among many members of the project
team for comment; does this suggest that such a presumption may be
reasonable unless a lawyer can demonstrate otherwise? Even if the lawyer
can rebut the presumption, she will still have to contend with the claim that
a competent attorney should have been aware of the terms of key
documents. To avoid a potential malpractice claim, should only deliberate
concealment of the documents by another party be sufficient to exonerate
the lawyer? In addition, regardless of the knowledge of any particular

270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

Id. app.
Id. app.
Id.
Id.
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Id. app.

C, at 194-95.
C, at 195.

C, at 70 (footnote omitted).
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attorney, should a law firm be liable for failing to be aware of all relevant
features of a transaction?
In this case, the most direct evidence of hardwiring ostensibly available
to V&E was a memo by a V&E associate that stated that the Enron demand
loan could not be held after January 23, 2000.276 That memo, however, was
dated February 8, 2000, after the loan had been repaid. Nonetheless, the
associate preparing the memo presumably obtained his information from
the relevant transaction documents, which suggests that V&E probably had
access to them while the deal was being put together.
Even if V&E knew of the repayment terms at the time of the transaction,
Nahanni did in fact remain available as a vehicle for further minority
financing of Enron subsidiaries after the loan was repaid to Citigroup,
although it was never used for this purpose. The larger structure that the
deal created remained in place, even though the first transaction that used
this structure would be completed in a brief period of time. V&E thus
might argue that this undermines the claim that the firm knew that Nahanni
was created in order to engage in only the $500 million transaction.
Even if that larger structure remained in place, however, did the $500
million transaction suggest that any future use of this structure would be for
questionable purposes? What was the economic benefit to Enron of using
the $500 million to purchase an asset of exactly the same value, then
repaying the same amount shortly afterward? Had Enron used the money,
for instance, to construct a plant or acquire a subsidiary, an observer would
assume that the company expected ultimately that its investment would
generate value that exceeded the amount of the $500 million purchase price.
This would be true even if Enron repaid the money within thirty days. In
that case, it would be easy to assume that Enron had a substantive business
purpose for engaging in the transaction.
Should the absence of such a conventional business rationale for a
transaction put a lawyer on notice that the company may have more sinister
reasons for engaging in the deal? A lawyer may claim that whatever use a
company makes of the proceeds that become available as a result of a
transaction on which he works is a matter of business judgment. The
lawyer is not in a position to second-guess the prudence or wisdom of that
decision, even if it seems misguided or unconventional.
This seems most persuasive when a lawyer works, say, on a loan
agreement, which results in proceeds that a company's managers have
discretion to use in a variety of ways. The Nahanni project, however, was
not simply a loan from Citigroup to Nahanni. Rather, it was an integrated
transaction intended to culminate in Enron's use of proceeds from the sale
of Treasury securities. In this instance, might a lawyer have a greater
obligation to be aware of the business purpose that the transaction as a
whole is supposed to serve? One dynamic that could have operated in this
situation is that V&E lawyers did not fully understand Enron's putative
276. Id. app. C, at 72.
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business purpose for the transaction, but assumed that the fault lay with
them for not appreciating the intricacies of yet another innovative Enron
financing technique.
If a lawyer fails to identify any conventional business purpose for a
transaction, should she at least be aware of how the company plans to treat
it for accounting purposes? Astin said that he knew of Enron's intention to
obtain proceeds from the sale of Treasury bills, and that he understood that
this would result in "enhancement of cash flow." 277 He did not testify,
however, that he understood that the proceeds would be recorded
specifically as cash flow from operations. If he had, would he then have an
obligation to satisfy himself that this was appropriate? Is this a matter on
which he should defer to the accountants, or must he be satisfied that their
explanation is persuasive before ending his inquiry? If a transaction
straddles reporting periods, is this enough of a warning sign that a lawyer
should be absolutely convinced that the accounting treatment is correct?
If neither Astin nor his partner Anderson were aware of precisely how
Enron planned to account for the proceeds, should they have known? That
is, should they be liable for malpractice based on negligence? Does a
lawyer working on a transaction have a responsibility to be informed not
only about the transaction's technical compliance with legal requirements,
but how the company plans to treat it for accounting purposes?
Finally, Sefton served as General Counsel of Enron Global Finance.
Someone who occupies such a position might rationalize to himself that he
is a generalist charged with broad oversight responsibilities, not someone
equipped to dissect intricate financial transactions. While Sefton was
charged with protecting Enron's interest in reviewing the documents drawn
up by Citigroup's lawyers, he might argue he fulfilled that duty primarily
by engaging experienced lawyers from V&E to analyze the transaction in
detail.
How much can a generalist rely on specialists in a situation like this?
Must the generalist at least understand the business rationale for the
transaction in order to claim that his reliance is reasonable? Or should he
assume that the company has a valid business purpose unless the specialists
suggest otherwise? Enron Global Finance was the main engine within the
company for a variety of complex financial transactions. Must the General
Counsel of such a unit have enough familiarity with these kinds of
arrangements to be able to analyze them in some detail? There's a good
argument that the General Counsel can rely on specialists for professional
judgment on close issues, but that he needs, at a minimum, to understand
the economic rationales for the transactions that he is reviewing.

277. Id. app. C, at 70 (footnote omitted).
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V. SUNDANCE INDUSTRIAL TRANSACTION

A. Background
As part of its efforts to expand its trading activity to new markets beyond
energy sources, Enron began trading in paper, pulp, and wood products in
1997.278 By 2001, it held interests in paper mills in New Jersey and
Quebec, timberland in Maine, and trading contracts for various forest
products. The paper mills and timberland were held by two wholly owned
subsidiaries, Enron North America ("ENA") and Enron Industrial Markets
("EIM"). The financial statements of these subsidiaries were consolidated
with Enron's .279
The trading contracts were held by Fishtail, which was an unconsolidated
subsidiary whose owners were ENA; LJM2, a partnership in which Enron
Chief Financial Officer ("CFO") Andrew Fastow had an interest; and a SPE
called Sonoma. Sonoma in turn was owned by two parties. ENA held a
Class A interest that entitled it to 0.01% of the economic proceeds from
Sonoma, managing member status, and all voting rights. Caymus Trust
held a Class B interest in Sonoma, entitling it to 99.99% of the economic
280
proceeds from the SPE.
In 2001, Enron sought to place all of its forest products assets into a
structure that would not be consolidated into its financial statements.
Sundance Industrial partnership was created for this purpose. Sundance
was structured on June 1, 2001, in the following way. EIM was the general
partner, entitled to a 0.01% economic interest in Sundance. For this
interest, it contributed the Quebec paper mill and the Maine timberland to
the partnership. 28 1 ENA was the Class A limited partner, entitled to a
79.99% economic interest in Sundance. For this interest, it contributed the
New Jersey paper mill and its Class A interest in Fishtail (which held
282
trading contracts).
Enron was the Class C limited partner in Sundance, contributing $208.5
million in cash. With this cash, Sundance purchased from Caymus Trust
the Trust's Class B interest in Sonoma, which gave Sundance a 99.99%
economic interest in that SPE (recall that Sonoma in turn held a 79.99%
economic interest in Fishtail). 283 Finally, Salomon Holding, a wholly
owned Citigroup subsidiary, was a Class B limited partner in Sundance,
284
which gave it a 20% economic interest in the partnership.

278. For the background on the Sundance transactions, see generally Second Batson
Report,
supra
note
55,
app.
K,
at
48-60,
available
at
http://www.enron.com/corplpor/pdfslexanminer2/9551-11 .pdf (Forest Products Transactions).
279. See id. app. K, at 49-50.
280. Id. app. K, at 58.
281. See infra fig.3 (step 1).
282. See infra fig.3 (step 3).
283. See infra fig.3 (step 2).
284. See infra fig.3 (steps 4-5).
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In a transaction on which the Examiner focused, Salomon also purchased
from ENA the Sonoma Class A interest for $20 million, 285 and then
immediately contributed this Class A interest, along with $8.5 million, to
Sundance. 28 6 This Class A interest entitled Sundance to 0.01% of the
economic interest in Sonoma, but gave it managing member status and all
voting rights in it.

285. See infra fig.3 (step 4).
286. See infra fig.3 (step 5).
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FIGURE 3: SUNDANCE INDUSTRIAL PROJECT

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

ElM contributes the Quebec paper mill and Maine timberland
to Sundance, in return for general partner status and 0.01%
economic interest in Sundance.
Enron contributes $208.5 million cash to Sundance, in return
for Class C limited partner status in Sundance.
ENA contributes a New Jersey paper mill and Class A interest
in Fishtail (which holds trading contracts), in return for Class A
limited partner status in Sundance (79.99% economic interest).
Salomon purchases for $20 million ENA's Class A interest in
Sonoma, (0.01% economic interest in Sonoma) which is part
owner of Fishtail.
Salomon contributes Class A Sonoma interest and $8.5 million
cash to Sundance, in return for Class B interest (20% economic
interest).
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B. ENA Sale of Sonoma Class A Interest to Salomon
ENA could have directly contributed its Class A Sonoma interest to
Sundance, rather than selling it to Salomon, which then contributed it to the
partnership. The effect in either case would be the same: Sundance would
acquire the Class A interest. Selling the interest to Salomon, however,
allowed ENA to record $20 million in income from gain on the sale. This
allowed Enron, through ENA, to recognize appreciation in the value of the
trading business that otherwise would remain just an increase on paper.
Had ENA contributed the Class A interest directly, it would have been
unable to do this. Enron concluded that recognizing the proceeds as income
transfer of the interest from
was appropriate under FAS 140 because the
2 87
ENA to Salomon was a true sale of the asset.
As with the ostensible FAS 140 transactions discussed earlier, 288 a true
sale requires that the transferor relinquish control over the asset. To
reiterate, one indication of such relinquishment is that a court would regard
the transferred asset as legally "isolated" from the estate of the transferor in
case of bankruptcy.2 89 Because Enron controlled Sundance as its general
partner, Enron needed a legal opinion stating that the transfer would be
treated as a true sale under state law so that after the transfer, the Sonoma
Class A interest would not be reachable by Enron's creditors. "Applying
the principal factors considered by courts in a true sale legal analysis," the
Examiner declared, "it is clear that no sale of the Sonoma Class A interest
to Salomon Holding took place." 290 The most important considerations
leading to this conclusion were Salomon's lack of control over the Class A
interest, and the absence of any evidence that Salomon had any intent to
own the asset.
In order for Salomon to retain the risks and rewards of owning the Class
A interest, V&E suggested that a put and call agreement be included as part
of the transaction. 29 1 ElM, the general partner of Sundance, and Salomon
executed such an agreement. It provided that during a six-month period
Salomon had a right to call the Class A interest from Sundance (that is, to
require Sundance to seli the interest back to it), and that Sundance had the
right to put the interest back to Salomon (that is, to require Salomon to
purchase the interest from Sundance). If Salomon called the asset, it would
have to pay Sundance $20 million in cash. If Sundance put the asset back
in cash or reduce its
to Salomon, Salomon could either pay $20 million 292
capital account in the partnership by the same amount.

287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

Second Batson Report, supra note 55, app. K, at 77.
See supra Part III.C-E.
See FAS 140, supra note 93, at 4.
Second Batson Report, supra note 55, app. K, at 77.
Id. app. K, at 78 n.331.
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The Examiner found, however, that the terms of the put and call rights,
combined with the terms of the Sundance Partnership Agreement, ensured
that Salomon would never be forced to repurchase the Sonoma Class A
interest. ElM could exercise the put on behalf of Sundance only on
December 5, 6, or 7, 2001, after giving notice of the exercise to Salomon
only on November 19, 20, or 21, 2001. This gave Salomon sufficient time
to exercise its right under the partnership agreement to establish a Board of
Directors to manage Sundance in place of EIM, and to create a deadlock
that would cause the partnership to be dissolved. 293 This meant that
Salomon did not retain any genuine risk associated with the asset.
Furthermore, the Examiner stated, there was no indication that Salomon
had any particular interest in the Sonoma Class A interest, which
represented a 0.01% economic interest in the forest products trading
contracts. Salomon conducted due diligence, for instance, on the Quebec
paper mill that Sundance would hold, and "negotiated terms in the
Sundance Partnership Agreement to protect that asset from being
encumbered by future debt. ' 29 4 By contrast, none of the internal Salomon
memoranda analyzing the Sundance transaction mentioned the Sonoma
Class A interest or the put and call agreement. Enron employees testified
that it was Enron's idea to transfer the Class A interest to Salomon rather
29 5
than contribute it directly to Sundance.
In addition, there is evidence that the purchase price of the interest
reflected internal Enron accounting methods, rather than arms-length
negotiation between ENA and Salomon. "The circumstances surrounding
this sale," said the Examiner, "make it difficult, if not impossible, to find
any legitimate business purpose. ' 296 There was no business reason why,
instead of contributing $20 million directly to Sundance, Salomon would
want to purchase an asset ostensibly worth the same amount, and then
contribute that asset to the partnership.
C. Enron's Lawyers
Ronald Astin of V&E represented Enron in Project Sundance Industrial.
The transaction originally had been structured so that Enron through ENA
would directly contribute Sonoma's Class A interest to Sundance. A month
before the anticipated closing, however, Enron advised Astin that it
believed that the value of the trading assets represented by that interest had
increased by $20 million since the trading activity had been moved off
Enron's books into an unconsolidated subsidiary. 297 Enron planned to
293. Id. Salomon could establish a Board of Directors on which it and Enron each would
have fifty percent of the votes. If the Board deadlocked on any matter, Sundance would be
dissolved, in which case Enron would be required to liquidate Salomon's investment,
"making Enron the sole economic and voting owner of Sundance." Id. app. K, at 13.
294. Id. app. K, at 79 (footnote omitted).
295. Id. (footnote omitted).
296. Id.
297. Final Batson Report, supra note 75, app. C, at 74.
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realize that gain by selling to Salomon an interest that represented the
Salomon would then contribute that interest to
increase in value.
Sundance. 298 A draft memorandum from Astin to Enron, which Astin
testified was never sent, said, "[W]e understand one result of the2 99proposed
sale transaction would be recognition of current period earnings."
Two weeks prior to the closing, Enron told Astin that it would need a true
sale opinion on the sale of the Sonoma Class A interest by ENA to Salomon
in order to recognize the $20 million gain. In a draft memorandum, Astin
described what was necessary for V&E to be able to render the opinion:
[Wie believe it is necessary for the transaction to reflect the assumption
by [Salomon] of real risks and benefits of ownership of the Sonoma A
that survive the transfer of the Sonoma A interest to Sundance. Any court
reviewing the transaction would examine the substance and reality of the
transaction rather than its mere form in order to assess whether the
characterization chosen by the transaction parties would be
300
respected ....
In order for V&E to provide a true sale opinion, the memo stated, each of
three conditions must be satisfied. First, "[t]he transaction must not be prewired (the option given to [Salomon] to contribute cash or the Sonoma A
must be real)." Second, "[t]he transaction must have a commercial purpose
for both parties (other than simply favorable tax or accounting . . .)."
Finally, "[a]ny interest retained by [Salomon] must continue to possess
aspects of risk and rewards of ownership with regard to the Sonoma A (that
continued ownership characteristics with
is, [Salomon] must have some '30
1
regard to the asset it purchased)."
Astin focused primarily on the third condition-that Salomon retain the
risks and rewards of ownership of the Sonoma A interest. Salomon's
immediate transfer of the interest to an affiliate of the seller threatened
satisfaction of this condition. To address this concern, V&E suggested
restructuring the transaction in order to include the put and call agreement
described above. 30 2 This agreement was the product of several weeks of
intensive negotiation. Salomon wanted to minimize any continued risk
associated with the Sonoma A interest, 30 3 "which [V&E] attempted to
resist. '304 The day before the transaction was scheduled to close, Astin
stated in an internal e-mail,
298. Id.
299. Id. app. C, at 75 n.281.
300. Id. app. C, at 75.
301. Id. app. C, at 76 (footnote omitted).
302. See id. app. C, at 76 n.288 ("Astin testified that initially Vinson & Elkins attempted
to get the transaction restructured so that Vinson & Elkins could give a true sale opinion.");
Second Batson Report, supra note 55, app. K, at 78 n.331 (noting that "the put and call was
added at the suggestion of V&E").

303. As a Citibank executive wrote in an internal e-mail, "Spoke with client.... They
" Second Batson
fully understand that we will blow the deal if we are at risk for the put ....
Report, supra note 55, app. K, at 14.

304. Final Batson Report, supra note 75, app. C, at 77.
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The puts and calls are what is necessary for us to give our true sale
opinion regarding true sale matters; at the moment, this is still a bone
sideways in [Salomon's] throat, which is why we haven't closed. It has
also put me in the annoying position of saying no serially to every request
to remove the risk from Salomon, since we're already at the wall on the
305
opinion.
On the day of the closing itself, Salomon's attorney proposed modifying
the agreement to provide that, under certain circumstances within the sole
control of Salomon, the put and call could not be exercised and any prior
attempts to do so would be ineffective. V&E refused to render a true sale
30 6
opinion if this provision was accepted, and it was not.
The Sundance Industrial transaction closed on June 1, 2001. The true
sale opinion was dated June 30, 2001, but the opinion was not completed
and executed until the end of July of that year. In that opinion, Astin
included a footnote that observed that Salomon had the right to establish a
Board of Directors to assume management of Sundance, and was entitled to
appoint half the members of that Board. The footnote then went on to say,
If the Board of Directors, after appointment, experiences Deadlock [an
event of dissolution of Sundance] at any time after notice of exercise of
the Put is given, neither [Salomon's] nor [Enron's] representatives on the
Board of Directors could force the Partnership to disclaim the contractual
rights or obligations of Sundance with respect to such Put. Thus,
[Salomon] does not have the power to block the exercise of the Put
through the appointment of a Board of Directors, unless a Dissolution
Event occurs before notice of exercise
of the Put is required to be given
30 7
under the [put and call] Agreement.
The final clause of the footnote thus indicates that Salomon could block
exercise of the put by establishing a board and creating a deadlock before
notice of exercise of the put.
Attorneys at V&E testified that this was not a correct statement of the put
and call agreement and the Sundance Partnership Agreement.
Notwithstanding this clause, they indicated, the terms of the Partnership
Agreement required that the option remain available for both parties to
exercise prior to December 2000.308 Astin testified that he wrote this clause
a month after the transaction closed, and that he may either have forgotten
about the contrary provision of the Sundance Partnership Agreement or was
referring to the termination of the partnership, rather than its dissolution
though a board deadlock. 30 9 If it was the latter, the Examiner observed, this
would reflect acknowledgement that Salomon "continued to have the power

305.
306.
307.
308.
309.

Id. (footnote omitted).
Id. app. C, at 77, 78 & n.293.
Id. app. C, at 78 n.298 (first alteration in original).
Id. app. C, at 78-79.
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to block the exercise of the put if there were a termination of the partnership
'310
before the notice of exercise of the put were given.
Ultimately, the Examiner concluded that, while there was evidence that
Salomon believed that its risks of owning the Sonoma Class A interest had
been eliminated, 3 11 V&E believed that it had drafted the documents so as to
preserve such risk. He therefore did not find that V&E's conduct with
respect to the put and call agreement might serve as the basis for a claim
against it by Enron.
The Examiner did conclude, however, that there was not a true sale of the
Sonoma Class A interest to Salomon because the transaction served no
business purpose 312-and that there was evidence from which a fact finder
could infer that V&E knew this. 3 13 An internal memo prepared by Astin in
connection with the Sonoma A true sale opinion noted that "the transferor
should be motivated by bona fide business benefits in consummating the
structured finance transaction," and that "[ilt may not be reasonable to rely
on recitations set out in the documents, if the statements or conduct
of the
3 14
parties to the transactions are inconsistent with the recitations."
In issuing its true sale opinion, V&E assumed that "each party has a valid
business purpose for entering into the transaction." 3 15 "We wish to point
out," the opinion continued, "that we have not made any investigation or
inquiry of any Party or of the books and records of any Party. Rather, we
have relied on officer's certificates and representations in the Transaction
Documents as to such factual matters as we have deemed appropriate for
the purposes of this opinion." 316 The Examiner concluded, however, that,
the circumstances surrounding the inclusion of the "sale" at the last
minute, the persistent attempts of Salomon Holding to extinguish any risk
of ownership of the Sonoma Class A interest, and the difficulty that
Vinson & Elkins had in negotiating the put and call provision belie that
either Salomon Holding or Enron had any true business purpose in this
transaction. The only purpose that Vinson & Elkins 3knew
of from
Enron's perspective was to recognize the $20 million gain. 17
As a result, the Examiner found that there was evidence from which a
fact finder could conclude that V&E was liable for malpractice under Texas
Rule 1.12, and for aiding and abetting certain Enron officers' breach of their

310. Id.
311. A description of the Sundance Industrial Transaction prepared by Citigroup on
October 29, 2001, some three months after the delivery of the true sale opinion, stated with
respect to Enron's put right that "[w]e can avoid this result by calling a board and electing to
dissolve the partnership prior to December 5, 2001." Second Batson Report, supra note 55,
app. K, at 78 n.337.
312. See supra notes 290-97 and accompanying text.
313. Final Batson Report, supra note 75, app. C, at 182.
314. Id. app. C, at 80 n.304.
315. Id. app. C, at 81 (quotations omitted).
316. Id. app. C, at 81 n.305.
317. Id. app. C, at 81 (footnote omitted).
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fiduciary duties. 318 The Examiner noted that V&E likely would argue that
it was entitled to rely upon the assumption that the transfer of the Sonoma
A interest served a legitimate business purpose. 3 19 He also observed-with
respect to an aiding and abetting claim-that V&E might argue that it did
not substantially assist Enron in its issuance of the true sale opinion, but
merely acted as a scrivener memorializing the terms of the transaction.
Providing just one legal opinion, however, can constitute substantial
assistance under some circumstances, the Examiner stated. The complexity
a fact finder to determine
of the deal and its documentation could permit
320
that V&E was not acting simply as a scrivener.
D. Questions and Discussion
The Examiner appears to have accepted the claim that V&E genuinely
believed that some risk had been transferred to Salomon as a result of the
put and call provision. In V&E's eyes, the transfer of the Sonoma A
interest therefore complied with the technical requirements for a sale. The
Examiner went on to say, however, that V&E nonetheless could be liable to
Enron because the firm knew that the transfer served no valid business
purpose. In essence, the Examiner seemed to argue, the fact that a
transaction conforms to the letter of the law does not insulate a lawyer from
liability if she knows that it does not conform to the law's spirit.
Transactional lawyers confront divergences between form and substance
all the time. How does a lawyer know when that divergence is so great that
the law will be unwilling to defer to form on the ground that it has been
abused? In the Sundance project, the Examiner based his conclusion on
evidence suggesting that Salomon had no particular interest in the Sonoma
A interest, that it resisted efforts to ensure that it assumed some of the risk
associated with the interest, and that upon transfer it immediately
321
contributed the interest to a partnership in which Enron had an interest.
V&E might argue that once it provided for a transfer of risk to Salomon, it
was entitled to assume that the sale served the business purpose that any
sale serves: to furnish sale proceeds to the seller and something of value to
the buyer. Enron received cash in the transaction, and Salomon received
something that it could use to make its capital contribution to Sundance.
The fact that Enron told V&E of its intention to record a gain from
appreciation in the value of the Sonoma interest seems to be the fact that the
Examiner regards as most troublesome for the law firm. Formation of
Sundance had been planned for some time, but the transaction originally
was structured so that Enron would contribute the Sonoma interest directly
to Sundance. 3 22 Enron would be unable to recognize the appreciation on

318. Id. app. C, at 182-83.
319. Id. app. C, at 182.
320. Id. app. C, at 183.
321. See supra note 294 and accompanying text.

322. Final Batson Report, supra note 75, app. C, at 74-75.
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that interest if this occurred, however, so the company wanted to restructure
the deal in a way that permitted it to do so. The Examiner regarded V&E's
knowledge of this as sufficient to charge it with notice that Enron had only
an accounting, not a business, purpose, for the sale of the Sonoma interest
to Salomon.
Consider, however, an analogy to tax practice. If a company has a
legitimate business reason to engage in a transaction, it is appropriate for a
tax lawyer to attempt to structure the transaction in a way that minimizes
the company's tax burden. Enron might argue that it had a valid business
purpose for creating the Sundance partnership, which was to move its forest
products assets off its books by placing them into an unconsolidated
subsidiary in which Salomon held an interest. Having decided to do this, it
would then have been appropriate for Enron to structure the capital
contributions to that subsidiary in a way that maximized the economic
benefits to Enron. As long as that arrangement transferred enough incidents
of ownership to Salomon, the form of the transaction should be respected.
If this is a colorable argument, does it mean that it was defensible for
Enron's lawyers to add a feature to a transfer of assets so that it met the
technical requirement for a "sale," even if the lawyers knew that no sale
was occurring in any conventional sense-as long as that transfer could be
characterized as one component of a larger transaction? This is basically
what V&E did by grafting the put and call provision onto the transfer
agreement. This defense is the opposite of the claim that a lawyer is
responsible only for a narrow, limited portion of a deal and should not be
charged with evaluating the overall transaction. Instead, the argument is
that the matter on which the lawyer worked is only one piece of a larger
transaction that has a legitimate business purpose, and the client's choice of
form with respect to that discrete component should be honored.
What would be the implications of accepting this argument in
transactional work? It probably would not be difficult to characterize many
transactions requiring true sale opinions as but one piece of a larger set of
interrelated transactions. Expanding the definition of what constitutes a
"transaction" thus might risk weakening constraints on the manipulation of
form to defeat substance.
Suppose that Enron had simply told V&E that it wanted to restructure the
transaction without indicating that this would enable Enron to realize a gain
on the appreciation in the value of the Sonoma interest. Would V&E then
be justified in assuming that there was a valid business purpose for the
transfer of assets to Salomon? This seems like an appropriate assumption
in most instances, perhaps because the business purpose usually is selfevident. What if the purpose is not obvious? Should lawyers inquire about
it?
As a practical matter, one would think that lawyers need this information
in order to provide competent legal services. A lawyer can be more creative
and effective if he is aware of what it is the client wants to accomplish. To
push the analysis a step further, what if the client explains the objective and
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the lawyer doesn't completely understand the explanation? Should he give
the client the benefit of the doubt or continue to press for a clearer
explanation? One suspects that this situation may have arisen on occasion
at Enron, where managers saw themselves as'323
brilliantly creative and had
little patience for those who "just didn't get it."
In the proposed scenario, could V&E simply agree to help restructure the
transaction without asking why the client wanted to do so? Could the
absence of an obvious business purpose later support an inference that the
firm knew that the transaction had no objective other than the manipulation
of Enron's financial statements? Was the need for V&E to suggest a put
and call provision in the transfer agreement a warning sign that should have
alerted the attorneys that this "sale" was not intended to accomplish the
usual purposes served by a sale? If not, was Salomon's resistance to the put
a red flag that more inquiry was necessary before assuming a valid business
purpose?
Finally, it is worth focusing on the put and call provision for a moment.
The Examiner concluded that V&E believed that the provision was
effective, and therefore that some risk associated with the Sonoma interest
had been transferred to Salomon. At the same time, however, the Examiner
concluded in his Second Report, which analyzed the Sundance Industrial
transaction in detail, that the extremely limited time during which the put
and call rights could be exercised "ensured that Salomon... could never be
forced to repurchase the Sonoma Class A interest. '324 The Examiner also
found that the Sundance Partnership Agreement contained provisions
designed to enhance Salomon's ability to establish a Board and declare a
deadlock, thereby avoiding exercise of the put. 325 These findings served as
part of the basis for the Examiner's conclusion that "the put and call the
parties placed on the asset was not designed to be implemented, ' 326 and that
as a result there was no true sale of the Sonoma A interest.
In light of these findings, was V&E' s belief that the put was available for
exercise a reasonable one? If the put and call agreement was subject to the
Examiner's and Salomon's interpretation, was V&E negligent in preparing
it because it did not serve the client's objective that the transfer of the
interest be treated as a true sale?
Suppose that V&E ensured that the Sundance transaction documents
enabled the parties to exercise a put or call, but that the lawyers knew that
Enron and Salomon had informally agreed not to exercise these rights.
Could V&E still deliver a true sale opinion? Presumably not, since the
intent of the parties can be inferred not only from the documents but also
from the parties' conduct.

323.
324.
325.
326.

See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
Second Batson Report, supra note 55, app. K, at 78-79.
Id. app. K, at 79.
Id. app. K, at 87.
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Project Sundance Industrial thus is a useful vehicle for exploring the
concept of business purpose as a constraint upon the manipulation of form.
When a transactional lawyer is justified in assuming a valid purpose, and
when she must investigate further, can be difficult questions to answer. In
addition, Sundance raises the issue of what kind of knowledge can be
attributed to lawyers working on complex transactions with multiple
components.
VI. RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS
A. Background
Beginning in 1997 and continuing until mid-2001, Enron engaged in
twenty-one transactions with Enron-created SPEs in which CFO Andrew
Fastow and other Enron employees were involved. 327 These entities were
known as LJM1 and LJM2. As long as three percent of the equity at risk in
the SPE was held by outside investors (and assuming a valid business
purpose), these transactions could be treated for accounting purposes as
occurring at arms length between two independent entities. 32 8 As a result,
Enron could book as income any gains that it derived from the transactions.
Furthermore, it did not have to reflect on its balance sheet the assets or,
especially important, the liabilities of the SPEs-that is, the SPE did not
have to be consolidated into Enron's financial reports.
The Examiner concluded that the related party transactions he reviewed
"had no business purpose from Enron's perspective, other than to achieve
desired financial statement reporting. '329 He estimated that these and other
transactions with related party SPEs permitted Enron to overstate its income
by $1.5 billion and its equity by the same amount, and to understate its
indebtedness by $885 million. Aside from the FAS 140 transactions, the
most notable transactions between Enron and the related party SPEs
involved hedging, or arrangements in which an SPE purported to indemnify
Enron for the loss in value of Enron's investments in other companies.
The discussion below of related party transactions focuses first on two
matters with respect to which the Examiner found that Enron's lawyers
might be liable for malpractice and/or aiding and abetting breach of
fiduciary duty: Enron's purported hedges with the SPEs and the failure to
press for adequate disclosure of Fastow's compensation for his involvement
in LJMI and LJM2. The discussion then moves to two matters as to which
the Examiner did not find potential attorney liability, but which offer a
useful vehicle for analyzing issues that can arise in transactional work. The
first of these is possible SPE difficulty in meeting the three percent outside
327. For a short overview of the related party transactions, see id. app. L, at 1-6, available
at http://www.enron.com/corp/por/pdfs/exaniiner2/9551-12.pdf.
328. See McLean & Elkind, supra note 13, at 157 ("[A]s long as 3 percent of the capital
in the SPE came from an independent risk... the SPE qualified as independent.").
329. Id. at 6.
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equity requirement, and the second is the "warehousing" of assets by Enron
in SPEs.
B. Issue One: The "Hedges" that Weren't
The hedging transactions took the same general form, with some
individual variations. The impetus for them was the fact that Enron had
"merchant investments" in companies that it carried on its books at current
value, under the mark-to-market method of accounting. 330 To reiterate,
under this method if the share price of a company increased, Enron did not
need to wait to sell shares at a gain to record an increase in income. Rather,
it could reflect the change in price by increasing the value of assets on its
balance sheet, and recording the appreciation as income on its income
statement. By the same token, any decrease in share price had to be
reflected in a reduction in the value of assets on the balance sheet and a loss
on the income statement. Enron held a substantial amount of merchant
investments in companies whose value was volatile. This created the
prospect that Enron's own reported financial performance could vary
widely-a condition that would make the stock market nervous and dampen
the value of Enron's shares.
Parties facing this prospect can attempt to reduce their risk by entering a
"hedging" transaction with another party, typically a large financial
institution. For a fee, the institution essentially agrees to compensate a
company such as Enron for the decline in the value of certain of its
merchant investments. The amount is determined by the difference
between the share price at the time of the hedge contract and the price at a
certain date in the future. With a hedge, while Enron would have to record
the decline in the value of its investment in its financial reports, it also
would be able to record a gain in the same amount because of its right to
this payment. Enron thus would be "held harmless"-it would not be
affected one way or other by the decline in the value of the investment. If
the share price rose, Enron would pay the hedging party the value of the
increase-but it could also record the increase in value in its financial
statements. Again, the result is a wash. Through such an arrangement, a
company can "lock in" the value of its investments at a given time.
Enron found it difficult to find parties to hedge its risk because many of
its investments were in companies for which there was not a substantial and
liquid trading market. 33 1 This was the case, for instance, with many hightech energy trading and telecommunications companies. The share price of
these companies often rose to dizzying heights. They also, however, posed
the risk of precipitous declines. Without a party with whom to hedge,
Enron could not lock in the high value of the shares. It thus would be fully
exposed to the vagaries of the market.

330. Id. at 7.
331. See Fox, supra note 10, at 149.
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To remedy this situation, Enron decided to create ostensibly independent
SPEs with whom it could engage in hedging transactions. In order for the
SPE to be treated as a separate entity that did not have to be included in
Enron's financial reports, outside investors had to contribute at least three
percent of the equity at risk. This contribution, and in some cases other
capital, was provided by a partnership managed by Andrew Fastow known
as LJM1 or LJM2. The remainder of the capital in most cases was
furnished by subsidiaries of Enron.
The SPE then entered into a Total Return Swap with Enron. Under this
arrangement, the SPE agreed to pay Enron the amount of any decline in the
value of certain investments, while Enron agreed to pay the SPE the amount
of any increase. In this way, Enron purported to lock in the value of its
investments at the date of the agreement. As the bankruptcy Examiner
explained,
Accordingly, if the market value of the asset were $100 on the date the
hedge became effective and declined to $90 at the end of the next fiscal
quarter, Enron would record a $10 decline in the value of the merchant
investment on its balance sheet, but it would also record a new $10 price
risk management asset on its balance sheet. The net effect on the balance
sheet would be $0. The increase
and decline would also offset each other
3 32
on Enron's income statement.
The transactions with the SPEs could serve as true hedges for Enron only
if the company suffered no financial impact from a decline in the value of
investments that it hedged. This would occur if the SPE was able to
compensate Enron for the amount of any decline. In order to cover its
potential obligation, the SPE needed capital. The problem was that
investors were unlikely to be interested in contributing funds to the entity
because the SPE was unable to hedge its own risks of having to pay
compensation to Enron. The very features of the investments that made it
nearly impossible for Enron to hedge its investment with a conventional
third party-their size, risk, and illiquidity-made it impossible for the SPE
to enter into a true hedge with anyone else with respect to its obligations on
those same investments. If the SPE did not have enough capital to cover its
potential obligations to Enron, however, then Enron obtained no real
protection from its hedges with the SPE.
Enron purported to solve this problem primarily by capitalizing the
hedging SPE with Enron's own stock. By doing this, however, Enron was
effectively hedging with itself-which is no hedge at all. As the Powers
Report put it, "The economic reality of these transactions was that Enron
never escaped the risk of loss, because it had provided the bulk of the
capital with which the SPEs would pay Enron. ' 33 3

332. Second Batson Report, supra note 55, app. L, at 8.
333. Special Investigative Comm. of the Bd. of Dirs. of Enron Corp., Report of
Investigation
14
(Feb.
1,
2002),
available
at
http://www.enron.com/corp/por/pdfs/PowersReport.pdf [hereinafter Powers Report].
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The first ostensible hedging transaction with an SPE occurred when
Enron established LJM to hedge Enron's investment in a
telecommunications company called RhythmsNet Connections. At a later
date, Enron established a second SPE known as LJM2, and engaged in
several additional purported hedges with LJM2 entities known as the
"Raptors."
C. RhythmsNet
The RhythmsNet transaction involving LJM1 was the first transaction in
which Enron entered into a supposed hedge with an SPE. V&E lawyers did
not work on structuring this transaction, but did work on discrete aspects of
it. The story begins in March 1998, when Enron's broadband unit
purchased $10 million of shares in an Internet service provider start-up
The investment eventually was
named RhythmsNet Connections.
calculated as a purchase at a sale price of $1.85 per share. 334 In April 1999,
Rhythms had an initial public offering ("IPO") at a price of $21 per share,
$10
and the share price rose sharply afterward. By June 1, 1999, Enron's
335
million investment was worth about $260 million, or $48.50 a share.
Enron treated the Rhythms investment as part of its merchant investment
portfolio, which was marked to market under fair value accounting. 336 It
thus immediately booked the appreciation in the value of the Rhythms stock
as income, which accounted for almost one-third of the company's earnings
in 1999. 337 The problem was that this gain was on paper, but not in cash.
Indeed, Enron could not convert it to cash for six months. As a condition of
from
being able to buy the pre-IPO Rhythms shares, Enron was prohibited 338
selling or transferring the ownership risk of the shares to another party.
The company thus was exposed during this period to the risk that the
share price of Rhythms would decline, which would lead to the need to
book a loss. Enron desired a hedge to lock in the appreciation in the value
of the Rhythms stock. It was unlikely, however, to find anyone willing to
provide it at anything other than a prohibitive price. Enron held a large
portion of the thinly traded stock, which meant that trying to sell the stock
could itself depress the price. Furthermore, technology stocks were
notoriously volatile, and a precipitous decline in value was a real
339
possibility.
Enron CFO Andrew Fastow told Enron executives that he was willing to
create a new SPE to hedge Enron's Rhythms position. 340 This entity was
known as LJM, and later as LJM1 after Fastow created a second LJM
334. Second Batson Report, supra note 55, app. L, annex 2 at 1 (Rhythms Transactions).
335. Id.

336. Id.
337. Mimi Swartz & Sherron Watkins, Power Failure: The Inside Story of the Collapse
of Enron 167 (2003).
338. Second Batson Report, supra note 55, app. L, annex 2, at 1-2.
339. Id. app. L, annex 2, at 3.
340. McLean & Elkind, supra note 13, at 191.
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SPE. 34 1

LJM's general partner was LJM Partners, LP, whose limited
partner was Fastow and whose general partner was LJM Partners, LLC.
The sole and managing member of the latter entity was Fastow. 342 The
upshot of this organizational structure was, as the Examiner put it, that
"Fastow owned and controlled the general partner of LJM1. ' '343 This
general partner contributed $1 million to LJM 1 through Fastow in return for
a 6% interest in it. 344 LJM1's two limited partners were entities affiliated
with Credit Suisse First Boston and Royal Bank of Scotland. They each
contributed $7.5 million in cash to IJM1 and each owned 47% of it. 345
Fastow was not permitted to receive distributions of LJM in the form of
Enron stock or proceeds from it. He was, however, entitled to 100% of all
other distributions until he had received (1) $1 million plus the general
partner's portion of LJMI's assets and (2) "a 25% compound annual rate of
return on that amount. '3 46 Any LJM1 distributions in excess of the latter
were to be made 50% to the general partner and 50% pro rata to the limited
34 7
partners and general partner.
Enron was not a partner in LJM1, but funded it with about 6.7 million
Enron shares worth $276 million, in return for $64 million in promissory
notes. 348 Certain restrictions were placed on LJMI's ability to transfer or
hedge these shares. These allowed LJM1 to acquire the shares at a discount
of $108 million. This difference between the market value of the shares and
LJMI's ostensible obligation to Enron was intended to provide LJM1 the
capacity to enter into a hedge with Enron. 349 LJM1 then funded an entity
known as Swap Sub. LJM1 formed a wholly owned entity, SwapCo, and
transferred about 32,000 Enron shares to it. 350 SwapCo then contributed
these shares to Swap Sub in return for becoming Swap Sub's general
51
partner. 3
LJM1 contributed to Swap Sub $3.75 million in proceeds from the sale of
about 91,000 of the Enron shares, and about 3.1 million shares of Enron, in
return for a limited partnership interest in Swap Sub.3 52 The market value
of these shares was $127 million, with a discounted value of $77 million,
which gave Swap Sub a credit capacity of about $50 million. 35 3 Swap Sub
341. LJM are the initials of Fastow's wife and children.
342. Second Batson Report, supra note 55, app. L, annex 2, at 5.
343. Id.

344. See infra fig.4 (step 1).
345. See infra fig.4 (step 2); see also Second Batson Report, supra note 55, app. L, annex

2, at6.
346. Second Batson Report, supra note 55, app. L, annex 2, at 5-6.
347. Id.

348. See infra fig.4 (step 3).
349. Second Batson Report, supra note 55, app. L, annex 2, at 8. "Credit capacity is
essentially the excess of a[n entity's] asset value over its liabilities." Id. app. L, annex 5, at 5
n.20 (Raptor Transactions).
350. See infra fig.4 (step 5).
351. See infra fig.4 (step 6).

352. See infra fig.4 (step 4).
353. Second Batson Report, supra note 55, app. L, annex 2, at 9.
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then granted Enron a put option under which Enron had the right to require
Swap Sub to purchase almost 5.4 million shares of Rhythms stock at a price
of $56.125. 354 This prevented Enron from incurring any losses on the
Rhythms investment if the share price fell below that figure.

354. Id. app. L, annex 2, at 12-13; see also infra fig.4 (step 7).
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FIGURE 4: RHYTHMSNET HEDGE

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

LJM Partners, LP, contributes $1 million cash to LJM1, in
return for general partner status.
Two outside investors contribute $15 million cash to LJM1, in
return for limited partner status and 94% interest.
Enron contributes 6.7 million Enron shares worth $276 million,
in return for $64 million in promissory notes.
LJM 1 contributes 3.1 million Enron shares worth $127 million
and $3.75 million proceeds from sale of Enron shares to Swap
Sub, in return for limited partner status.
LJM1 contributes 32,000 Enron shares to wholly owned
SwapCo.
SwapCo contributes the 32,000 Enron shares it received from
LJMl to Swap Sub, in return for general partner status.
Swap Sub enters into a hedge granting Enron a put on 5.4
million RhythmsNet shares at an exercise price of $56.125 per
share.

2005]

TEACHING ENRON

1209

In return for its contributions, Enron received two notes from LJM1
totaling $64 million, with no recourse for Enron against any of the LJM1
partners. In addition, Swap Sub granted Enron a put option under which
Enron had the right to require Swap Sub to purchase 5.4 million shares of
Rhythms stock at an exercise price of $56.125 per share. 355 If Rhythms'
share price fell below that figure, Enron would have to record its loss in the
value of the investment under mark-to-market accounting. At the same
time, however, even though Swap Sub did not have to make an actual
payment until a later time, Enron was entitled immediately to record as
income the payment to which it was entitled from Swap Sub, which offset
that loss. This ostensibly locked in the appreciation of the Rhythms shares,
holding Enron harmless for any decline in value.
The only funds that Swap Sub had available to make its eventual
payment to Enron, however, were the Enron shares that it had received
either directly or indirectly from LJM1. As a result, "[b]ecause this would
be a return of its own property, Enron would never realize any net economic
benefit." 356 An additional problem with the arrangement was that, to the
extent that Enron's share price might be reduced by the decline in the value
of its merchant investments such as Rhythms, a hedging SPE's obligation to
Enron would be increasing at the same time as the value of the Enron shares
that it had available to satisfy that obligation would be declining.
Nonetheless, Enron included the value of the hedge in its financial
357
statements.
The Examiner summarized the net economic effect of the Rhythms hedge
in this way:
Enron's sole motivation for entering into the Rhythms hedging
transaction was to impact its income statement to achieve desired
financial reporting results. Enron was indifferent as to whether it ever
received cash under these hedges in the future because it was marking
each option on the Rhythms stock to fair value to offset any losses
attributable to declines in the value of the Rhythms stock. The hedges
with Swap Sub had no economic benefit to Enron because the sole asset
supporting the hedges was the Enron stock held by Swap Sub, which had
been contributed by Enron. Upon settling the hedge, all Enron would
receive would be the assets that it had contributed (indirectly) to Swap
Sub (or their value) less the amount of any compensation paid to LJM1
358
and its partners.

355. PricewaterhouseCoopers eventually provided an opinion that the notes and the put
option that Enron received (both for the shares that it contributed to LJM1) was fair
consideration. Second Batson Report, supranote 55, app. L, annex 2, at 16-17.
356. Final Batson Report, supra note 75, app. C, at 115.
357. Another potential problem that the Examiner noted but did not discuss at length is
that the lock-up provision that was a condition of Enron's purchase of the pre-IPO Rhythms
stock apparently prohibited hedging the investment in the stock. Unless the underwriters
waived this provision, Enron's hedge with Swap Sub violated it. Second Batson Report,
supra note 55, app. L, annex 2, at 13-14.
358. Id. app. L, annex 2, at 36.
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The law firm of Kirkland & Ellis established LJM1 and represented it in
the Rhythms transaction. 359 V&E represented Enron in this matter, but
apparently did not participate in the planning or initial structuring of the
Rhythms transaction. 360 In-house lawyer Kristina Mordaunt appears to
have directed the legal work on the deal. The principal V&E attorneys were
Edward Osterberg, John Leggett, and Petrina Chandler. Osterberg and
Leggett advised Enron on tax aspects of the transaction, while Chandler
36 1
acted as the lead transactional lawyer within V&E.
The bankruptcy Examiner concluded that the evidence could support a
finding that V&E committed malpractice because it knew that the Rhythms
hedge was supported only by Enron's own stock, and thus "was a hedge
only for financial statement benefits, lacking any genuine economic
substance." 362 He focused specifically on Osterberg, who understood from
"conversations with people at Enron and the descriptions of the transaction
[he] saw' that the purpose of the project was to hedge Enron's risk on the
Rhythms investment. 363 The Examiner stated that Osterberg, however,
knew that (1) Enron delivered Enron shares to Swap Sub as consideration
for the hedge of Rhythms stock, (2) Enron stock constituted the assets of
Swap Sub, and (3) as a result, Enron stock held by Swap Sub was the only
thing of value available to meet Swap Sub's hedging obligation to Enron.
The Examiner stated,
Osterberg therefore possessed all of the facts necessary to an
understanding that Enron effectively paid significant value in a
transaction in which it had no possibility of obtaining an economic return
and that the Rhythms hedge was non-economic in nature and could
achieve only accounting benefits. Osterberg testified, however, that
during his work on [the project] he neither discussed nor considered
whether the Rhythms hedge was economic in nature
and did not know
364
how Enron would account for the Rhythms hedge.
Questions and Discussion
Should malpractice be attributed to V&E by virtue of Osterberg's
knowledge of the essential features of the Rhythms hedge and his
participation in the transaction? Could he claim that he was responsible
only for the tax aspects of the deal, and assumed that those who worked on
structuring the deal focused on the economic substance of the transaction?
The concepts of "economic substance" and "business purpose" are
familiar to tax lawyers. In order for the Internal Revenue Service to honor
the tax treatment chosen by the taxpayer for a transaction, that transaction
359. Final Batson Report, supra note 75, app. C, at 117.
360. Id.

361. Id.
362. Id. app. C, at 180.
363. Id. app. C, at 117-18 (quoting Osterberg's sworn statement of October 23, 2003).
364. Id. app. C, at 118 (footnote omitted).
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must be motivated primarily by a business purpose beyond simply reducing
taxes. Tax lawyers are not permitted simply to assume in all instances that
their clients have a legitimate business purpose. Once a lawyer is satisfied
that a company has such a business motive for entering into a transaction,
she then can attempt to devise a structure for the transaction that minimizes
the company's tax liability. Osterberg thus would have had occasion to
discuss the economics of the Rhythms arrangement at least to the extent
necessary to assess whether Enron was engaging in the transaction simply
to lower its taxes.
Enron presumably told Osterberg that its motive for Rhythms was to
hedge the volatility of the value of its merchant investments. This is a
legitimate business purpose that would justify the tax treatment that the
company sought. Could Osterberg simply take Enron at its word and
assume that the company had a valid business purpose?
Generally
speaking, he would have an obligation to satisfy himself-at least as a
preliminary matter-that there was no reason to disbelieve Enron's
description of its business objective. In the case of a purported hedging
transaction, that obligation arguably would involve determining that the
entity with which Enron was hedging had sufficient assets of its own to
meet its obligations under the arrangement.
How closely would Osterberg be likely to scrutinize the Rhythms hedge?
It is plausible to imagine that as a tax lawyer he was inclined to examine it
most critically if the transaction created substantial tax benefits that
otherwise would be unavailable. In that instance, he would be especially
alert to the possibility that Enron's stated business purpose was contrived
and the arrangement produced no real economic benefits to the company.
His cognitive filter thus would be influenced by his experience as a tax
lawyer.
If the tax incidents of the transaction were less pronounced, however,
how sensitive would he be to the possibility that there was neither a valid
business purpose nor meaningful substance to the Rhythms hedge? Would
that depend on whether he knew of the accounting benefits that Enron stood
to gain from the deal? It would seem natural for a tax lawyer analyzing the
economics of the transaction to be aware of what accounting treatment
Enron planned to use. If Osterberg had this information, should it have put
him on notice that Enron might be entering into the transaction not mainly
for tax purposes but for accounting benefits?
If he had such notice, it is easy to imagine that Osterberg might avoid
confronting its implications by characterizing the information as requiring
an accounting, rather than a legal, judgment. That rationalization arguably
would be flawed, because whether Enron used the appropriate accounting
treatment for the transaction is an issue separate from whether obtaining
that treatment was the motivation for the deal. Nonetheless, Osterberg may
have relied on it while telling himself that he was responsible only for
ensuring that Enron's primary purpose in the Rhythms transaction was not
to reduce its taxes.
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What might Osterberg have done if he suspected that Rhythms was not a
genuine economic hedge? Suppose that Osterberg asked the main in-house
Enron lawyer on the deal whether it constituted a genuine hedge and was
assured that it did? What if he consulted Arthur Andersen and received the
same answer? If he still had some doubts in either case, should he defer to
their judgment? Hedges, derivatives, and increasingly complex financial
instruments were all cutting-edge tools that Enron used in its activities.
Even if a lawyer did not fully understand the transactions in which they
were used, he might be reluctant to admit it-especially to a client like
Enron whose employees had a reputation for arrogance. Rather than keep
pressing in the face of a puzzling explanation, a lawyer might rationalize
that sophisticated financial professionals knew better than he.
This inclination might be especially strong if information comes in bits
and pieces rather than in the form of an integrated and comprehensive
whole. The Examiner said that the information that put Osterberg on notice
of a problem with the deal came from conversations with Enron employees
and the descriptions that he saw of the transaction. If this came in
fragmented and intermittent form, how would Osterberg know that there
were not other pieces of information of which he was unaware that resolved
any apparent anomalies? How does someone know when he knows all
there is to know? Does Osterberg's liability depend on the fortuity of what
information he happened to receive?
Does a finding of liability in these circumstances create a disincentive for
lawyers to attend to anything other than their own narrow portion of a
transaction? Or does it lessen the temptation to engage in willful blindness?
Does anyone who works on a transaction have an obligation to understand
its economic substance, even if her role does not call for an evaluation of
that issue?
The Rhythms arrangement thus illustrates the fragmentation of
information and responsibility that can exist in complex transactions. Such
fragmentation can provide fertile ground for self-serving rationalizations.
First, not everyone may receive all the information that relates to the project
as a whole. Second, even when information ostensibly is accessible,
professional myopia can limit how much of it a person actually sees and the
significance that she attaches to it. Finally, even when someone is aware of
information and appreciates its significance, she may rationalize that certain
issues that it raises are the responsibility of another specialist.
Lastly, it is worth noting that the Enron Board of Directors approved the
LJM/Rhythms hedge transaction. The Examiner found, however, that
Enron General Counsel Derrick had not "developed an informed
understanding of the transaction or performed a substantive analysis of its
material terms. ' 365 He therefore did not adequately advise the Board of the
basis upon which its approval of the transaction could be given. Did
Osterberg have an obligation to ensure that the presentation to the Board
365. Id. app. C, at 119 (footnote omitted).
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was sufficient? If he had concerns about the transaction but learned that the
Board had approved the deal, could he reasonably resolve any concerns by
deferring to the Board's decision? Or could he do so only if he knew what
information the Board had received?
D. Raptors
"Building upon its experience and apparent success in hedging its
position in Rhythms stock, ' 366 in 2000 Enron created a series of four SPEs
known as the "Raptors" to engage in additional hedging transactions with
Enron. In each instance, LJM2 served as the vehicle for providing three
percent outside equity for the Raptor, and contributed a total of $30 million
to the SPE. Attorneys from both Enron Global Finance and V&E worked
on the creation of each of the Raptors. Most heavily involved were Scott
Sefton from Enron and Ronald Astin and Mark Spradling from V&E. The
Examiner estimated that from the third quarter of 2000 through the third
quarter of 2001, Enron used these transactions to avoid reporting
367
approximately $1.1 billion in losses from its merchant investments.
The structure of the Raptors transactions resembled the Rhythms hedge
in its essential economic features. The creation of an entity known as Talon
on April 18, 2000, illustrates this structure. 368 Talon was capitalized by
LJM2-Talon, a majority-owned subsidiary of LJM2, and Harrier, a wholly
owned subsidiary of Enron. 369 LJM2-Talon contributed $30 million cash to
Talon, in exchange for a membership interest. 370 Harrier contributed a $50
million note and $1000 cash, but its most significant contribution involved
Enron shares. Harrier transferred about 3.7 million shares of Enron stock,
along with an agreement to contribute up to about 3.8 million under certain
contingencies involving the price of Enron shares. All these contributions
were in return for a membership interest. 37 1 In addition, Talon made a
special distribution to Harrier of a $400 million note on the date that the
372
transaction closed.
As in the Rhythms transaction, the Enron stock that the company
contributed to Talon contained restrictions that resulted in a valuation of it
at a discount from current market value. In this case, the $537 million
market value was discounted by thirty-five percent to $349 million, with the
resulting $188 million treated as credit capacity for Talon to enter into
hedging transactions with Enron. 373 Before Talon was allowed to engage in
such transactions, however, it was required to make a distribution to LJM2
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
5, at 3.
372.
373.

Second Batson Report, supra note 55, app. L, annex 5, at 1.
Id. app. L, annex 5, at 2.
See supra fig.4 for information on the Raptor structure.
Second Batson Report, supra note 55, app. L, annex 5, at 3.
See infra fig.5 (step 1).
See infra fig.5 (step 2); see also Second Batson Report, supra note 55, app. L, annex
See infra fig.5 (step 3).
Second Batson Report, supra note 55, app. L, annex 5, at 5-6.
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equal to $41 million or a thirty percent annualized return. 374 As described
in more detail below, Talon obtained $41 million for this distribution
375
through a transaction involving a put on Enron stock.
All but one of the hedging transactions took the form of Total Return
Swaps. Talon agreed to pay Harrier the amount of any future losses on a
certain investment, while Harrier agreed to pay Talon the amount of any
future gains. 3 76 No cash was to change hands between the parties, however.
Instead, the payments owed by Talon or Harrier would serve as the basis for
adjusting the principal of the $400 million Talon note377to Harrier that was
provided in a special distribution when the deal closed.
The Examiner found that in Raptor transactions such as the one with
Talon, "Enron never escaped the risk of loss [on its merchant investments]
since it provided all of the capital with which the Raptors could pay Enron
on the [hedges]. '37 8 The hedging transactions, he said, "were not real
economic hedges, but were merely accounting hedges-apparently
designed to generate favorable financial
statement results without serving
37 9
any commercial business purpose."
Enron in-house attorney Sefton and V&E attorneys Astin and Spradling
participated in meetings in January and February 2000 at which they
discussed and analyzed how to structure the Raptors transactions. The
V&E attorneys understood that Enron's objective in establishing380the
Raptors was to "'smooth the volatility of their mark-to-market assets."'
While V&E raised certain questions about the implication of the Talon
$41 million payment to LJM2, 38 1 the Examiner found no evidence that the
firm expressed any concern "regarding the Raptors' non-economic
nature." 382 The Enron Board apparently was told of this characteristic of
the Raptor hedges in a presentation shortly after Talon was created. Notes
taken by the Secretary of the Board state, "Does not transfer economic risk
383
but transfers P[rofit] & L[oss] volatility."
374. Id. app. L, annex 5, at 10.
375. See infra note 436; see also infra fig.5 (steps 4-5).
376. See infra fig.5 (step 6).
377. Second Batson Report, supra note 55, app. L, annex 5, at 15 n.57.
378. Id. app. L, annex 5, at 48. The Examiner regarded the $41 million distribution to
LJM2 as effectively eliminating that entity's risk by providing a return of and on its capital.
Id. app. L, annex 5, at 12.
379. Id. app. L, annex 5, at 48.
380. Final Batson Report, supra note 75, app. C, at 140 n.616 (quoting statement of
Spradling); see also id. (stating that Astin testified that Enron sought to use the Raptors to
"manage the volatility that was inherent in certain of the existing merchant assets").
381. See infra notes 461-63 and accompanying text.
382. Final Batson Report, supra note 75, app. C, at 142.
383. Id. app. C, at 135 & n.593 (noting that the Enron Finance Committee was told at the
May 1, 2000, presentation that the purpose of the Raptors was to "hedge the profit and loss
volatility of Enron investments"); Powers Report, supra note 333, at 106; see also id. at 106
n.50 (stating that a May 2000 presentation to the Enron Board noted, "'a substantial decline
in the price of [Enron] stock will cause the program to terminate early and may return credit
risk to Enron,' and thus the Raptor program was '[n]ot an economic hedge; ...[therefore,]
credit risk retained with Enron Corp."').
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FIGURE 5: TALON RAPTOR HEDGE

98.33%

(1)
(2)

(3)
(4)

(5)
(6)

LJM2-Talon contributes $30 million cash to Talon, in return for
membership interest.
Harrier contributes to Talon (a) 3.7 million Enron shares worth
$537 million, (b) $50 million note, (c) $1000 cash, and (d) a
conditional promise for 3.8 million Enron shares, in return for
membership interest.
Talon makes a special distribution to Harrier of $400 million
note on the closing date.
Enron purchases a put on Enron stock from Talon for $41
million; the put settles after four months and Talon keeps $41
million.
Talon distributes $41 million from the put to LJM2-Talon.
Talon enters into hedges with Harrier, with gains and losses
resulting in adjustments to the $400 million Talon note to
Harrier ((3) above).
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Astin and Spradling testified that this issue was never discussed in their
presence while they were working on establishing the Raptors. Astin said
that he did not understand that there was a distinction between an economic
and an accounting hedge, nor did he regard the Raptors as noneconomic
hedges. The Examiner stated that, nonetheless, other than LJM2's original
investment of $30 million, Astin was "unable to identify any assets that
Raptor I could use to satisfy its obligations under the hedge that did not
originate with Enron. 3 s4
On August 31, 2000, in-house Enron attorney Stuart Zisman prepared a
legal risk memorandum relating to the Raptors in which he noted "[o]verall
book manipulation" 385 as one possible legal risk. Zisman stated that the
original understanding of the Raptors was that all types of Enron merchant
investments would be included in the transactions. He said, however, that
"we have discovered that a majority of the investments being introduced
into the Raptor structure are bad ones .... [This] might lead one to believe
that the financial books at Enron are being 'cooked' in order to eliminate
the drag on earnings that would otherwise occur under fair value
accounting."

3 86

Zisman's memo was distributed to ENA's General Counsel Mark
Haedicke, another ENA attorney, and several ENA employees. Haedicke,
said the Examiner, "dismissed the concerns expressed without further
inquiry," 3 87 and admonished Zisman for using "colorful" and
"inflammatory" language. 388 Enron Global Finance General Counsel
Jordan Mintz discussed the memo with Zisman, and said that Zisman told
him that his conclusions were not based on personal knowledge of the
Raptor assets, and therefore may have been "overstated or even
3 89
erroneous."
Enron in-house lawyer Joel Ephross did not work on the first two
Raptors, but was the lead in-house lawyer on Raptors III and IV. He
acknowledged that he understood that these hedges provided only
accounting, and not economic, benefits. As he testified, "I believe the
advice I gave [Enron] was that they're trading economics for accounting
390
and that was a bad trade."
The Examiner found that Enron might have a claim against V&E for
malpractice based on Texas Rule 1.12 and for aiding and abetting breach of
fiduciary duty, as well as malpractice based on negligence. 39 1 He stated
that V&E knew that the Raptor hedges were "only for the purpose of
financial statement manipulation, and that they lacked any economic
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.

Final Batson Report, supra note 75, app. C, at 143.
Id.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Id. app. C, at 144.
Id. app. C, at 143.
Id. app. C, at 144 n.636.
Id. app. C, at 144.

391. Id. app. C, at 181, 184.
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substance." 392 Astin and Spradling knew that almost all the assets
supporting the Raptors' hedging obligations to Enron were supplied by
Enron. At a minimum, the Examiner said, a reasonable attorney "should
have recognized that these transactions had no business purpose other than
and therefore would not have
to manipulate Enron's financial statements,
39 3
participated in such transactions."
V&E may argue, the Examiner acknowledged, that it did not determine
whether the hedges were economic or accounting in nature because this was
outside the scope of its representation and expertise. Furthermore, he
noted, the firm may argue that the Board was explicitly told that the Raptors
did not reduce economic risk, but profit and loss volatility, and that it was
up to the Board to decide whether such transactions were appropriate. In
relied on Andersen's approval
addition, V&E might claim that it reasonably
394
of the accounting for the Raptor hedges.
The Examiner also found that in-house attorney Sefton could be liable for
malpractice based on Texas Rule 1.12 or negligence, and for breach of his
fiduciary duty to Enron. 395 There is evidence, the Examiner said, that
Sefton knew or should have known that the Raptors on which he worked
had no economic purpose and were hedges only for financial statement
purposes. 39 6 He knew or should have known that virtually all of the assets
available to lJM2 to support its hedging obligation to Enron came from
1.12, Sefton
Enron. 39 7 Instead of taking remedial action under Texas Rule
398
assisted Enron with the documentation of these transactions.
The Examiner noted that Sefton may argue that he was not told, nor did
he consider, whether the Raptors were economic or accounting hedges,
since this was outside the scope of his legal expertise. 399 He might also
claim that the Board approved the Raptors with awareness that they "did
not transfer economic risk,"' 400 and that he appropriately relied on
These arguments,
Andersen's approval of the accounting for the 40Raptors.
1
the Examiner said, raise issues for a fact finder.
Questions and Discussion
Astin and Spradling testified that there was no discussion in their
presence about the difference between an economic and accounting hedge
during their work on the Raptors transactions. 40 2 Astin said that he did not

392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.

Id. app. C, at 181.
Id. app. C, at 184.
Id. app. C, at 181.
See id. app. C, at 194-95.
Id. app. C, at 196.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. app. C, at 142.
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understand there to be a difference between the two and, in any event, he
was never told that the Raptors provided a noneconomic hedge. 40 3 Even if
this precise terminology was never used in discussions with the V&E
lawyers, should those lawyers nonetheless be charged with awareness that
almost all of the assets that the Raptors had available to pay Enron under
the hedging arrangement came from Enron?
Unlike Osterberg, who worked only on tax aspects of the Rhythms
transaction, Astin and Spradling worked directly on structuring the Raptors.
Indeed, given V&E's close association with Enron and its desire to serve as
problem solvers for the company, the firm's lawyers may well have been
part of a team that helped devise the Raptors explicitly as a response to
Enron's concerns about the volatility of the value of its merchant
investments. Rather than serving as legal technicians who determined how
to effectuate an arrangement created by others, in other words, they may
have been involved in conceptualizing the Raptors from the start. If so, it
would be hard to claim that they were not aware that the assets that the
Raptors had available to meet their obligations consisted mostly of Enron
stock. More generally, it would be hard to argue that they were not familiar
with the economic substance of the arrangement, since they had helped
create it.
If this is true, how could the V&E lawyers not regard the absence of
economic benefit to Enron as a problem? How could they not suspect that
Enron's objective was simply to obtain accounting benefits? Consider one
possibility: The merchant investments whose value the Raptor arrangement
was supposed to hedge were assets whose value reflected the application of
mark-to-market accounting. Given that many of them were traded in thin
markets that provided little basis for calculation of fair value, their
economic substance was a function of mathematical models. In this
abstract realm, accounting treatment could seem to be economic reality.
Obtaining permission to use mark-to-market accounting, for instance, had
immediately created millions of dollars in assets that Enron could use to
bolster its credit rating, engage in trading, acquire other companies, and
create new markets. Constructing hedges that resulted in favorable
accounting treatment might seem to promise the same alchemy. Indeed, as
described earlier, Enron was explicit that its "risk management strategies
are directed at accounting, rather than economic, performance. 4 04
Remember, of course, that this was an era in which there were breathless
pronouncements that traditional methods of valuation and measurements of
economic vibrancy were inadequate for high-tech companies engaged in
activities such as Enron's trading and market-making. Those who believed
that transactions lacked economic substance or investment decisions were
not founded on economic reality risked being derided in some quarters as
relying on outdated concepts. The risk of this may have been especially
403. Id. app. C, at 142-43.
404. McLean & Elkind, supra note 13, at 132.
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high at Enron, given the company's self-image as a business revolutionary.
All this may have made it easier for V&E lawyers who wanted to be
regarded as team players to rationalize that the Raptor transactions provided
genuine economic benefits to Enron.
To reiterate an earlier point, accounting treatment often diverges from
underlying economic substance to some degree. Many argue that business
developments in recent years such as increasing reliance on intellectual
property and technological innovation threaten to widen this divergence to a
dangerous distance. 40 5 Such a development can jeopardize the value of
financial reporting. Perhaps even more important, it can undermine a sense
of the legitimacy of accounting rules. As Donald Langevoort suggests, the
1990s were an era in which for some managers "[i]nnovation in business
strategies made the lines drawn in the historic norms of financial reporting
Playing conservatively by the
increasingly artificial and outdated.
accounting rules [was] seen as conforming to a regime in which fairness
and utility were questionable as a reflection of economic reality." 40 6 As a
managers, financial reporting had lost its
result, "[i]n the eyes of 'many
40 7
relevance and legitimacy."
If Enron managers were among those who held this view-and evidence
suggests that many were-they may have engaged in manipulation of
accounting rules with little sense of impropriety. Indeed, they may have
felt that gaming the rules was a way to compensate for the insensitivity of
conventional accounting to the value of Enron's operations. One bit of
evidence in support of this conjecture is that Enron openly sought to market
its "creative accounting" services to other companies. 40 8 Doing so would
indicate that "executives had little sense. . . that their conduct was seriously
wrongful. '40 9 Another is that Enron in-house attorney Ephross freely
admitted that he recognized that the Raptors were being used to obtain only
accounting and not economic benefits, and that he told Enron that this was a
bad trade. 4 10 This statement suggests the belief that the Raptors raised
questions about business, but not ethical, judgment.
This thesis may help explain what otherwise seems inexplicable: that
Enron managers explicitly told the Board of Directors and its Finance
Committee that the Raptors would serve as an accounting but not an
economic hedge. 4 11 Declaring this openly to the highest authority in the
company suggests that Enron managers who worked on the Raptors
regarded the divergence between form and substance in this instance as

405. See, e.g., Steven M. H. Wallman, The Future of Accounting and Disclosure in an

Evolving World: The Need for Dramatic Change, Accounting Horizons, Sept. 1995, at 81.
406. Donald C. Langevoort, Technological Evolution and the Devolution of Corporate
FinancialReporting, 46 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 1, 16 (2004).
407. Id.
408. Id. at 18.

409. Id.
410. Final Batson Report, supra note 75, app. C, at 144.
411. See supra note 383 and accompanying text.
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perfectly acceptable. If this is so, it suggests that even had V&E lawyers
been informed that the Raptors provided accounting rather than economic
benefits, they may not have regarded this as problematic. Would they be
likely to be concerned if Enron employees were straightforward in telling
them this and made no attempt to keep it a secret? Furthermore, if they
knew that the Board would be told the same thing, could they reasonably
assume that the Raptors were not being used to commit fraud?
The experience with the Raptors thus suggests at least a couple of ways
in which both inside and outside counsel might have rationalized to
themselves that this project raised no ethical issues. First, as with most of
us, they probably proceeded on the assumption of normalcy: that people
were acting in good faith when they sought a way to smooth out
fluctuations in the value of Enron's merchant investments.
Second, corporate lawyers today want to be seen as creative business
problem solvers and team players, not obstructionists who tell the client
what it cannot do. As a result, the lawyers may have been inclined to defer
to the client in the face of strong indications that the Raptor hedges
provided no genuine economic benefit to Enron.
Indeed, given the
seemingly magical benefits of mark-to-market accounting that the company
had enjoyed, they might assume that achieving a certain accounting
treatment was itself an economic benefit. The rationalizations may not
seem persuasive, but keep in mind that the lawyers likely had a powerful
impulse to accept them.
The assumption of normalcy and desire to be a team player may also
explain why ENA General Counsel Haedicke was not more responsive
when confronted with explicit speculation by an in-house lawyer that
Enron's activities with the Raptors "might lead one to believe that the
financial books at Enron are being 'cooked."'' 4 12 The person who prepared
the memo was a junior lawyer who admitted that he was not personally
familiar with the assets in the Raptor structures, and that his conclusion
therefore may have been "overstated or even erroneous. '4 13 In retrospect
this may seem a frail rationale for not at least inquiring further. At the time,
however, it may have been all that was necessary for someone who was
predisposed not to find a problem.
E. Issue Two: Disclosure of Fastow'sLJM Compensation
Enron CFO Andrew Fastow served in a management role for the LJM
entities in their transactions with Enron, earning several million dollars in
addition to his compensation from Enron. In the section of Enron's proxy
statements entitled "Certain Transactions," Item 404 of Regulation S-K
required Enron to disclose information about transactions over $60,000
between the company and any of its executive officers, including "where

412. Final Batson Report, supra note 75, app. C, at 143.
413. Id. app. C, at 144 n.636.
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practicable, the amount of such person's interest in the transaction[s] ...
"414 The Examiner concluded that Enron's proxy statements filed in 2000
and 2001 did not satisfy this requirement because they did not include
sufficient information about the amount of
Fastow's financial interest in
4 15
Enron's transactions with the LJM entities.
The Examiner opined that Enron might have claims against its in-house
counsel because they should have made greater efforts to determine
Fastow's compensation for his role in LJM, and should have disclosed the
amount both to the Enron Board of Directors and in the company's proxy
statement.4 16 The lawyers in question were Rex Rogers, who had primary
responsibility for securities issues, and Scott Sefton and Jordan Mintz, who
were successively General Counsel for Enron Global Finance ("EGF'),
which handled the legal work for the Enron/LJM transactions.
Rogers asked Sefton, and then Mintz, to analyze and draft disclosures
relating to Enron's transactions with the LJM entities, since lawyers in EGF
performed the legal work on these transactions. 4 17 Because he was the
most senior securities attorney at Enron, however, Rogers "actively
participated in the analysis and reviewed the disclosure." 4 18 These lawyers
consulted on the disclosure with V&E. The Examiner suggested that Enron
also might have a claim against V&E for malpractice based on negligence,
because the firm failed to inquire into material facts that were necessary
to
4 19
make an informed judgment about the adequacy of Enron's disclosure.
As part of the proxy statement drafting process, Fastow was required to
provide Enron with information about his interest in the LJM transactions in
his response to a questionnaire sent annually to directors and officers. As
the Examiner put it, "Fastow side-stepped this responsibility. ' 420 For the
2000 proxy statement, he referred the reader to an addendum to the
questionnaire, which stated that Sefton was preparing a draft disclosure that
the attorney would shortly make available. For the 2002 proxy statement,
the addendum said that the nature of Fastow's involvement in the LJM
entities was described in Enron's 1999 and 2000 proxy statements. Neither
the questionnaire nor the sources to which it referred contained any estimate
of the amount of Fastow's financial interest in these transactions. The
Examiner concluded that "Mintz took no steps to make Fastow provide a
meaningful and responsive answer to the relevant question on the annual

414. 17 C.F.R. § 229.404(a) (2005).
415. Second Batson Report, supra note 55, app. D, at 59, available at
http://www.enron.com/corp/por/pdfs/examiner2/9551-04.pdf (Enron's Disclosure of Its
SPEs). The Examiner also concluded that Fastow breached his fiduciary duties to Enron
with respect to these disclosures. See generally Final Batson Report, supra note 75, app. C
(Role of Enron's Attorneys).
416. Final Batson Report, supra note 75, app. C, at 190-201.
417. Id. app. C, at 147.
418. Id.
419. Id. app. C, at 184-86.
420. Id. app. C, at 148.
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Directors and Officers Questionnaire, and the Examiner found no evidence
4 21
showing that Sefton did either."
Efforts to obtain information for the 2001 proxy statement illustrate the
concerns of the Examiner with respect to the conduct of the attorneys for
Enron. In the course of working on the related party disclosures for that
statement, EGF General Counsel Mintz received an e-mail from Ronald
Astin of V&E on November 2, 2000, that stated, "As I hope everyone is
aware, the 'senior officer['s] name, and the nature and amount of his
interest in the transaction, if quantifiable, will be disclosed in the 2001
proxy." 422 Mintz then told Fastow that Astin had advised him that Enron
would have to disclose the compensation that Fastow earned from his
general partner position in LJM. 423 Fastow left a voicemail in reply to
Mintz, stating his understanding that no disclosure of his compensation was
necessary because the earnings that he received from participation in LJM
came not from Enron, but from LJM's limited partners. He stated, "If that
424
thinking has changed, that's a BIG issue and I need to know about that."
Mintz forwarded a transcription of this voicemail to Rogers and copied
Astin on it.
A January 2001 conversation with Fastow left Mintz with the
understanding that Fastow wanted to avoid disclosing his compensation
related to his position with LJM. As Mintz testified, Fastow "told me that if
[Enron Chief Operating Officer] Skilling ever found out how much
[Fastow] was making, Skilling would have no choice but to shut down
LJM."

425

Mintz sent an e-mail to Astin and Rogers informing them of this
conversation. He asked to meet with them to discuss how to treat the
Fastow disclosure issue in the proxy statement. "I think," he said, "that the
number one item on our list is to resolve the 'where practicable' language in
connection with AF's interest in the transactions engaged in with Enron by
LJM1 and 2."426 The e-mail went on to say, "I spoke, again, with Andy
about this earlier today and he believes (perhaps rightly so) that Skilling
will shut down LJM if he knew how much Andy earned with respect to the
Rhythms transaction." 427 Mintz closed by saying, "We need to be
'creative' on this point," he said, "within the contours of [SEC regulations]
42 8
so as to avoid any type of stark disclosure, if at all possible."
Astin testified that when he received this e-mail, he believed that it raised
a significant issue for discussion. He had some skepticism, however, about
its accuracy, because he had seen a Board presentation about the formation
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of a possible LJM3 entity that referred
to Fastow's discussions with Skilling
42 9
about Fastow's compensation.
Astin, Mintz, and Rogers met to discuss the proxy disclosure on January
18, 2001. The testimony is in dispute about what resulted from that
meeting. Rogers and Astin testified that the group decided that Mintz
would follow up with Fastow and get the necessary factual information.
Rogers said that Astin then applied the legal standards to that information.
Astin said that he never asked directly, but that the information that Mintz
provided led him to infer that there had been no distributions to Fastow in
2000 related to his involvement in LJM. Mintz, on the other hand, denies
that he was charged with obtaining additional information from Fastow. He
claims that he understood Rogers and Astin to say that the company didn't
have an obligation to pursue the issue with the CFO. In any event, no one
ever asked Fastow if he had received any such payments, nor did they check
LJM's records, which apparently were in the same building where Enron
430
was located.
As the Examiner put it, "[d]espite lacking this crucial piece of
information, preparation of the related party transaction disclosure
proceeded."'43 1 Mintz testified that Astin and Rogers advised him that there
was no need to make a disclosure in 2001 regarding the LJM1 Rhythms
"hedge." Their argument was that the settlement of this transaction
occurred under the original Rhythms agreement, which was entered into in
1999 and disclosed in 2000. Thus, there had been no new Rhythms
transaction in 2000 generating income for Fastow that had to be disclosed
in the 2001 proxy statement. Mintz said that he "initially disagreed" with
this reasoning because he believed that it was possible to calculate and
disclose Fastow's interest after the Rhythms transaction settled. 4 32 He
eventually, however, accepted the rationale for nondisclosure. 4 33 He
explained the reasoning in a later memo to Fastow in this way:
At settlement of RhythymNet [sic] it may have been practicable to
determine your financial interest. However, no further disclosure was
otherwise required of the RhythmsNet transaction in 2000 because
settlement occurred under conditions permitted in the original agreement.
Thus, there was no new transaction involving LJM 1 and Enron in the year
2000 required to be disclosed in this year's proxy ....434

429. Id. app. C, at 152.
430. Id. app. C, at 153 & n.686 (stating "[b]y all accounts, access to LIM was as simple
as walking down the hallway of Enron's corporate offices").
431. Id. app. C, at 154.
432. Id.
433. See id. app. C, at 155 (stating that Mintz, Rogers, and Astin told Derrick in March
2001 that no disclosure was required and that "all involved were comfortable with that
position").
434. Id. app. C, at 156.
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With respect to Fastow's interest in LJM2, the attorneys concluded that a
determination of that interest was "not practicable. 4 35 This judgment was
based on the facts that the Enron/LJM2 transactions had not yet settled, and
that Fastow potentially was subject to a requirement to recontribute capital
to the LJM2 partnership. 43 6 In Mintz's memo to Fastow he stated, "We
determined it was not practicable to quantify your interest in LJM2 in the
most recent Proxy . . . based on the existence of multiple open and

unmatured transactions making it impracticable to compute. '43 7
On March 7, 2001, Mintz, Rogers, and Astin met with Enron General
Counsel James Derrick to discuss the proxy statement disclosure of related
party transactions. Based on the arguments described above, they informed
him that no disclosure of Fastow's interest in the LJM transactions with
Enron was required, and he accepted their conclusion. The proxy statement
was filed on March 27, 2001. The relevant portion of the proxy statement
noted that Enron had entered into a number of transactions with LJM2 in
2000, and that Fastow was the managing member of LUM2's general
partner. It went on to say, "[t]he general partner of LJM2 is entitled to
receive a percentage of the profits of LJM2 in excess of the general
partner's portion of the total capital contributed to LJM2, depending upon
the performance of the investments made by LJM2. ' '4 38
Mintz's subsequent memo to Fastow indicated that with respect to the
LJM1/Rhythms transaction, the "decision not to disclose in this instance
was a close call; arguably, the more conservative approach would have been
to disclose the amount of [your] interest. '4 39 if the Rhythms transaction
had begun and ended in the same year, he told Fastow, "it would have been
more difficult to avoid making some additional level of financial
disclosure."440
Mintz circulated a draft of the memo to Rogers and Astin for comments,
and Derrick eventually received a copy of it as well. Upon receiving it,
Derrick contacted Astin to confirm that he was comfortable with the proxy
statement, since Derrick had not understood that the determination
regarding the disclosure of the LJM1/Rhythms transaction was a "close
call."' 44 1 Astin provided such confirmation.

Shortly afterward, without notifying Derrick or Rogers, Mintz sought
advice about the related party transactions from the law firm of Fried,
Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson. Fried Frank regarded the amount of
payments that Fastow had received from LJM as material in determining
the adequacy of the disclosures that had been made and those that might be
made in the future. The firm concluded that the prior disclosures were
435. Id.
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incomplete.
With respect to Fastow's compensation from LJM2's
transactions with Enron, Fried Frank believed that the view that calculating
the amount of Fastow's compensation was not "practicable" because the
'44 2
transactions had not yet closed was "too aggressive.
The Examiner found that Enron might have a claim against Rogers and
Mintz for malpractice based on violation of Texas Rule 1.12 and breach of
fiduciary duty. 44 3

Rogers knew that Fastow considered the amount of

Fastow's interest in the LJM transactions so large that Skilling would shut
down the SPEs if he knew about it. Rather than asking Fastow how much
this amount was, however, Rogers, Mintz, and Astin focused on why it was
not practicable to calculate Fastow's interest.44 4 The Examiner notes that
Rogers may claim that his responsibility regarding disclosures "was more
administrative than substantive," and that he relied on Enron employees, as
well as on V&E, with more knowledge of the SPE transactions to review
the disclosures. 445 With respect to Mintz, the Examiner found that there
was evidence that Mintz was given responsibility to determine whether
Fastow received any distributions from LJM transactions in 2000 and, if so,
44 6
their amount.
Finally, the Examiner found that Enron might have a claim against V&E
for malpractice based on negligence in connection with V&E's advice to
Enron about disclosure of Fastow's interest in LJM transactions in the 2001
proxy statement. V&E knew of Fastow's characterization of the amount of
his compensation from LM transactions, yet it "never received or insisted
upon receiving facts that were sufficiently developed to make an informed
legal judgment. No one asked Fastow the simple question: How much
money have you received in connection with your LJM activities? 447 The
Examiner noted that the firm might contend that it relied upon Enron's inhouse attorneys to determine if it was practicable to calculate the amount of
Fastow's interest in LJM matters. 448
Questions and Discussion
Mintz's approach to disclosure, apparently shared by other lawyers
working on the matter, was to be as "creative" as possible in exploring
rationales under the regulations for not disclosing Fastow's compensation
from participation in LJM. As the discussion below elaborates, this premise
shaped how the lawyers proceeded in gathering information and
interpreting the relevant legal rules. An important question therefore is why
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the lawyers adopted this approach to disclosure of Fastow's LJM
compensation and whether it was appropriate.
We can begin to answer this question by considering another one: Who
was the Enron lawyers' client with respect to the disclosure issue? The
EGF unit for which Mintz served as general counsel was the entity within
Enron that was involved in most of the company's structured finance
transactions. 44 9 As those transactions generated increasing earnings for
Enron, EGF naturally rose in stature.
A crucial reason for this was Fastow and his LJM entities, which
provided parties ready and willing to engage in transactions with Enron on
relatively short notice. Although ultimately the facts decisively proved
otherwise, Fastow steadfastly maintained that he played this role at a
personal and professional sacrifice for the good of Enron.4 50 The apparent
success of the Enron/LJM transactions gave Fastow considerable influence
within the company even beyond what his CFO position furnished. Fastow
became someone whom others did not want to cross, least of all someone in
EGF. His reluctance to disclose his LJM compensation to the public might
even be taken as an implicit threat to discontinue the Enron/LJM
transactions if disclosure were required.
In these circumstances, who was the client with respect to the disclosure
issue? As a formal matter, of course, the client was Enron the entity. As a
practical matter, however, the entity could speak only through "duly
authorized constituents" 45 1 such as executives and managers. Who spoke
for the company on this question? Fastow was the executive most directly
involved in the LJM transactions and was the CFO of the company. The
Board of Directors had approved his involvement on the belief that it would
benefit Enron, and the results to date appeared to validate this judgment.
Given the integral role that Fastow effectively played in the operations of
Enron and its EGF unit, Mintz might well assume that Fastow spoke on
behalf of the company with respect to the disclosure issue.
This assumption might be appropriate under normal circumstances.
Corporate lawyers are accustomed to thinking of disclosure in terms of
providing the public with the information that it needs. Executives
sometimes may be disinclined to disclose this information until educated by
a lawyer about why it is necessary. This scenario may not arise frequently,
but it is not uncommon. The fact that Fastow was reluctant to disclose his
LJM compensation thus in itself does not automatically mean that it was
improper to regard him as authorized to speak for the client on this issue.
What makes this more problematic, however, is that Fastow apparently
did not want the amount of his LJM compensation disclosed to Enron. His
comment that Skilling would shut down LJM if he knew how much Fastow
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earned suggested that there might be a conflict between Fastow's personal
interest and Enron's interest. In that situation, it was inappropriate for
Mintz and other lawyers to treat Fastow as Enron's "duly authorized
constituent" with respect to the disclosure issue.
Indeed, Fastow's
reluctance arguably should have been taken as a warning sign that
disclosure might be especially important in order to protect Enron.
Enron's lawyers, however, were loath to interpret the situation in that
way. One reason might be that Mintz was located in EGF rather than in
Enron's General Counsel's office. His day-to-day colleagues thus tended to
be business managers rather than lawyers, and he inevitably was immersed
in the culture of the unit. As a result, while he was of course a lawyer, it
also would be natural for Mintz to regard himself as a member of the EGF
team-and there was no question that Fastow was the head of that team.
This is one foreseeable result of assigning lawyers to work in business
units, rather than locating them within a central legal department. The
advantage of placing a lawyer in a unit is that she is directly involved in its
work flow and is privy to informal, "back channel" sources of information
about its operations. Ideally, this puts the lawyer in a position to provide
advice, anticipate problems, and fashion creative solutions that meet the
unit's objectives. One possible drawback, however, is that the individual's
identity as a lawyer who is subject to distinct professional demands may
become less salient than her identity as a member of the business team. To
the extent this occurs, it may make the lawyer insensitive to concerns that a
more detached observer would recognize. If this process of informal
socialization occurred with Mintz, it would be natural for him subtly to
regard EGF as his client and Fastow as speaking for EGF-while
convincing himself that doing so was in Enron' s best interest. 452
Enron's lawyers likely preferred not to cross swords with Fastow on an
issue about which he felt so strongly. As a result, they may have convinced
themselves that Fastow was exaggerating his LJM rewards in keeping with
the hypercompetitive Enron culture. Perhaps they assumed that, in an era
of often exorbitant compensation, whatever benefits Fastow was receiving
were more than offset by the value of the LJM transactions to Enron.
Maybe they rationalized that the Board would not have waived the conflict
of interest prohibition for Fastow without ensuring that stringent measures
were in place to prevent abuse. On paper, at least, such controls were in
place. Whatever their reasoning, they approached the disclosure issue with
Fastow's wishes as their implicit marching orders-find a way to avoid
disclosure if at all possible.
The most promising basis for not disclosing Fastow's LJM compensation
was that calculation of it was not "practicable." The desire to avoid
452. "[L]awyers' self-conception as advocates for the client, as neutral, non-judgmental
facilitators of transactions, or as professionals trained to make 'arguments' on either side of
an issue, can allow a high degree of rationalization of their complicity in conduct that is
ultimately not in their corporate client's interest .... Sargent, supra note 9, at 880.
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acquiring any information that would make reliance on this justification
difficult seems to have shaped the way in which the lawyers proceeded.
Most striking, as the Examiner observed, was the failure simply to ask
Fastow directly how much compensation he had received. Not surprisingly,
the lawyers differ in their recollections of who had responsibility for this.
Each has a plausible story of why he depended on others for information
that could have triggered a reporting obligation.
Rogers and V&E lawyer Astin testified that Mintz was responsible for
obtaining from Fastow the amount of his LJM compensation. 45 3 Mintz
disputed this, saying that he was told by the two lawyers that there was no
obligation to pursue the matter with Fastow. Astin said that he was waiting
for information from Mintz, which he would then analyze to determine if
disclosure were required. Not hearing from Mintz on the issue, he assumed
without inquiring that there was no compensation that could be calculated.
This scenario reflects the tendency in organizations deliberately to leave
matters unresolved by avoiding direct confrontation with potentially
unpleasant facts. In this case, the lawyers apparently wished to conclude
that determining Fastow's LM compensation was not "practicable."
Rogers and Astin may not have directly instructed Mintz to ask Fastow
about his compensation because that would set in motion an assignment that
could result in destroying this rationale for nondisclosure. Even if Rogers
and Astin strongly intimated that Mintz should make an inquiry, Mintz
would be inclined to interpret the slightest ambiguity otherwise.
Similarly, it would have been easy for Astin directly to ask Mintz what if
anything he had learned from Fastow. Instead, Astin assumed that no news
was good news. In this way, an implicit consensus may have developed
that the calculation of Fastow's compensation was not practicable, based
not on detailed inquiry but on wishful thinking. By leaving responsibility
ambiguous and information uncertain, the lawyers maximized their freedom
to maneuver.
It is worth keeping in mind that two of the men who worked on the
Fastow LJM compensation issue-Mintz and Astin-exhibited some
independence on this and other matters. This belies any claim that they
were simply single-minded lawyers inclined to act uncritically on their
client's behalf. Mintz, without informing the Enron legal department,
sought outside advice on Fastow's involvement with LJM and the
disclosure of it. It is possible that he subsequently may have raised more
pointed questions about LJM had Fastow not reduced his involvement in
those entities shortly afterward.
Astin was the lawyer who first advised Mintz that Fastow's name and
compensation should be disclosed in Enron's 2001 proxy statement. Astin
also was the lawyer who resisted Salomon's efforts to avoid being bound by
the put and call agreement that Astin had said was necessary in order to
issue a true sale opinion on the Sundance Industrial project. Finally, as
453. Final Batson Report, supra note 75, app. C, at 152-53.
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another section below describes in more detail, Astin also expressed
concern that an LJM entity with which Enron engaged in a transaction
might not have the necessary three percent outside equity to avoid being
consolidated with Enron's financial statements. 454 Characterizing Mintz's
and Astin's conduct in the Fastow compensation matter as the actions of
lawyers insensitive to ethical concerns thus seems an unsatisfying
explanation.
The question of disclosure in this instance also can serve as a vehicle for
addressing additional issues that arise with respect to lawyers'
responsibilities. Suppose that Fastow's superiors were aware of the amount
of compensation he was receiving for this work on LJM, so there was no
potential conflict between Fastow's and Enron's interests. Would it be
more appropriate in that case for Enron's lawyers to be as aggressive and
creative as possible in avoiding disclosure? Or is this approach inconsistent
with ensuring Enron's compliance with the law? If a decision not to
disclose is, as Mintz described it, a "close call," should a lawyer resolve it
in favor of advising disclosure?
The SEC is understaffed and has limited resources. It reviews only a
small number of filings such as proxy statements each year. In presenting
the options on disclosure, could Enron lawyers factor into their
recommendation an estimate of the small likelihood that the SEC would
ever review the proxy statement, as well as the likely penalty if it did? Or
does the low probability of SEC detection make it even more important for
lawyers to urge the client to comply with the spirit, not just the letter, of the
law? If Enron management believed that the benefits from not disclosing
Fastow's LJM compensation exceeded the risks associated with
nondisclosure, should the lawyers defer to this as a business judgment?
Finally, Mintz's memo to Fastow suggested that it was "fortuitous" that
the Rhythms transaction stretched over two proxy filing years, which made
it possible to claim that "a disclosable transaction occurred only in the year
in which financial disclosure was impracticable. '455 If Rhythms had begun
and ended in the same year, Mintz said, "it would have been more difficult
to avoid making some additional level of financial disclosure. '4 56 Would
this rationale for not disclosing the compensation from the Rhythms
transaction create the possibility for avoiding ever disclosing any
compensation from the LJM/Enron transactions, by simply entering into an
agreement in one year and not settling until the next? Suppose that Enron
management asked that all transactions with LJM be structured in this way
to avoid disclosure. Should a lawyer raise any objection?

454. See supra note 381 and accompanying text.

455. Final Batson Report, supra note 75, app. C, at 156.
456. Id. app. C, at 156-57.
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F. Issue Three: Three Percent Outside Equity in Raptors
The remaining issue with the Raptors, along with questions arising in the
Cuiaba and Chewco transactions discussed below, are those as to which the
Examiner found no potential liability on the part of Enron's lawyers.
Examining these matters, however, provides an additional sense of the
texture of transactional work and enhances appreciation of the kinds of
issues that call for the practical and ethical judgment of lawyers engaged in
this practice.
The final issue involving the Raptors concerns whether there was
sufficient outside equity in an SPE known as Talon to avoid the need to
consolidate Talon into Enron's financial statements.
Each Raptor's
operating agreement provided that before the Raptor could begin to enter
into hedges with Enron, LJM2 was to received 100% of all income
distributed by the Raptor up to the greater of $41 million or a 30%
annualized rate of return. 457 In order to generate income to make this
distribution, three of the four Raptors sold a "put" on Enron stock to Enron
458
for $41 million.
In the case of Talon, this put gave Enron the right to require Talon to
purchase about seven million shares of Enron stock in six months at a price
of $57.50 per share. 459 This is the kind of right that a purchaser buys if it
expects the stock to drop below $57.50 in the next six months. At the time,
however, Enron's shares were trading at $68 per share, and it seemed highly
unlikely that the price would fall below the exercise price for the put during
this period.
Four months later, Enron and Talon agreed to settle this put when
Enron's share price was well above $57.50. Talon got to keep the $41
million it had charged for the put. It then distributed this amount to LJM2
460
in accordance with the operating agreement.
At some point during the work on Talon, Astin questioned Enron
financial officer Ben Glisan about this distribution. Astin's concern was
whether it constituted a return of LJM2's investment, such that LJM2 no
longer had any equity at risk in Talon. If this were the case, Talon no
longer met the 3% outside equity requirement, and its financial position
would have to be consolidated into Enron's financial statements. Prior to
raising the issue with Glisan, Astin reviewed the position of the SEC on
how the 3% equity remained at risk throughout the life of the SPE. Around
the time that the put option was terminated, Astin confirmed with Glisan
46 1
that Andersen continued to regard LJM2's investment as being at risk.

457. Second Batson Report, supra note 55, app. L, annex 5, at 10.
458. See supra fig.5 (steps 4-5).
459. Second Batson Report, supra note 55, app. L, annex 5, at 11.
460. See supra fig.5 (step 5); see also Second Batson Report, supra note 55, app. L,
annex 5, at 13.
461. Final Batson Report, supra note 75, app. C, at 141 n.617.
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V&E lawyer Spradling raised similar concerns, first with Dilg and then
with Glisan. Spradling testified that Dilg regarded the question as an
accounting issue, and that he suggested to Spradling that he "go check,
make sure everybody's comfortable with the accounting and then, you
know, it doesn't sound like a legal issue." 4 62 Both Astin and Spradling
shared their question with Sefton, but did not raise the issue with Enron
Glisan reassured them that Enron Chief
general counsel Derrick.
Accounting Officer Causey was confident that the distribution to LJM2 did
not jeopardize Talon's ability to satisfy the 3 % outside equity requirement.
The Examiner suggested, however, that Astin continued to have
concerns. Notes of a conversation with him in connection with V&E' s later
investigation of Sherron Watkins's allegations of misconduct describe him
as saying that the distribution "[p]aid LJM full investment, plus 30% rate of
return. Theoretically, LJM still ha[d] capital in . . . [but] as a practical
matter, LJM ha[d] its investment back."' 463 Astin testified, however, that he
had no further communications about the issue after his conversation with
Glisan.
Glisan eventually pled guilty to conspiracy to commit wire and securities
fraud in connection with the Raptors. With respect to Talon, he stated,
Although there was no true
Enron and Talon entered into a "put" ....
business purpose, the "put" option was purchased by Enron for $41
million. The put was designed by me and others as an ostensible reason
to make a distribution of $41 million to LJM, economically providing a
return of and return on capital. Since the put failed to have a true business
the minimum equity test as required by
purpose, Talon failed to meet
4 64
applicable accounting rules.

Questions and Discussion
Was the effect of the Talon distribution to LJM2 a legal issue or an
accounting issue? The ultimate question whether Talon had to be
consolidated into Enron's financial statements arguably was a judgment for
the accountants. As a precondition to that conclusion, however, did the
accountants need to rely on a lawyer's determination whether the economic
interest that LJM held had the legal characteristics of equity? Does the fact
that Astin reviewed the SEC's position on the issue suggest that this is the
case?
Enron's assurance to V&E attorneys may have taken the following form.
Talon was established to help Enron hedge its risks. One risk is that
Enron's stock would decline in value. The "put" provided Enron protection
against that risk. The $41 million that Talon received to furnish such
protection was income from its operations, which it then was free to

462. Id. app. C, at 141.

463. Id. app. C, at 142.
464. Id. app. C, at 135 n.592.
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distribute to its investors as it wished. This distribution thus was not a
return of LJM2's original equity, which remained at risk, but a return on
that equity. Is this persuasive? Were V&E lawyers in a position to evaluate
this explanation? Does it call for an accounting or a legal conclusion?
Note that Dilg instructed Spradling to engage in discussions about the
accounting treatment for the LJM2 distribution so that "it doesn't sound like
a legal issue." 465 Did this reflect an effort to deflect responsibility, by
making sure that the parties would regard the accountants, rather than the
lawyers, as the professionals who had to make the ultimate decision on the
issue? Or was it an attempt to clarify that the lawyers did not have the
expertise to judge whether a distribution was return on or a return of equity?
Characterizing a potentially troublesome issue as one that required a
judgment call by the accountants rather than the lawyers would permit V&E
to continue working on the transaction despite its reservations. In this way,
the division of responsibilities among specialized professionals can provide
the basis for a rationalization that avoids the need to confront potentially
unpleasant facts.
As Astin's comments during the Watkins investigation indicate, he
continued to have doubts about the effect of the LJM2 distribution even
after V&E obtained confirmation that Enron did not regard it as
jeopardizing the outside equity requirement. Was assurance from Glisan
that Enron's Chief Accounting Officer saw no reason for concern sufficient
to justify not following up on those doubts? Should Astin have sought
further reassurance from Arthur Andersen? If Andersen provided the same
response, would it be appropriate to defer to its judgment? Or did Astin's
concerns really relate to a legal issue, so that deference to accountants was
inappropriate? If so, would assurance from Enron's General Counsel's
office be enough to relieve him of further responsibility?
G. Issue Four: Cuiaba Transaction
The Examiner found that Enron was effectively warehousing many of its
assets through transactions with related parties. By "warehousing," the
Examiner referred to those transactions in which
Enron temporarily transferred assets to a Related Party to impact
favorably Enron's financial statements, while Enron continued to search
for a third party purchaser. In many instances, there was no third party
purchaser, and Enron repurchased those assets at
a premium over the
466
price at which they were sold to the Related Party.

To the extent that such warehousing occurred, the Examiner concluded,
the transfer of the assets should be recharacterized as secured loans rather

465. Id. app. C, at 141.
466. Second Batson Report, supranote 55, app. L, at 15 (Related Transactions).
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than sales. 467 The resulting accounting treatment would be much less
favorable to Enron than what it had originally reported.
The Examiner opined that one illustration of warehousing was the
ostensible purchase by an LJM1 subsidiary of Enron's interest in Empresa
Produtora de Energia Ltda ("EPE"), which owned a power plant located in
Cuiaba, Mato Grosso, Brazil. 4 68 In mid-1999, Enron owned about 65% of
EPE through its wholly owned subsidiary Enron do Brazil Holdings, Ltd
("EBHL"). The remaining 35% was owned by a Shell Oil subsidiary
(22%), and a subsidiary of Transredes, S.A. (13%), an entity in which
Enron held a 25% interest. Enron had the right to appoint three members of
the EPE Board of Directors and the Shell subsidiary had the right to appoint
the fourth.

46 9

Enron sought to reduce its interest in EPE so that it no longer would have
to consolidate it in its financial statements. This would keep off Enron's
books about $200 million in project debt that EPE was preparing to incur.
It also would allow Enron to treat as an arms-length transaction for
accounting purposes a gas supply contract between EPE and Transborder
Gas Services, Ltd ("TGS"), an entity in which Enron had a 72.5%
470
interest.
On September 30, 1999, EBHL sold to LJM Brazil Co. ("LJMB"), a
wholly owned subsidiary of LJM1, 13% of the outstanding equity in EPE
and 10,000 shares of EBHL "preference shares." 4 71 LJMB paid $10.8
million for the EPE equity and $500,000 for the preference shares. Enron
also gave to LJMB its right to appoint one of the members of the EPE
Board. 4 72 As a result of the sale, EBHL (and thus Enron) reduced its
ownership interest in EPE to 52%. Enron concluded that it was appropriate
to deconsolidate EPE from the former's financial statements even though it
owned more than 50% of EPE because, having assigned the right to appoint
one Board member, it no longer had the right to appoint a majority of EPE's
4 73

Board.

As part of the transaction, LJMB assumed obligations to provide a pro
rata share of funds for the Cuiaba project up to $36 million. 474 LJMB was
not required, however, to make any loan or capital contribution under this
obligation unless EBHL loaned the amount to LJMB. As a result,
concluded the Examiner, "any required cash call to EPE by LJMB was in
Reinforcing this protection, LJMB's
effect funded by EBHL. ' ' 475
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preference shares provided that LJMB was to receive the principal amount
that it loaned to EPE and interest on any loan from EBHL to LJMB.
EBHL had the exclusive right to market the EPE interests, although
LJMB was permitted after May 10, 2000, to sell those interests to any third
party with the consent of EBHL. If a sale occurred, LJMB was required to
pay EBHL a fee equal to (1) the amount by which the sale proceeds
exceeded $10.8 million (the amount that LJMB had paid for the EPE
interests), less any dividends that had been paid to LJMB, plus (2) the
amount necessary to result in a 13% annual return on LJMB's investment,
to rise to 25% if the sale were after May 10, 2000. Enron South America,
LLC, a wholly owned Enron subsidiary, guaranteed EBHL's obligations to
4 76
LJMB.

EBHL was unable to find a purchaser for the EPE interests. On March
28, 2001, it therefore agreed to repurchase those interests from LJMB for
477
$13.2 million, and to redeem the EBHL preference shares for $800,000.

The Examiner noted that "[i]t has been suggested" that this transaction was
pursuant to "an undisclosed verbal agreement with LJMB to repurchase the
EPE Interests." 47 8 He stated, however, that, despite this allegation by an
Enron employee, he "is not aware of any evidence of such an agreement
other than" a cryptic entry on the Enron's Chief Accounting Officer's
calendar referring to a meeting with Andrew Fastow regarding "Global
479
Galactic."
Nonetheless, the Examiner concluded that "LJMB never had any
significant risk with respect to the EPE Interests and that the sole purpose
for the Cuiaba Sale was to 'warehouse' the EPE Interests with LJMB. ' '480
The Examiner reached this conclusion because the EBHL preference shares
were structured so that the most that LJMB could lose was the equivalent of
3% of the value of the EPE assets. In addition, the repurchase of the EPE
interest provided LJMB with a 13% return on and of its investment, "even
though the market value of the EPE Interests had likely decreased since the
time of the Cuiaba Sale, as evidenced by EBHL's inability to find an
unrelated third party purchaser for the EPE Interests. '48 1 This suggested
that "Enron had agreed to repurchase the EPE Interests from LJMB at a
guaranteed return" 482-which meant that the latter never assumed any of
the risks of ownership in EPE. The warehousing allowed Enron from 19992001 to mark to market $85 million in income from the TGS gas contract in

476. Id. app. L, annex 3, at 6.
477. See infra fig.6 (step 4); see also Second Batson Report, supra note 55, app. L, annex
3, at 7.
478.
479.
480.
481.
482.

Second Batson Report, supra note 55, app. L, annex 3, at 7.
Id. app. L, annex 3, at 11.
Id. app. L, annex 3, at 10.
Id.
Id.
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an ostensibly arms-length transaction with EPE, and to remove $200
483
million of EPE's debt off Enron's balance sheet.
Boyd Carano was the lead V&E attorney on the sale of the EPE interest
to LJMB. Just before the deal was to close, he overheard Enron employee
Cheryl Lipshutz, who represented LJM1 in the Cuiaba transaction, "say
words to the effect that, at the end of the day, Enron would make LJM1
whole in the Cuiaba Transaction. ' '4 84 Carano testified that he spoke with
Enron employee Kent Castleman, who confirmed that he heard Lipshutz
485
make the same remark.
Carano then sought to contact Enron Chief Accounting Officer Rick
Causey to confirm that there was no such agreement. He did not speak
directly to Causey, but Castleman confirmed to Carano that Causey denied
that any such agreement existed.
Carano evidently felt that this
confirmation was sufficiently crucial that he saved for two years two voice
mail messages from Castleman stating that there was no "make whole"
agreement. 4 86 Lipshutz later told the Powers Committee that there was
487
such an understanding between Fastow and Causey.

483.
484.
485.
486.
487.

Id. app. L, annex 3, at 14; see also infra fig.6 (steps 2-3).
Final Batson Report, supra note 75, app. C, at 122-23.
Id. app. C, at 123 n.525.
Id. app. C, at 123 n.528.
Id. app. C, at 123.
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FIGURE 6: CUIABA TRANSACTION

(1)

(2)
(3)
(4)

On September 30, 1999, EBHL sells a 13% interest in EPE to
LJMB for $10.8 million, and 10,000 EBHL preference shares
for $500,000. LJMB obtains the right to appoint one EPE
Board member.
Enron deconsolidates EPE from its financial statements.
Enron records $85 million income from TGS Gas Contract
1999-2001.
On March 28, 2001, EBHL repurchases a 13% interest in EPE
from LJMB for $13.2 million, and redeems EBHL preference
shares for $800,000.
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When Enron repurchased the EPE shares from LJMB, Carano asked
Castleman whether the repurchase created the need to unwind the earlier
accounting that Enron had used for the Cuiaba transaction. Castleman
4 88
replied that it was a "close call," but that there was no need to do so.
The Examiner found no basis for any claims by Enron against V&E for
its work on the Cuiaba transaction. While he did not say so explicitly, he
presumably believed that Carano had responded appropriately to the
possibility of a make-whole agreement by seeking clarification from higher
authority within Enron, up to the company's Chief Accounting Officer.
The fact that Carano saved the voicemails confirming the absence of an
agreement indicates the significance that he attached to this issue.
Questions and Discussion
Suppose that Carano had asked Lipshutz directly about her remark, and
that she had laughed and replied, "Oh, that's a running joke around here."
Could he then continue his work on the transaction under the assumption
that there was no make-whole agreement? Or did he have an obligation to
seek clarification from higher authority?
Does Carano's preservation of the two voicemails from Castleman
suggest that Carano had some lingering unease about the transaction? That
he anticipated that an occasion might arise when his work on the deal might
be questioned on the ground that the transaction was not genuinely a sale?
If so, should he have done anything else? Or is the possibility that the bona
fides of a transaction might be subject to challenge simply a risk that every
lawyer takes?

Apart from the issue of the make-whole agreement, the Examiner found
that the terms of the transaction effectively shielded LJMB from any risk
associated with ownership of the EPE interest. If Carano worked on the
transaction, is it proper to infer that he was aware of this? Does that depend
on the particular tasks that he performed on the deal? If he did not know,
should he have? Does it matter whether he knew of the accounting benefits
that Enron gained from the transaction?
Finally, was the question whether Enron's purchase of the EPE shares
required Enron to unwind the earlier accounting an accounting or a legal
issue? If it was a "close call," as Castleman told Carano, should Carano
have satisfied himself that reversing the accounting was unnecessary,
instead of relying on Castleman's judgment? It is unclear if Castleman was
a lawyer. If he was, does that suggest that Carano regarded the issue as a
legal one? If he was not, does that support a claim that the issue was an
accounting one, with respect to which it was reasonable for Carano to rely
on Castleman's opinion?

488. Id. app. C, at 123 n.530.
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VII. CHEWCO

A. Background
One of the first SPEs that Enron created was Chewco, formed in late
1997 to acquire the California Public Employees' Retirement System
("CalPERS") interest in Joint Energy Development Investments ("JEDI"),
4 89
which was an investment partnership in which Enron was a partner.
Enron wanted to arrange for CalPERS to divest its interest in JEDI so that
the pension fund could participate in another investment partnership with
Enron. 490 Enron did not want to purchase CalPERS' interest outright,
because that would require that JEDI be consolidated with Enron's financial
statements.
491
Enron initially sought outside investors to take the place of CalPERS.
This effort was unsuccessful by late 1997, and Enron was anxious that JEDI
be able to engage in transactions before the end of the year. Enron thus
proposed that Enron officers and employees would invest in an entity that
would assume the role of partner with Enron in JEDI by year's end. This
entity was known as Chewco. As long as there was three percent equity
investment in Chewco by outside investors, and Enron did not control the
entity, Chewco and JEDI did not have to be consolidated with Enron's
financial statements.
B. Issue One: Enron Officer Involvement in Chewco
Enron's Legal Department met with V&E lawyers in early September
1997 to discuss the formation of Chewco. 492 The meeting included
discussion of possible conflict of interest and disclosure issues stemming
from Enron officers' and employees' participation in Chewco. At this time,
Enron was considering permitting Enron CFO Andrew Fastow to invest in
Chewco.

49 3

V&E advised Enron that Fastow's participation would require that the
Board of Directors be notified, and that the Board waive the Code of
Conduct provision relating to potential conflicts of interest resulting from
Fastow's involvement in an entity engaged in business dealings with Enron.
In addition, since Fastow was considered an "executive officer" of the
company under SEC regulations, his participation
in Chewco would have to
49 4
be disclosed in Enron's public filings.
Following the September meeting, Enron suspended work by V&E on
the Chewco matter until Enron and CalPERS could resolve their

489.
490.
491.
492.
493.
494.

Second Batson Report, supra note 55, app. L, annex 1, at 1.
Id.
Id. app. L, annex 3, at 4.
Id.
Final Batson Report, supra note 75, app. C, at 111.
Id.
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disagreements on the terms on which CalPERS would be bought out.4 95 In
October 1997, V&E's work on the Chewco transaction resumed. On
October 31, Enron in-house lawyers sent to V&E a diagram of the proposed
transaction. It listed the manager and owner of Chewco as William Kopper,
a vice president in the Global Capital (later Global Finance) unit of Enron,
and an immediate subordinate of Fastow. When Astin learned of Kopper's
planned involvement, he discussed its ramifications with Rex Rogers and
two other Enron in-house lawyers working on Chewco, and also left a voice
496
mail message for General Counsel James Derrick about Kopper's role.
Enron's understanding at that time was that Kopper was not an
"executive officer" under SEC regulations, and that his involvement in
Chewco therefore did not have to be reported in Enron's public filings.
Kopper' s participation did, however, require that the Chairman of the Enron
Board, CEO Kenneth Lay, evaluate Kopper's participation with reference to
497
the company's Code of Conduct.
Lawyers in Enron's Legal Department told V&E attorney Ronald Astin
that they would handle application of the Code of Conduct and
consideration of whether the Enron Board should be informed of Kopper's
participation. For reasons that are unclear, Kopper's involvement in
Chewco was disclosed in Enron's 1999 Form 10-K, but not in its Form 10K for 1997, 1998, and 2000. The Examiner concluded that it should have
been disclosed in those years as well. 498 In addition, the Examiner found
no evidence that Kopper's potential conflict was raised as an issue with
Chairman Kenneth Lay, or that Kopper's involvement in Chewco was ever
499
disclosed to the Enron Board.

Questions and Discussion
Was the use of Kopper instead of Fastow as manager and owner of
Chewco a creative way to avoid having to disclose Kopper's involvement in
Enron's public filings? Or was it problematic in light of the underlying
purpose of the requirement that a company disclose transactions involving
"executive officers"? Would it make a difference if Kopper were not a
subordinate of Fastow? If V&E believed that Enron was wrong in
concluding that Kopper was not an executive officer whose involvement
did not have to be disclosed, what should it have done? Defer to Enron as
long as there was a colorable, even if not persuasive, ground for the
company's position? If V&E believed that not disclosing Kopper's
involvement in Enron's public filings was plausibly permissible but unwise,
what should it have done?

495.
496.
497.
498.
499.

Id. app. C, at 112.
Id. app. C, at 112-13.
Second Batson Report, supra note 55, app. L, annex 1, at 5.
Id. app. L, annex 1, at 27.
Final Batson Report, supra note 75, app. C, at 113.
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Did V&E have any continuing obligations with respect to Chewco once
Enron's Legal Department said that it would handle any issues relating to
conflict of interest issues with respect to Kopper? What if V&E learned
after the Board meeting that the Board had not been informed of Kopper's
participation in Chewco?
C. Issue Two: Three Percent Outside Equity
Capital for Chewco eventually came primarily from a $240 million loan
to Chewco from Barclays, 500 guaranteed by Enron, 50 1 for which Chewco
paid Enron a fee, 50 2 a small contribution by Kopper to Chewco's general
partner, 50 3 and an ostensible three percent equity investment from
Chewco's limited partner.50 4 Funding for the latter took the form of an
$11.4 million contribution by Barclays Bank to the limited partner. 505 This
was structured formally as equity rather than debt in that the limited partner
was required to pay "yield" on "certificates" to Barclays rather than interest
on a loan. 506 Under the accounting rules at the time dealing with special
purpose entities, this allowed Barclays to characterize the advance as a loan
for business purposes and Enron and Chewco to characterize it as an equity
contribution for the purpose of the three percent outside equity requirement.
As equity, therefore, Barclay's contribution was supposed to be at risk,
rather than entitled to guaranteed repayment as would be the case with a
loan.
Barclays insisted, however, that Chewco's limited partner set aside a
reserve account of $6.6 million at closing of the transaction that was
pledged to secure repayment of its $11.4 million contribution. 50 7 JEDI sold
one of its assets, and gave Chewco its share of the proceeds, which
amounted to $16.6 million. 508 Enron and Chewco then agreed that Chewco
could use this money to fund the $6.6 million reserve account. 50 9 The
consequence of this was that $6.6 million of Barclay's contribution was not
at risk, and thus should not have been treated as equity. This had the effect
of reducing the outside equity in Chewco and JEDI below the three percent
required to avoid consolidating those two entities with Enron's financial
statements.
Arthur Andersen apparently was unaware of this reserve fund at the time
the transaction closed. When it learned of it in the fall of 2001, it
500. See infra fig.7 (step 1); see also Second Batson Report, supra note 55, app. L, annex
1, at 7.
501. See infra fig.7 (step 2).
502. See infra fig.7 (step 3).
503. See infra fig.7 (step 4).
504. See infra fig.7 (step 6); see also Second Batson Report, supra note 55, app. L, annex
1, at 10.
505. See infra fig.7 (step 5).
506. Second Batson Report, supra note 55, app. L, annex 1, at 11-13.
507. Id. app. L, annex 1, at 12.
508. See infra fig.7 (step 7).
509. See infra fig.7 (step 8).
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determined that Chewco and JEDI should have been consolidated in
Enron's financial statements beginning in November 1997. This resulted in
a reduction in income for the third quarter of 2001 of $400 million, and a
$800 million reduction in equity and $600 million increase in indebtedness
5
as of December 31, 2000. 10
The Examiner noted that V&E's Spradling and the Enron in-house
lawyers working on Chewco knew that three percent outside equity needed
to be maintained in Chewco to avoid consolidation of JEDI. He stated,
however, that these lawyers "appear to have relied on the accountants'
involvement in and approval of the structure to insure that the 3% equity
'511
requirement was satisfied.
An associate at V&E who worked with Spradling on the Chewco matter
drafted the "side letter" establishing the reserve account that resulted in a
violation of the three percent outside equity requirement. The Examiner
said, however, that he had "not found evidence" that either the associate or
the partner working with him "had sufficient experience with such
transaction structures to appreciate the significance of the reserve accounts
' '512
on the consolidation of JEDI.

510. Second Batson Report, supra note 55, app. L, annex 1, at 2-3.
511. Final Batson Report, supra note 75, app. C, at 113-14.
512. Id. app. C, at 114.

1242

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
FIGURE

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)

[Vol. 74

7: CHEWCO TRANSACTION STRUCTURE

Barclays contributes $240 million to Chewco.
Enron guarantees Barclays's $240 million contribution.
Chewco pays Enron for the guarantee.
The General Partner of Chewco controlled by Kopper and
Dobson contributes $115,000 to Chewco for its partnership
interest.
Barclays advances $11.4 million to Chewco's limited partner,
controlled first by Kopper, then Dodson, ostensibly
representing a three percent outside equity at risk in Chewco.
Chewco's limited partner contributes $11.4 million to Chewco
in return for a partnership interest.
JEDI sells an asset, and gives Chewco $16.6 million as its share
of proceeds.
Chewco uses $6.6 million of proceeds to establish a reserve
account as security for repayment of Barclays's $11.4 million
contribution.
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Questions and Discussion
Was the V&E partner who supervised the associate who worked on the
side letter negligent in not recognizing the significance of the letter? Was
the firm negligent in not ensuring that someone with sufficient expertise to
recognize its significance was in charge of the matter? Was there anyone at
the firm who understood all the elements of the transaction?
As the Examiner noted, the lawyers working on Chewco relied on the
accountants for assurance that the three percent outside equity requirement
was satisfied. The accountants, however, apparently did not know of the
side letter. It is likely that they assumed that the lawyers had brought to
their attention all of the legal information necessary for them to make an
accounting judgment. In these circumstances, who is to blame for the
failure to meet the outside equity requirement? The Chewco structure was
established quickly under considerable time pressure. Is it possible that no
one fully understood all its components? Might Enron have been aware of
this confusion and used it to its advantage? Or should the in-house lawyer
overseeing the transaction have assumed responsibility for fully
understanding all aspects of the deal?
Finally, note that accounting rules apparently permitted Barclays to treat
its contribution to Chewco as a loan and Chewco and Enron to treat it as
equity. In the midst of this officially sanctioned manipulability, would the
side letter establishing the reserve account necessarily set off alarms that
there no longer was three percent equity at risk in Chewco?
CONCLUSION

The Examiner's analyses of each of the matters that I have discussed
provide a rare window into the texture and dynamics of transactional
practice. While events unfolded differently in each case, there are some
common features and patterns that suggest some of the characteristic issues
that transactional lawyers must confront, and the judgments that they must
make, in the course of their practice.
Perhaps most striking, the Enron attorneys in these matters repeatedly
had to assess, even if only implicitly, the relationship between legal form
and economic substance. In some respects, creative deployment of legal
form is the transactional lawyer's stock in trade. Regulatory, tax, or
practical business considerations may suggest that deals with identical
economic results be structured differently in order to take advantage or
avoid the consequences of particular legal forms. The lawyer who practices
in this field thus almost inevitably encounters-indeed, helps createdivergences between form and substance. The law usually tolerates such
divergences as long as transactions meet certain formal requirements.
There is, however, an outer limit to such tolerance, as we see in the
Examiner's report and the case law that he discusses. Sometimes the
divergence between form and substance is so great that the law will not
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honor the form that parties have chosen. At some point, in other words, the
law concludes that creativity has crossed the line and becomes abuse.
Exactly where that line is, however, can be difficult to say. Courts take into
account a variety of factors in a determination that ultimately is based on
considerations of equity. A transactional lawyer thus must have one eye on
technical legal requirements and another on more amorphous and openended equitable concerns.
For this reason, acting solely as a legal
technician may not serve the client's interest.
To varying degrees, a divergence between form and substance existed in
each of the matters with respect to which the Examiner concluded that
Enron might have a cause of action against its attorneys. In the FAS 140
transactions, Enron's guarantee of the loan to the SPE took the form of a
Total Return Swap, a complex financial arrangement formally designed to
hedge market risks rather than provide complete assurance of the return of
capital. 5 13 In substance, however, the Swap meant that Enron effectively
advanced the money that the Asset LLC had used to purchase assets from it.
In addition, the decision to prepay the SPE's loan and unwind the
transaction formally lay with the SPE investors, who were under no legal
obligation to accept Enron's offer to buy them out. In practice, however,
Enron always was able to purchase their interest and ultimately unwind the
transaction when it wanted to.
In Project Nahanni, $500 million passed from Citigroup to Nahanni to
Marengo to Enron, and then back again, in a series of transactions that took
the form of a loan, a purchase of Treasury securities, a capital contribution
to a partnership, the sale of the Treasury securities, a loan of the proceeds in
return for a demand note, a repayment of that loan, a redemption of a
partnership interest, and a repayment to the original lender. Each step met
the necessary formal requirements along the way, but the Examiner
concluded that, taken together, they served no substantive business
5 14
purpose.
In Sundance Industrial, an Enron entity transferred assets to Salomon in a
transaction explicitly structured to meet the technical requirements for a
sale. Despite the formal existence of a put and call agreement between the
parties, however, the Examiner concluded that the ability to act on this
agreement was so constrained that in substance it was a nullity.
Furthermore, despite the formal transfer of assets, the Examiner found that
Salomon had no genuine business reason for acquiring the assets. He
therefore concluded that no genuine sale had taken place. 515
In the RhythmsNet and Raptors supposed hedges, Enron had formal
agreements with SPEs to pay it amounts that would preserve the value of its
merchant investments. In substance, however, the assets that the SPE's had
available to meet these obligations came from Enron, so that Enron received

513. See supra Part III.B-C.
514. See supra Part IV.
515. See supra Part V.
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no genuine economic benefit from these arrangements. In considering
disclosure of Andrew Fastow's compensation from LJM transactions,
Enron's lawyers were able to construct a rationale for avoiding disclosure
through technical compliance with regulations. The Examiner found,
however, that the lawyers deliberately avoided obtaining information that
might have made the technical basis for nondisclosure unavailable. More
generally, the Examiner said that they had notice that Fastow's
compensation was substantial, and that disclosure of it therefore was
material both to investors and to Enron itself. 516
The relationship between form and substance also was salient in
transactions in which the Examiner found no potential attorney liability. In
the Talon Raptor putative hedge, Talon obtained $41 million by providing
Enron a put on Enron stock, and then distributed this to LJM2 before it
began its hedging activity. An Enron executive admitted in his plea
agreement, however, that the put served no economic purpose under the
circumstances. It was designed simply to provide LJM2 with a guaranteed
return on its contribution to Talon-which effectively meant that there no
longer was the three percent outside equity necessary for Enron to avoid
consolidating Talon into its financial statements. One V&E lawyer
recognized at the time that such divergence between form and substance
might raise this problem, but received reassurance that it was not a
5 17
concern.
Similarly, a V&E lawyer in the Cuiaba transaction heard a comment by
an Enron employee that seemed to indicate that the transfer of assets to
LJMB might not be a genuine sale because Enron had promised to
repurchase the assets if another buyer could not be found. He sought and
received confirmation that no such agreement existed. Later, however, the
51 8
employee in question testified that such an agreement was in place.
Finally, in the Chewco transaction Enron substituted William Kopper for
Andrew Fastow as manager and owner of Chewco, based on the contention
that Kopper was not an "executive officer" whose involvement had to be
disclosed in Enron's public filings. Kopper, however, reported directly to
Fastow, and it was clear that in substance Fastow would be taking an active
role in Chewco's affairs. In addition, funding for Chewco's ostensible three
percent equity came from a contribution from Barclays. This contribution
was structured formally as equity rather than debt. A side letter establishing
a reserve account to cover some of this contribution, however, served to
guarantee repayment of some of this amount-which in substance nullified
5 19
its formal status as equity.
In all these instances, a divergence between form and substance either
was the basis for finding possible attorney liability, or at least raised

516.
517.
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potentially troublesome questions. A second pattern in the events that the
Examiner described is that there were various ways in which the lawyers
were able either to miss, avoid confronting, or rationalize away
disconcerting facts. The first element of this pattern may be the most
important. This is that the law's wide tolerance of some divergence
between legal form and economic substance helps create a background
assumption that such divergence is normal and not problematic.
Transactional lawyers likely take this as a working premise, which means
that it may require something strikingly out of the ordinary for them to
conclude that things are amiss.
Lawyers' abilities to recognize that this moment has occurred can be
hindered by several influences. One is specialization. Large transactions
may involve teams of lawyers who focus on specific, relatively narrow
aspects of the deal. These lawyers may obtain only fragmentary knowledge
of the larger picture, and thus not be in a position to learn troublesome
facts. Furthermore, even if they become aware of the details of the overall
transaction, they may well be inclined to insist that their responsibility is
limited to the discrete task that they are being called upon to perform.
Thus, for instance, the Examiner found that, while V&E tax attorney
Edward Osterberg did not help structure the RhythmsNet "hedge," he had
enough information to know that it provided no genuine economic benefit
to Enron. 5 20 Osterberg, however, might contend that his responsibility was
confined to providing advice on the tax aspects of the transaction, and it
was up to others to assess the overall economic consequences of the deal.
In addition, even if facts come to the attention of a specialist, he may not
fully appreciate their significance because he is focused only on those that
are relevant to performing his task. Specialization, in other words, can
create a cognitive filter that influences what a lawyer perceives. As a tax
lawyer, for example, Osterberg had some familiarity with the concepts of
"business purpose" and "economic substance." This may have led the
Examiner to find that he was potentially liable to Enron. His inclination to
scrutinize a transaction closely in terms of these concepts, however, might
be activated only in transactions that resulted in substantial tax benefits for
the client.
Furthermore, suppose that Osterberg had been instead an intellectual
property specialist working on certain licensing issues in connection with
the transaction. As someone whose work typically required less attention to
business purpose than did a tax lawyer's, would he be in as good a position
to assess the significance of the facts in the Rhythms hedge as the Examiner
believes Osterberg was?
A factor with effects similar to specialization is the desire to routinize
certain legal work. Once the first in a planned series of similar transactions
closes, successive transactions generally require less intensive and creative
attention. Much of the work can become more predictable and routine,
520. See supra notes 362-64 and accompanying text.
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which means that it can be handed over to junior lawyers who need exercise
only minimal discretion. This practice can be efficient for both clients
attempting to hold down legal costs and law firms who must respond to this
desire in a competitive legal services market. The result may be that many
lawyers work on transactions with only a general appreciation of their broad
outlines and business purposes.
One example may be the side letter establishing a reserve fund for
Barclays in the Chewco transaction. This reserve fund ultimately forced the
company to consolidate JEDI retroactively into its financial statements back
to 1997, and to restate its financial statements for the period 1997 through
2001. The result for this period was a reduction in net income of $508
million, a decrease in shareholders' equity by $2.1 billion, and an increase
in debt of almost $2.6 billion.5 2 1 The impact of the side letter therefore was
disastrous. With respect to potential attorney liability, however, the
Examiner found that the letter was drafted by attorneys who may not have
been aware of its significance for the larger transaction. It is conceivable
that drafting the letter by itself was a relatively straightforward exercise,
which V&E decided could be handled by a junior lawyer who made only
this small contribution to the transaction.
Another way that lawyers can avoid confronting unpleasant issues is to
defer to the judgments of other professionals who tend to work with them
on complex business transactions. One group of professionals particularly
salient in the Enron events is accountants. Accounting and legal issues can
be intricately intertwined and difficult to untangle. This ambiguity creates
an opportunity for a lawyer to convince herself that an issue about which
she has some concern ultimately requires an accounting rather than a legal
judgment. Recall, for instance, the instruction of one V&E lawyer to
another with respect to whether the Talon distribution to LJM2 put Talon in
noncompliance with the three percent outside equity requirement: "[G]o
check, make sure everybody's comfortable with the accounting and then,
522
you know, it doesn't sound like a legal issue."
A lawyer may tell herself that as long as she provides accurate
information about the law, it is up to the accountants to determine what
accounting treatment is appropriate and how it can be defended-even if
the lawyer may disagree with it. Thus, for example, when asked for a true
issuance rather than true sale opinion in connection with the FAS 140
transactions, V&E lawyers eventually concluded that as long as the
accountants understood the parameters of the opinion, it was up to them to
determine whether a true issuance opinion was sufficient to justify FAS 140
accounting treatment. Similarly, A&K lawyers asked whether prepayments
that occurred soon after putative FAS 140 sales might jeopardize the

521. See Powers Report, supra note 333, at 3.
522. Final Batson Report, supra note 75, app. C, at 141.
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transactions, but, as the Examiner noted, appeared to regard this as an
523
accounting, rather than a legal, issue.
Another similar inclination is to characterize an issue as calling for a
business, rather than legal, judgment. The comments to the ethical rules say
explicitly that when business managers make decisions for the organization,
"the decisions ordinarily must be accepted by the lawyer even if their utility
or prudence is doubtful. Decisions concerning policy and operations,
including ones entailing serious risk, are not as such in the lawyer's
province." 5 24 To repeat an earlier point, a lawyer might claim that as long
as he provides accurate information about the law, it is up to the business
executive to weigh legal against other considerations. Thus, for instance,
an Enron inside lawyer concluded that the Raptors provided accounting but
not economic benefits to the company, and advised Enron that it was
"trading economics for accounting and that was a bad trade." 525 By "bad,"
however, he apparently meant "unwise" rather than "illegal," and thus
ultimately deferred to executives' judgment on the matter.
The tendency to characterize an issue as calling only for business
judgment can operate even when a lawyer cautions that conduct may violate
the law. The most that a lawyer often may be able to say is that there is a
certain probability that activity might be found illegal, rather than that it is
absolutely certain. Contemplated behavior thus may carry some risk of
running afoul of the law, but not be definitively illegal. In these
circumstances, a lawyer may rationalize that whether the risks of illegality
are outweighed by other benefits calls for business, not legal, judgment.
This is an approach to legal compliance that is controversial, but it does
have support in some quarters. 526 A lawyer's adoption of it can be a way of
trying to deflect responsibility for a client's actions even when there is a
good chance that they are illegal.
Finally, a variant on deference to business judgment is to claim that the
lawyer does not fully understand, and is not responsible for understanding,
the business purposes that animate and the economic consequences that
flow from a given transaction. The lawyer is entitled to assume that the
523. Id. app. C, at 60 n.204.
524. See Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.13 cmt.3 (2005).
525. Final Batson Report, supra note 75, app. C, at 144.
526. The federal indictment of individuals in connection with certain KPMG tax shelter
opinions, for instance, alleged that a KPMG executive urged the firm not to register the
shelters as required by the Internal Revenue Service because "the IRS penalties applicable to
a failure to register would be dwarfed by the lucrative fees KPMG stood to collect from
selling unregistered tax shelters." Sealed Indictment at 25, United States v. Stein, 05 Cr. 888
(S.D.N.Y.

Aug.

24,

2005),

available

at

http://www.quatloos.com/KPMG-individualslND.pdf.
The indictment further alleges,
"Moreover, KPMG's office of general counsel, among others, advised that by deciding not
to register tax shelters, KPMG risked criminal prosecution, but... advised that KPMG's tax
leadership could nevertheless make a business decision to not register the activity as a tax
shelter." Id. at 26 (internal quotation omitted). For a description and critique of this
approach, see Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Compliance with the Law in the Era of

Efficiency, 76 N.C. L. Rev. 1265 (1998).
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client has a good business reason for wanting to enter into the transaction,
and need not become an expert in the intricacies of the company's business
operations. Indeed, the claim may be, it is impossible in an era of rapid
technological change for lawyers to be fully informed about all their clients'
business activities.
Increasing legal specialization may lend some support to this claim. The
most effective corporate lawyers, however, understand their clients'
business goals and market themselves to companies as partners in devising
strategies to accomplish them. This requires appreciation not only of how
the company makes money, but of how various activities will be treated for
accounting purposes. 527 It is unlikely, for instance, that outside counsel
who represented Enron presented themselves to the company as proficient
legal technicians who confined their advice to discrete points of law. That
is not the way to win a large amount of business from a major corporation.
Furthermore, to bring us full circle, a transactional lawyer must always
consider the possibility, however remote, that the law will not honor legal
form because it diverges too far from economic substance. In order to
assess this possibility, the lawyer must know what the client hopes to
achieve from a transaction and whether the economic consequences that
will result are consistent with that desire. The background constraint of
equity thus makes ignorance a dangerous claim.
Teaching Enron therefore can yield valuable insights if we have the
patience to examine the complex transactions in which the company
engaged and the lawyers who worked on them. This Article has tried to
make this process easier by summarizing some of these transactions, and by
recounting the Examiner's analysis of the lawyers' activities.
I am well aware that the discussion raises at least as many questions as it
answers. Still, asking the right questions is an important feature of effective
teaching. By prompting reflection and even some discomfort, it can move
us closer to a more nuanced appreciation of the world that transactional
lawyers inhabit and the kinds of judgments, both practical and ethical, that
they must make. To reiterate an earlier point, to understand is not
necessarily to forgive. In order to condemn or to forgive, however, we first
must understand.

527. Lawrence A. Cunningham, Sharing Accounting's Burden: Business Lawyers in
Enron's Dark Shadows, 57 Bus. Law. 1421 (2002).
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